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United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

**NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
MULTIPLE PROPERTY DOCUMENTATION FORM**

This form is used for documenting multiple property groups relating to one or several historic contexts. See instructions in *How to Complete the Multiple Property Documentation Form* (National Register Bulletin 16B). Complete each item by entering the requested information. For additional space, use continuation sheets (Form 10-900-a). Use a typewriter, word processor, or computer to complete all items.

New Submission Amended Submission

A. Name of Multiple Property Listing

The Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources

B. Associated Historic Contexts

(Name each associated historic context, identifying theme, geographical area, and chronological period for each.)

The Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources

C. Form Prepared by

name/title John S. Salmon
organization Virginia Department of Historic Resources
street & number 2801 Kensington Avenue telephone 804-367-2323 ext. 117
city or town Richmond state VA zip code 23221

D. Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60 and the Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation. (See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

H. Alexander Wise Jr. 12/28/99
Signature and title of certifying official Date

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HISTORIC RESOURCES
State or Federal agency and bureau

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Signature of the Keeper _____ Date _____

Table of Contents for Written Narrative

Provide the following information on continuation sheets. Cite the letter and the title before each section of the narrative. Assign page numbers according to the instructions for continuation sheets in *How to Complete the Multiple Property Documentation Form* (National Register Bulletin 16B). Fill in page numbers for each section in the space below.

E. Statement of Historic Contexts (Document historic contexts on one or more continuation sheets. If more than one historic context is documented, present them in sequential order.)

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F. Associated Property Types (Provide description, significance, and registration requirements on one or more continuation sheets.)

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G. Geographical Data

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H. Summary of Identification and Evaluation Methods (Discuss the methods used in developing the multiple property listing on one or more continuation sheets..)

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I. Major Bibliographical References (List major written works and primary location of additional documentation: State Historic Preservation Office, other State agency, Federal agency, local government, university, or other, specifying repository.)

Bibliography (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form on one or more continuation sheets.)

I-127 — I-133

Previous documentation on file (NPS)

preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested.

previously listed in the National Register

previously determined eligible by the National Register

designated a National Historic Landmark

recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey # _____

recorded by Historic American Engineering Record # _____

Primary Location of Additional Data:

State Historic Preservation Office

Other State agency

Federal agency

Local government

University

Other

Name of repository: _____

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E. STATEMENT OF HISTORIC CONTEXTS

BACKGROUND

Virginia (excluding present-day West Virginia) is divided into several geographical and cultural regions. The geographical regions include Tidewater, a relatively flat area from the coast (including the Eastern Shore) west to the “fall line,” from which the rolling terrain of the Piedmont then extends to the Blue Ridge Mountains. West of the Blue Ridge lies the “Breadbasket of the Confederacy,” the Shenandoah Valley (from Lexington north to Harper’s Ferry, West Virginia), and the Valley of Virginia (south of Lexington to about present-day Roanoke). The valleys are bounded on the west by the Appalachian Mountains, which extend past Roanoke through a cultural region called Southwest Virginia. Other cultural regions include the Southside, which lies in Tidewater and the Piedmont between the James River and North Carolina, and the Northern Neck, a colonial proprietary located in Tidewater and Piedmont north of the Rappahannock River.

At the time of the Civil War, Virginia was a predominantly rural state. Several large urban areas existed, however, including Richmond, the state capital and capital of the Confederacy; Alexandria, a major port on the Potomac River opposite Washington, D.C.; Fredericksburg, located halfway between the two capitals; Lynchburg, the industrial center of the Piedmont; Norfolk and Portsmouth, large Tidewater ports near the entrances to the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean; and Petersburg, an important port town on the Appomattox River about thirty miles south of Richmond. Few other commercial and industrial centers existed in the state except for the county seats, which varied in size from bustling large towns such as Winchester and Staunton to small hamlets such as Charlotte Court House and Appomattox Court House. Most industrial sites, including gristmills and ironworks, were scattered over the countryside or stood on the fringes of small towns and villages.

By mid-century, a growing network of railroads and turnpikes—in addition to preexisting, notoriously poor roads—linked towns, cities, and industrial centers. Strategically, the railroads held the greatest importance for the contending armies. Among the most significant railroads were the Orange and Alexandria, between Alexandria and Gordonsville, in Orange County; the Manassas Gap, between Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria in Prince William County to Mount Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley; the Virginia Central, between Richmond and Covington in the Allegheny Mountains by way of Gordonsville and Charlottesville; the Virginia and Tennessee, between Lynchburg and the Tennessee line through the Valley of Virginia and Southwest Virginia; the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac between Richmond and Aquia Landing on the Potomac River; the Richmond and York River; the Richmond and Danville; the Richmond and Petersburg; the Petersburg (often called the Weldon), between Petersburg and Weldon, North Carolina; and the South Side, between Petersburg and Lynchburg by way of Appomattox Station. The most important highways were the Valley Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 11) between Winchester and Staunton, and the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike (various county roads and U.S. Rte. 250). Many of the railroads and turnpikes passed through mountain gaps, further enhancing their strategic value.

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Most of the Civil War campaigns in Virginia were conducted along the principal transportation routes. The Manassas campaign of 1861 and the Northern Virginia campaign of 1862 were focused on the vitally important Manassas Junction. During the Peninsula and Seven Days' campaigns of 1862, the Union army relied on the Richmond and York River Railroad as well as Federal shipping on the York and James Rivers for supplies and troop transportation. The Shenandoah Valley campaigns of 1862 and 1864–1865 took place on the Valley Turnpike, the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike, and other turnpikes and roads in the region. Most of the battles of the Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg campaigns of 1862–1863 were fought at river crossings and on turnpikes. During the Bristoe Station campaign in 1863, most of the fighting occurred on or near the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as well as on major highways. Turnpikes, road intersections, railroads, and rail junctions comprised key objectives during the Overland, Richmond and Petersburg, Southwest Virginia, and Appomattox campaigns in 1864–1865.

MANASSAS CAMPAIGN

The long-simmering sectional crisis over slavery in the United States reached the boiling point after the election of Abraham Lincoln as president in November 1860. Even before Lincoln's inauguration, several Southern states that felt threatened by his anti-slavery views summoned delegates to consider secession from the Union. Virginia convened a special session of the General Assembly on 7 January 1861; on 19 January, the legislature called for the election on 4 February of delegates to a statewide convention. The delegates first met on 13 February but delayed action until the results of a peace conference chaired by former president John Tyler in Washington were known. Although the conference failed and Lincoln's inaugural address was poorly received in the South, the delegates still defeated a motion to recommend secession to the voters. Then came the attack on Fort Sumter in South Carolina by Confederate forces.

The United States garrison at Fort Sumter formally surrendered on 14 April. In Washington the next day, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers to uphold the laws of the United States. The announcement galvanized secession conventions in several Southern states. Seven states—South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas—had left the Union even before the fall of Sumter. Virginia seceded on 17 April, followed by Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee.

The seceding states joined the Confederate States of America, which had been formed in Montgomery, Alabama, on 4 February 1861. Five days later, the Confederate Provisional Congress elected as president Jefferson Davis, who had recently resigned as Mississippi's United States senator. He was inaugurated on 18 February. Late in May, seeking to be close to the anticipated theater of war, the Confederate government moved from Montgomery to Richmond, Virginia.

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In Washington, Gen. Winfield Scott commanded the United States Army. Born near Petersburg, Virginia, on 13 June 1786, Scott had fought in every American war since the War of 1812, becoming a national hero. Junior officers, who referred to him as "Old Fuss and Feathers," thought Scott too old and settled in his ways to organize a huge, modern army. They were right, but Scott was astute enough to formulate the Union grand strategy, popularly known as the Anaconda Plan. Blockade the Southern coast, said Scott, cut off the West by securing the Mississippi River, and use the border states as a buffer, thereby strangling the Confederacy and avoiding a costly overland war. Although Lincoln did not adopt Scott's plan at first, eventually it became Federal policy, but in conjunction with the bloody war Scott hoped to evade.

The politicians wanted a quick war, not slow strangulation. The Northern press urged the immediate capture of the Confederate capital with the cry "On to Richmond!" Both presidents prodded their armies into the field, and many citizens on each side predicted that the war would be settled with one large battle.

On 19 April Lincoln ordered the execution of part of Scott's plan, a blockade of Southern ports and harbors from the Rio Grande to the North Carolina–South Carolina border. He extended the blockade on 27 April to include the North Carolina and Virginia coast. The Confederates in Virginia responded quickly by building artillery batteries on the bluffs overlooking the Potomac River to blockade Washington in return. By mid-May, batteries stood at several points along the Potomac, including Aquia Creek in Stafford County and Cockpit Point in Prince William County. The Union answered with the Potomac Flotilla, which consisted of a half-dozen steam-powered vessels. Although the Union vessels kept the Potomac open to military traffic, as long as crews manned the batteries they effectively closed the river to other shipping.

In the meantime, both the Union and Confederate governments strengthened their armies. After the Federals burned the Harpers Ferry armory and abandoned the town on 18 April, Confederate troops began to assemble there. The Confederate government commissioned a professor of artillery and natural philosophy at Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Thomas Jonathan Jackson, a colonel in the Confederate infantry and sent to train the troops at Harpers Ferry. There he began molding them into an army, drilling them incessantly and drawing their ire for his strict discipline. On 15 May the Confederate War Department ordered Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, a widely known and well-respected officer, to assume command of this army. Soon the government promoted Jackson to brigadier general as Johnston's second in command.

The Harpers Ferry pattern was repeated in other parts of Virginia. In Lynchburg, Col. Jubal A. Early raised volunteers and organized them into regiments. Col. Philip St. George Cocke, at first stationed in Alexandria to keep an eye on Washington, moved to Culpeper Court House, near the center of the state, and established a large training camp. Other Southern states raised their own regiments and sent them to Virginia.

Except for a few regular army units, the Union army also had to be created from scratch. Its thousands of new recruits needed training as desperately as their Confederate counterparts. Brig. Gen.

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Irvin McDowell undertook the task, using Arlington House, Gen. Robert E. Lee's residence on the Potomac (actually his wife's home), as his headquarters. He did the gentlemanly thing by living in a tent in the front yard and assuring Mrs. Lee by letter that whenever she returned home she would find nothing out of place. Across the Potomac, Washington became a training camp. Tents covered the Mall, and thousands of Union troops saw their capital for the first time. When they were not drilling, they climbed into the upper stories of the Capitol for the view or visited the Patent Office to admire the patent models. Some of the bolder soldier-tourists, intent on seeing Abraham Lincoln, wandered through the White House, as open to the public as any other government building. Outside the city, in western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, other regiments trained. They became Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's army when the sixty-nine-year-old Irishman gathered them to recapture Harpers Ferry in June.

Patterson, exhibiting all the caution for which Union generals soon became famous, moved on the arsenal late in May. By the time he approached Harpers Ferry, however, Johnston, who had received ample warning, had salvaged the machinery and tools, burned the key buildings, and marched south, up the Shenandoah Valley. He easily eluded Patterson for the next three weeks and camped at Winchester, which he considered a better post than Harpers Ferry anyway.

Meanwhile, Cocks had received orders from Lee, who commanded all state forces from Richmond, to move from Culpeper northeast to Manassas Junction in Prince William County, about thirty miles outside Washington. There, two vitally important railroads met. The Orange & Alexandria Railroad connected Alexandria with Gordonsville, in Orange County, where the Virginia Central Railroad led to Charlottesville. The Manassas Gap Railroad extended from the junction through the Manassas Gap near Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley, less than twenty miles southwest of Winchester, then south to Harrisonburg. If the Confederates held Manassas Junction, they could deny the Federals access to the Shenandoah Valley and central Virginia while protecting the approaches to Richmond and retaining the option to attack Washington via the valley and western Maryland. Conversely, if the Union army seized the junction, it could more easily protect its capital, march on Richmond, and ride the rails westward.

Lee first sent Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham to command the growing force at the junction, then at the end of May supplanted him with Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, who had commanded in Charleston during the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The troop buildup continued, until by mid-July Beauregard had some 22,000 men at the junction.

Responding to Northern pressure, on 3 June Winfield Scott asked McDowell to submit a plan for advancing on Manassas Junction. McDowell complied, hoping that a mere show of force would drive away the Confederates. His plan called for three columns, totaling 39,000 men, to approach the junction by way of the Little River Turnpike (present-day Rte. 236) and the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Patterson, with 18,000 troops, was to prevent Johnston's 12,000-man army from leaving the Shenandoah Valley.

By the time McDowell's army began trudging and sweating its way through the hot, humid Virginia countryside on 16 July, Beauregard knew his plan. Washington remained at heart, after all, a Southern city, and crawled with Confederate spies. The sheer size of McDowell's force—the largest ever to take the field on American soil until then—the heat, and the inexperience of his lieutenants all combined

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to slow its progress to a crawl. By noon the next day McDowell stood at Fairfax Court House, about halfway to his objective. He chose to rest the troops while sending Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler and a reinforced brigade of about 3,000 men on a reconnaissance in force to locate the Confederate eastern flank. Tyler was to avoid an engagement, secure Centreville, scout beyond the village, and report to McDowell. Tyler, like his fellow subordinates, did not care for the younger McDowell, who they regarded as rude and aloof. After Tyler entered Centreville on 18 July and found the Confederates had abandoned it, he pushed on toward Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run. When he approached Blackburn's Ford, he saw only a Confederate battery and a handful of pickets. He did not stop to consider whether the thick underbrush and trees around the ford might conceal more of the enemy's troops. From his hilltop position, he thought he could see Manassas in the distance. He also thought he could see glory, and a chance to grab the credit from McDowell, if he could press on to the junction. He was certain that the Confederates would fall back before his advance, as they had at Centreville. He was wrong.

Tyler began his assault on Blackburn's Ford cautiously, opening with his artillery and gradually committing more and more infantry. On the other side, Brig. Gen. James Longstreet led the brigade that Tyler could not see; Longstreet fed his troops into the fray at a pace matching Tyler's. McDowell, hearing the uproar, rode to the ford, arriving about 4:00 P.M. He angrily ordered Tyler to break off the action and return to Centreville, where he established a new headquarters. Tyler and his men felt frustrated, having fought for hours to little effect. McDowell feared that Tyler's disobedience had ruined his plans to capture Manassas Junction. The Confederates, on the other hand, exulted. They had tested their mettle in a fight and had seen the enemy leave the field. Perhaps they could do it again.

McDowell fumed and revised his plans for the next two days. Far away, in the Shenandoah Valley, Patterson inched south and then pulled back while Johnston made military history. Leaving a young cavalryman, Col. James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart, to screen his movement, the Confederate general led his army out of its defenses at Winchester on 18 July and marched twenty miles southeast to Piedmont Station (present-day Delaplane) on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Jackson led the way, driving his men at a furious pace through the villages of Millwood and Paris. On 19 July Johnston's army began boarding a train of freight and cattle cars for the slow ride to Manassas Junction. It took two days to move all the troops. For the first time in history, a railroad had been used to transport an army to battle.

Once at the junction, however, the army rested. Johnston assumed command and executed Beauregard's scheme to disperse most of their combined force to guard the fords and bridges on Bull Run, northeast of Manassas Junction. At last McDowell, having revised his plan of attack, pressed forward from Centreville at 2:00 A.M. on Sunday, 21 July, beginning the First Battle of Manassas.

His plan called for Tyler to feign an attack on the left of the Confederate line about dawn, while McDowell's main force moved upstream to Sudley Springs Ford, then to cross and strike the enemy's left flank. Tyler executed the feint so poorly, however, that he fooled no one. The Confederate brigades of Col. Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans, Brig. Gen. Bernard Bee, and Col. Francis Bartow detected McDowell's movement to Sudley Springs and countered it at Matthews Hill, south of the ford. Brig. Gen. David Hunter, leading the Union attack was wounded immediately and succeeded by Brig. Gen. Andrew Porter,

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who eventually forced the Confederates off the hill and into retreat toward Henry Hill. Meanwhile, Jackson had led his brigade to the reverse slope of Henry Hill, where it lay hidden from friend and foe alike. Jackson sat on his horse and calmly watched the battle beyond, awaiting orders. When Bee finally saw him, he is said by Virginians to have cried "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall!" and ordered the remnants of his command to rally around the former professor. Although some historians believe anger that Jackson had not come to his aid prompted Bee's remark, most agree that he meant it as a compliment. Regardless of his intention, however, Bee awarded Jackson the *nom de guerre* by which he would be called henceforth, Stonewall.

For the remainder of the battle, Jackson especially merited the name. His brigade, and the others that assembled on Henry Hill, held firm against one Union assault after another. Into the long, hot afternoon the battle raged, until Johnston threw fresh brigades against the Union right and Beauregard ordered a general advance. At 4:00 P.M., the Federal line crumpled and began a retreat that quickly turned to a rout. The undisciplined Union troops raced for the rear, entangling themselves with the carriages of civilians who, equipped with picnic baskets, had driven out from Washington to watch what they thought would be the only battle of the war. All mixed together, spectators and combatants streamed back to the capital in a panicked mob. The victorious Confederates pursued them toward Centreville but, disorganized and exhausted, soon gave up the chase.

For the Union, First Manassas was a demoralizing defeat. Those who had cautioned against sending a green, undisciplined army into the field shouted "I told you so!" at the politicians and newspaper editors who had urged them on. President Lincoln, at least, learned from the experience. Six days after the battle he replaced McDowell with Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, a master of organization who would build and train the army that helped win the war.

On the Confederate side, sadness over the deaths of many commanders, Bee and Bartow foremost among them, tempered the joy of victory. Jefferson Davis and his lieutenants knew that their army—as raw and ill-trained as the Union force—had been fortunate. The courage of the men and their officers contributed more to the victory than did superb generalship, for the Confederate part of the battle had been improvised from beginning to end.

Over the winter both combatants labored to train and supply their armies while keeping an eye on each other. In a futile effort to restore the Union army's tarnished prestige, on 21 October Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone attempted to cross the Potomac at Harrison's Island and capture Leesburg. A timely Confederate counterattack under Col. Nathan Evans drove Stone's force over Ball's Bluff and into the river. The Federals suffered more than seven hundred captured and some two hundred killed, including Col. Edward D. Baker, U.S. Senator from Oregon. For days thereafter, Union corpses floated down the river past Washington.

The Northern army at least won a technical victory on 20 December, however, when Confederate Brig. Gen. Jeb Stuart led a brigade-sized force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery to protect a foraging expedition near Dranesville. Union Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, advancing on the Georgetown Pike,

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encountered Stuart's cavalry. Both sides deployed as more units arrived on the field, and a sharp firefight developed. Stuart withdrew in the mid-afternoon after dispatching his wagons safely to the rear.

These were the last actions of note fought in northern Virginia in 1861. In the spring of 1862 the seat of war in Virginia shifted to the Shenandoah Valley, where Union and Confederate armies vied for control, and to the southeastern part of the state, where McClellan advanced on Richmond from Hampton.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

The present-day preeminence of Robert E. Lee in the Southern—as well as the national—pantheon of Confederate military heroes obscures the fact that for the first two years of the war, Thomas J. Jackson, not Lee, was the idol of the Confederacy. At Manassas, Jackson earned his *nom de guerre* and a reputation for dependability. In the spring of 1862, in the Shenandoah Valley, Stonewall led his men in a campaign that brought him and them international renown and a kind of immortality. Among his colleagues in the service, Lee was better known and highly regarded, but little known to the public. By June 1862, in contrast, Jackson's name was on everyone's lips, military and civilian, Northerner and Southerner and European alike.

Time has not dimmed the luster of Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, especially among military historians. Our national understanding of the military significance of the Shenandoah Valley to the war in Virginia has faded, however, and today the valley is sometimes erroneously considered a sideshow to the "real war" in eastern Virginia. In contrast, during the war both Union and Confederate commanders recognized the significance of the valley and contested hotly for control of the region.

Topography and transportation made the region strategically important. The valley extends from the headwaters of the Shenandoah River near Lexington, Virginia, to its confluence with the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, about 150 miles northeast, and averages about twenty-five miles in width. Because the Shenandoah drains from south to north (that is, the altitude in the south near Lexington is higher than at Harpers Ferry, in the north), one goes "down" the valley heading north and "up" the valley traveling south. The Shenandoah Valley itself angles from southwest to northeast, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge Mountains and on the west by the Appalachian Mountains. From Harrisonburg northeast to Strasburg, however, Massanutten Mountain divides fifty miles of the valley into two smaller valleys to its west (the main valley) and east (the Luray or Page Valley).

The Blue Ridge Mountains are pierced by a series of gaps; at the time of the Civil War, turnpikes or railroads passed through most of the gaps from the east to major towns in the valley. From Harpers Ferry in the north to Waynesboro in the south, the principal gaps in the Blue Ridge, and the turnpikes and railroads that passed through them are Vestal's (now Keys) Gap (Hillsboro & Harpers Ferry Turnpike, present-day Rte. 9); Snicker's Gap (Snicker's Gap Turnpike and the Leesburg & Snicker's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 7); Ashby Gap (Ashby's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 17/50); Manassas Gap (Manassas Gap Railroad, now paralleled by I-66 and Rte. 55); Chester Gap (Front Royal & Gaines's Cross Roads Turnpike, Rte. 522);

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Thornton Gap (Thornton's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 211); Swift Run Gap (Swift Run Gap Turnpike, Rte. 33); Brown's Gap (Brown's Gap Turnpike, Albemarle County Rte. 629 and Rockingham County Rte. 663); and Rockfish Gap (Virginia Central Railroad, Staunton & James River Turnpike, and Rivanna & Rockfish Gap Turnpike, today paralleled by I-64 and Rte. 250).

Several turnpikes and roads ran up and down the Shenandoah Valley, joining most of the turnpikes from the east. The best valley highway, the Valley Turnpike (present-day U.S. Route 11), linked Winchester and Staunton. East of Massanutten Mountain, the Luray and Front Royal Turnpike (present-day Rte. 340) provided a good north-south road between the mountain and the Blue Ridge. Other principal clay roads included the Middle Road, between the turnpike and the Appalachians to the west, and the Back Road, running along the base of the Appalachian range. Today, a series of paved county roads follow the routes of the Middle Road and the Back Road.

The way the valley slants through western Virginia made it an ideal route of invasion for the Confederate army. Movements up or down could be protected from Union attack from the east by guarding the Blue Ridge gaps. The lower or northern end of the valley is only some fifty-five miles from Washington and leads into western Maryland and Pennsylvania. Lee used this route in 1862 and 1863 before and after the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, while Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early employed it in 1864 to occupy Hagerstown and Frederick, Maryland, and to threaten the defenses of Washington.

From the Union perspective, securing the valley was essential to protecting the national capital and avoiding the embarrassment of fighting Southern troops on Northern soil. It also provided a "back door" to Richmond and access to the rear of Lee's army, which Maj. Gen. David Hunter threatened in 1864 until Early drove him into West Virginia.

By March 1862, the string of Confederate victories that began with the First Battle of Manassas had been broken. Union victories in North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri eroded Confederate morale and boosted that of the Union. In and around Washington, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who had reawakened Northern hopes for a great Union victory and a quick end to the war, molded some 150,000 fresh volunteers into a well-equipped and -trained army. Meanwhile, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Confederates abandoned Manassas Junction to defend Richmond, leaving Quaker guns for the enemy and burning a million pounds of beef. His army marched away ill-supplied and hungry as the scent of steak tinged the winter air—a fitting symbol of last year's successes and this year's failures. Southerners were as starved for victories as the troops were for victuals.

McClellan decided against a direct overland campaign from Washington to Richmond, choosing instead an amphibious landing at Fort Monroe and Newport News followed by a march up the Peninsula past Yorktown and Williamsburg to the Confederate capital. Lincoln, anxious for the security of Washington, got a promise from McClellan to protect the city. In February 1862, McClellan detailed the duty to Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks and his corps, then located in western Maryland, but ordered him first to clear the lower Shenandoah Valley of Confederates by driving them from Winchester. Thereafter, Banks was to post a small force in the town to protect the region's railroads and turnpikes, then proceed with most of his troops to Manassas Junction to guard the approaches to the national capital. By 24 February, Banks

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had occupied Harpers Ferry with his 28,000 men and less than two weeks later had marched south to within twelve miles of Winchester. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson and his 4,600-man valley army defended the town.

To the east, Joseph E. Johnston, the commander of Confederate troops in Virginia, expecting McClellan to march overland toward Richmond from Washington, disposed his army to defend the Confederate capital. In early March he ordered Jackson to protect the main army’s left flank by guarding the Blue Ridge gaps and advancing or retreating in concert with Johnston’s forces near Richmond. Jackson, however, had no intention of retreating and instead requested reinforcements so he could defeat Banks’s army, or at least strike the enemy and keep him off balance. Johnston did not reply, and Jackson soon found his army further outnumbered when Union Brig. Gen. James Shields arrived from western Virginia to join his 12,000-man division with Banks’s.

Despite the numerical odds against him, Jackson possessed important advantages over his opponents: a knowledge of the valley and, soon, excellent maps. On 26 March 1862, just three days after his defeat at Kernstown, Jackson told Jedediah Hotchkiss, a talented young amateur cartographer who had recently joined his command: “I want you to make me a map of the Valley, from Harper’s Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of offence and defence in those places.” Hotchkiss set to work at once, drawing maps that remain remarkable for their clarity, beauty, and accuracy. The maps became Jackson’s secret weapon. In contrast, his Union counterparts marched up and down the valley with out-of-date, sketchy, and inaccurate maps—when they had maps at all.

What kind of man was this Jackson? To answer the question, one must separate Jackson the legend from Jackson the man. Fortunately, the noted Virginia historian James I. Robertson, Jr., accomplished that task in his outstanding 1997 biography, *Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Soldier, the Legend*. This is Jackson the legend: “Old Tom Fool,” as his young students called him, an eccentric and ineffectual college professor. Insane, according to Richard Ewell and others. Jackson the legend could fall asleep instantly anywhere, anytime; he constantly sucked lemons, even in combat; he avoided pepper because it made his legs ache; on occasion he abruptly raised his left arm high to allow the blood to flow back down to his heart and thereby lessen the imagined weight of his hand; he preferred standing to sitting, to align his internal organs for improved digestion. He was a religious fanatic. He often refused to converse, and his subordinates found him extraordinarily secretive. Yet this supposedly crazy man conducted a perfect military campaign against overwhelming odds and outsmarted his opponents at every turn, according to the legend.

Jackson the man is far more interesting than Jackson the legend. The real Jackson was a painfully shy orphan born in present-day West Virginia. His consuming ambition to improve his lot and find social acceptance impelled him to the military academy at West Point, where he overcame his woefully inadequate elementary education through sheer determination and hard work. After a heroic stint as an artillery officer in the Mexican War, Jackson served unhappily as second in command to a martinet in Florida and resigned his commission. He joined the faculty at Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, where the same students who mocked him during their freshman year admired him greatly by their senior

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year. Although stiff and awkward in society, Jackson slowly made friends who discovered the kind and generous heart behind his wall of reserve. In the valley town he found a home at last, something he had longed for all his life. He found love and family there, too, and joy mixed with tragedy: his beloved first wife died in childbirth, and the baby was stillborn; less than three years later he remarried, but his first child died four weeks after her birth. Jackson's own life underwent renewal when he joined the Presbyterian church. His religious faith sustained him in adversity and became as natural a part of him as his skin. His health, particularly as it related to his digestive system, remained delicate, and he obsessively sought treatments for his many ailments; but he based many of his seemingly hypochondriacal remedies on current medical advice, or at least his own logic. Jackson often had difficulty sleeping when on campaign, and his famous impromptu naps could be credited to exhaustion. He did eat lemons, but rarely. He ate any fruit he could put his hands on, although he liked peaches best. He had no discernible sense of humor and never understood a joke, but he adored children and loved to frolic on the floor with them. His secretiveness arose naturally from his shyness, and also from a desire to confuse the enemy. His valley campaign, while a work of genius in its entirety, was far from perfect in its parts. Jackson improvised in the field, often brilliantly, but often to compensate for his own errors of judgment, as well as to take advantage of his opponents' lapses. He learned quickly from experience but was not infallible; Jackson in June 1862 was a far more skillful commander than he had been in February, but still he got caught napping at Port Republic.

What made Jackson a great general? Strategic and tactical brilliance to be sure, and an unwavering faith that God would not permit the failure of what Jackson viewed as a just cause, but even more importantly a grim determination to defeat his enemies—the same unyielding will that saw him through four demanding years at West Point. At a time when many men viewed war as a romantic adventure, Jackson was as utterly unromantic in his attitude as William Tecumseh Sherman. Stonewall, in his own words, believed that “war is the greatest of evils,” but once under way the commander should inflict “all possible damage in the shortest possible time” on the enemy, even to the point of taking no prisoners. “To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war,” he told a minister. On another occasion, when one of his subordinates expressed regret at the deaths of three Union cavalymen who charged his position bravely, Jackson responded: “No, Colonel, shoot them all. I don't want them to be brave.” Jackson's seeming ruthlessness concealed an intense desire for peace, a physical ache to be at home with his wife and, later, his daughter. He believed in fighting savagely to win the peace sooner. His valley campaign succeeded because Jackson “moved swiftly and struck vigorously” and followed his favorite maxim: “Never take counsel of your fears.” And it succeeded because he inspired his soldiers to victory.

His men cursed this tough disciplinarian who refused to grant furloughs, even to himself, who marched them bloody-footed, who urged them ever forward with a curt “Press on, press on,” who rarely praised (“Good, good,” was about as effusive as Jackson ever got), who was quick to punish and slow to forgive. But he gave them victories, and the men of his beloved Stonewall Brigade relished their reputations as his “foot cavalry,” and when he rode by they cheered and cheered. Many soldiers wrote home that it was far more pleasant to read about Jackson's exploits in the newspapers than to take part in

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them, but they all admitted they would follow him anywhere. Jackson's men savored the memories for the rest of their lives.

At this moment in March 1862, however, Jackson commanded largely untested soldiers as eager for combat as he was, despite odds of nine-to-one against them. After preliminary skirmishes in which Col. Turner Ashby and his cavalry held Banks at bay, on the afternoon of 11 March the Union army began to advance in earnest against Winchester. Jackson ordered his wagons south of town, then directed the infantry to join them, cook rations, and await orders. That night, Jackson called his first council of war with his lieutenants.

He presented them with an audacious plan: march his men back through Winchester and strike Banks in a predawn attack. The shock of the assault, he reasoned, should unnerve the even less experienced Federals and stampede them. After a brief silence, it probably fell to Brig. Gen. Richard Garnett, the senior subordinate present, to clear his throat and inform Jackson that his plan could not be executed. His army, he explained, was farther away than Jackson realized, because the wagons had gone some six miles south of town before stopping. The men would have to march about eight miles in the dark before they would be in position to attack. The army would be exhausted and incapable of holding its own against a force so many times its size. It could not be done.

After futile arguing, Jackson conceded and ordered a retreat. As he and his headquarters staff withdrew, however, a perfect fury of frustration seized him. He ignored the fact that his subordinates probably had saved his army from disaster. Never again, he vowed, would he convene a council of war. His first had been his last.

Thus one of the most illustrious campaigns in the history of American warfare began with a retreat on the part of the eventual victor. For ten days, between 12 and 21 March, Jackson and Banks kept their armies apart; Jackson encamped around Mount Jackson while Banks stopped his cautious pursuit at Strasburg, roughly twenty-three miles northeast of Mount Jackson and about seventeen miles southwest of Winchester. On 21 March, one of Ashby's troopers informed Jackson that Banks was moving back toward Winchester. Jackson followed, sending Ashby ahead to harry the Union rear. Two days later, just south of Winchester at the First Battle of Kernstown, the Federal force, at first under Brig. Gen. James Shields and then under Col. Nathan Kimball after Shields fell wounded, turned to fight. Jackson deployed Col. Samuel Fulkerson's brigade to the left and, after some confusion of orders, Garnett joined the line on Fulkerson's right.

Jackson suffered his first and only defeat at Kernstown, late in the afternoon of 23 March, when the Union right began to overwhelm the Confederate center as Garnett's men ran out of ammunition. Without orders, Garnett retreated with his command, leaving Fulkerson dangling and causing a general collapse of Jackson's line and a near rout. Garnett's decision earned him the never-ending enmity of Jackson and an abbreviated court martial—a stain on his record that he finally erased with his gallant death at Gettysburg two years later in "Pickett's Charge" (actually the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge, or Longstreet's attack).

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Jackson retreated once more. Strategically, however, he gained more than he lost. The savagery of the Kernstown battle convinced Banks, who had been in the act of leaving the valley for Manassas Junction when Jackson caught up with him, that the little Confederate army indeed presented a threat. He decided to remain west of the Blue Ridge until either he pinned it down and destroyed it, or it fled the valley. For the next several weeks, the armies teased each other with cavalry and artillery engagements as Jackson withdrew to Swift Run Gap.

Early in April, the Union strategy in eastern Virginia became clear as McClellan began his slow march up the Peninsula toward Richmond. The Confederates feared a second advance against Richmond as Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell assembled a Union force north of Fredericksburg that in reality was intended to protect Washington. In western Virginia, Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker's 10,000-man division augmented Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont's Mountain Department army, on its march eastward toward the valley. Returning to Winchester, Banks once more moved south, up the valley. On the Confederate side, Gen. Robert E. Lee, in his capacity as military advisor to President Jefferson Davis, changed Johnston's orders to Jackson. Abandon the defensive and take the offensive, Lee wrote to Stonewall on 21 April.

Jackson quickly formulated a plan of action, sent it to Lee on 29 April, and put his army in motion without waiting for a reply. With the number of his men increased to 14,500 by the addition of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's division, Jackson marched from Port Republic eastward through Brown's Gap and out of the valley, fueling rumors that he was taking his army to Richmond. At Mechum's River station on the Virginia Central Railroad, he and his men boarded railroad cars and rode west through Rockfish Gap back into the valley to Staunton. Soon the army marched west on the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike (present-day Rte. 250), toward Highland County and Frémont. On 8 May, at Sitlington's Hill just east of the village of McDowell, Jackson defeated Frémont's advance force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck and Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy. After pursuing Frémont for a few days, Jackson returned to the valley and headed north against Banks.

Jackson used the Luray Valley to conceal his movements and then, with Ewell, overran the Federal garrison at Front Royal on 23 May, exposing Banks's right flank and causing him to retreat north. Two days later, in the First Battle of Winchester, Jackson enveloped Banks's right flank and defeated him. Jackson pursued Banks's army until it fled across the Potomac River into Maryland.

Lincoln, ever mindful of the Confederate threat against Washington, sent McDowell's divisions at Fredericksburg, recently reinforced by Shields's division, into the Shenandoah Valley under Shields's command. Marching through Manassas Gap, Shields recaptured Front Royal and planned to join Frémont in Strasburg, thereby stranding Jackson between three Union forces (counting Banks's). Jackson, however, abandoned his positions above Winchester on 31 May and slipped south through the pincers, aided by Federal slowness in closing them, up the Valley Turnpike. Two Union forces—Frémont's on the Valley Turnpike and the advance of Shields's on the Luray and Front Royal Turnpike—pursued Jackson down muddy roads through a week of heavy rain.

At Cross Keys on 8 June, Shields caught Jackson napping, but when Frémont attacked from the northwest, Ewell battled him to a standstill. The next day, Jackson stalled Frémont with a rearguard action

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and then burned the bridge over the South Fork of the Shenandoah River at Port Republic to isolate him on the western side of the rain-swollen South Fork. Meanwhile, he attacked Shields's vanguard under Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler and drove it from the field. Shields and Frémont withdrew northward the next day with Massanutten Mountain between them, leaving Jackson in control of the southern end of the valley.

Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign was a spectacular strategic success. During a five-week period, with no more than 17,000 troops, he marched more than 650 miles and defeated three Federal armies numbering 52,000 men by attacking them separately when his own force was numerically superior to his opponent's. He inflicted some 7,000 Union casualties while losing some 2,500 of his own men. He made his name famous throughout and even beyond the country, worried Lincoln endlessly, and, most importantly, caused the diversion of thousands of Union troops toward the defense of Washington and away from McClellan's campaign. McClellan later claimed that the additional troops would have enabled him to capture Richmond. Now, at mid-June 1862, it was Jackson and his army, not Banks's or McDowell's, who were marching toward Richmond.

PENINSULA AND SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGNS

The Peninsula and Seven Days' Campaigns constitute one of the oddest episodes in the course of the Civil War in Virginia. Few leaders displayed especially brilliant generalship; both commanders made costly errors of judgment; the wizard of the Shenandoah Campaign, Stonewall Jackson, was present on the battlefield physically but not mentally; and the Confederate army, which either lost almost every battle or fought to a draw, pushed the vastly larger Union army to the edge of the James River and emerged the victor.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the thirty-five-year-old commander of the Army of the Potomac, seemed destined for success in the spring of 1862. Born in Philadelphia, the scion of a distinguished family, McClellan entered West Point in 1842 after attending the University of Pennsylvania. He graduated second in his academy class in 1846 and served in the Mexican War, in which he earned two brevet promotions. During his eleven-year military career, he rose to the rank of captain, built forts, taught at the U.S. Military Academy, and designed a saddle that the army adopted as its standard. He was sent to Europe during the Crimean War as an official observer, and was present at the siege of Sebastopol. After resigning his commission in 1857, he pursued a new career in railroading, becoming president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. When the war began, Ohio governor William Dennison appointed McClellan major general in the Ohio volunteers. In July 1861, just before the First Battle of Manassas, McClellan won victories at Rich Mountain and Corrick's Ford in western Virginia, helping secure what would become West Virginia for the Union and gaining instant fame. Following the Federal defeat at First Manassas on 21 July 1861, President Abraham Lincoln removed Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell as commander of the principal Union force and appointed McClellan in his place on 27 July. On 1 November 1861 McClellan replaced Bvt. Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott as general-in-chief of the United States Army.

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McClellan took command of a demoralized, poorly trained army—essentially an armed mob, some thought. Over the next few months he worked a miracle. The mob became a professional, well-supplied, thoroughly drilled, massive war machine of more than 100,000 men. The soldiers adored McClellan, who had restored their pride and confidence. McClellan loved the army he had created. It was ready to fight.

Its general, however, demonstrated an intense reluctance to fight. He was the most politically ambitious general in the Union army, and more than anything he wanted to become president. If he took his great army into battle and lost, he believed, his hoped-for political career would be stillborn. If, however, he delayed his campaign until he had an overwhelming superiority in men and supplies, and fought only when victory was assured, then, he thought, his political success also would be assured. Also, he did not wish to shame the South by crushing its army if he could help achieve a negotiated settlement. Additionally, if he could convince the public that Lincoln and his Republican administration were not giving him the men he needed to save the Union, then he could shift the responsibility for any military defeat from his shoulders to theirs. McClellan adopted a strategy of delay while constantly soliciting reinforcements from Lincoln, who kept urging his general to take the field and grew increasingly impatient with his demands. Once in the field, McClellan moved with exceeding caution, frustrating not only Lincoln but his own subordinates. McClellan's motives and behavior, his ambitions and his hesitations, have been much debated by historians—and the debate shows no signs of ending. It is fair to say, however, that McClellan's military strategy, as executed, was not so much to fight to win as to fight not to lose.

Two Confederate generals, Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee, stood ready to oppose McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. Johnston, a native of Prince Edward County, Virginia, graduated from West Point in 1829 (thirteenth in his class, which included Robert E. Lee) and served for eight years as an artillery officer, then resigned to pursue a civil engineering career. In 1838, on an expedition to Florida, Johnston skillfully defended his party against an Indian attack, thereby earning a first lieutenant's commission in the Topographical Engineers. He served with distinction in the Mexican War and remained in the army afterward, eventually rising to quartermaster general with the rank of brigadier general. He resigned from the U.S. Army on 22 April 1861 and joined the Confederate army, assuming command at Harper's Ferry from Thomas J. Jackson in May 1861. After eluding the Federal force led by Brig. Gen. Robert Patterson, Johnston led his army to Manassas Junction in July 1861, where on 21 July he combined forces with Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard to turn the tide of battle for the Confederacy. President Jefferson Davis promoted him to full general, although fourth in rank after Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Robert E. Lee—a move that angered Johnston, who had been the senior brigadier general in the U.S. Army. He reported to Richmond, however, and organized its defenses, a task at which he was an acknowledged master. When McClellan began his march up the Peninsula toward Richmond, Johnston crafted a strategic withdrawal of his army to the strong defensive works protecting the Confederate capital. Wounded early in the fighting there, Johnston was replaced by Robert E. Lee.

Lee, like McClellan, descended from an illustrious family, although one that had fallen on hard times. Born in 1807 at the ancestral home, Stratford Hall, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, Lee was the

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son of Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee, a Revolutionary War cavalry hero. At the age of three, after his father had been jailed for debt, young Robert moved with most of his family to Alexandria, where he lived in a series of dwellings, often as a houseguest. In 1813, when he was six, his father abandoned the family, fled to the Caribbean, and wandered, dying at Cumberland Island, Georgia, five years later. Robert attended Alexandria Academy and, as a dutiful son, helped his mother rear his younger siblings. The family lived somewhat above the "genteel poverty" line, but money always was a concern. Lee's elder half-brother, saddled with debt, sold Stratford Hall in 1822; Lee never owned a home himself, but remained a "houseguest" for the rest of his life.

Lee entered West Point in 1825 and graduated second in his class in 1829 without receiving a single demerit (one of five members of his class to accomplish that feat). He entered the Corps of Engineers as a brevet second lieutenant, beginning a military career that lasted some thirty-two years for the United States and four years for the Confederate States. During his long tenure in the U.S. Army, Lee built forts (including part of Fort Monroe, in Virginia) and other engineering projects, served with distinction in the Mexican War, superintended the academy at West Point, and rose to the rank of colonel. In October 1859 he led the contingent of U.S. Marines that captured the abolitionist John Brown at Harper's Ferry. Lee's fellow officers esteemed him highly, and Winfield Scott made him his protégé, declaring Lee "the very best soldier I ever saw in the field." Yet Lee often felt frustrated by military politics, and his desire to care for his growing family (he married Mary Ann Randolph Custis in 1831 and by her fathered four daughters and three sons) and tend for his wife's estate (Arlington) led him to consider resignation more than once.

Lee, like Thomas J. Jackson, tended toward shyness when in the presence of strangers, but with friends was highly sociable and flirtatious with women. Physically, Lee was considered the handsomest man in the army, five feet eleven inches tall, graceful and athletic, of military bearing but never stiff. He had black hair and brown eyes, and eventually grew a moustache but remained beardless until the fall of 1861. Lee possessed a wry wit, occasionally risqué but not vulgar. He had a temper, which he controlled with his iron will, sometimes with difficulty. The most important words in his life were duty, service, and honor, and his religious faith was quiet and pietistic. For all the excellence of his character, however, Lee was a human being with ambitions and self-doubts, overbearing though loving as a father, and sometimes unclear in his orders as a military leader. As is the case with Jackson, Lee the mortal man is much more interesting than Lee the myth, Lee the perfect "Marble Man."

Early in his career as a Confederate general, the Marble Man showed feet of clay, for Lee did not meet with success in his first assignments. Following his resignation from the U.S. Army on 20 April 1861 (he had been offered field command of the Union army two days earlier but declined), Lee was given the rank of major general and placed in charge of Virginia's defenses by Governor John Letcher. In August 1861, promoted to full general to rank from mid-June, he led an unsuccessful campaign in western Virginia that did nothing to enhance his reputation as a field commander. Lee's reluctance to attack an entrenched Union force with his own poorly organized troops led to his being called "Granny Lee" by armchair generals and newspaper editors. At least he found a horse he liked in western Virginia: at first called Jeff

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Davis and then Greenbrier, the dappled gray gelding later was renamed Traveller by Lee. Like Jackson's Little Sorrel, Traveller could trot and gallop other horses into the ground, and his gait, which most riders found bone-jarring, suited Lee.

Lee next saw service in South Carolina, where Davis sent him in November to organize the coastal defenses, and where he purchased Traveller. Lee's plans ran counter to the desires of certain Palmetto State politicians and wealthy planters, however, and he found himself increasingly unpopular there. By March 1862 Davis ordered him back to Richmond to serve as the president's military advisor. In that capacity Lee hit his stride, gaining invaluable knowledge of the Confederate command structure, acquiring supporters among Confederate politicians, and beginning (by mail and telegraph) a relationship with the man who would be his most important lieutenant in campaigns to come, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. But when he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on 1 June, after Johnston fell wounded, he withdrew it behind the Richmond fortifications and set the men to digging and strengthening the defenses. This caused some to dub Lee the "King of Spades" and voice fears that Granny Lee would never attack McClellan. Lee's critics were as mistaken in their judgments of him as McClellan's supporters were in their assessments of the Union commander.

McClellan had been christened "Young Napoleon," wishfully, by the newspapers, and "Little Mac," affectionately, by his soldiers. President Lincoln, certain that he had appointed the right man to lead the Army of the Potomac, waited for him to take it into the field, and waited, and waited some more. Finally, exasperated, Lincoln ordered McClellan into battle, to no avail. The general offered reason after reason for not crossing the Potomac ("All quiet along the Potomac," a popular phrase, began to sound ironic) and offering battle to the Confederates who until late in September were entrenched within sight of Washington. Stonewall Jackson eventually delivered his own judgment on McClellan: "He lacks nerve." To be fair, McClellan did have a plan of attack, the so-called Urbanna Plan, which involved a flanking maneuver around Johnston's right near the Middlesex County village for which it was named, but he kept it secret even from Lincoln. When he finally disclosed it to the president, its complexity and the consequences of certain Confederate strategic decisions soon rendered it obsolete.

South of the Potomac, Johnston traveled to Richmond to consult with Davis and other Confederate leaders. He was told to withdraw his outnumbered army from northern Virginia and set up a new defensive line closer to Richmond to protect the capital against the campaign that McClellan was certain to launch. Concerned that such a move would expose his left flank to attack from the Shenandoah Valley, where a Union army led by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks lurked among the hills, Johnston ordered Stonewall Jackson to keep in contact and adopt a defensive mode. Lee later changed these orders to enable Jackson to begin his Valley Campaign. Johnston returned to his lines and carried out the withdrawal as ordered, evacuating his army from Centreville and Manassas Junction on 8-9 March 1862. The troops burned all the stores and baggage that they could not carry, as well as mountains of supplies stockpiled in Confederate magazines. The odor of burning beef and bacon followed the retreating Confederates for twenty miles, adding to their ill humor at turning their backs on their foes.

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McClellan, as Davis predicted, at last developed a plan. After several evolutions, it called for the general to transport his mighty force to Newport News and Fort Monroe, which remained in Federal hands, first under the amiable Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. (later “Beast” or “Spoons”) Butler and then under Maj. Gen. John A. Dix. There the army would disembark and march up the Peninsula, between the York and James Rivers, to Richmond. There McClellan, as both he and his supporters believed, would save the Union with one great battle.

The Peninsula was a flat land of large plantations and smaller farms worn out by repeated crops of tobacco. Located between the Chesapeake Bay and Richmond, the Peninsula is part of Tidewater Virginia, where the terrain is cut by slow-flowing rivers and swamps. Historically, it was (and remains) one of the most significant places in Virginia. The list of historic sites was well-known to McClellan: Jamestown, where the colonists established their first permanent settlement; Old Point Comfort at Fort Monroe, the new colony’s window on the Chesapeake to guard against Spanish marauders; Williamsburg, the second colonial capital; Yorktown, where Washington captured Cornwallis and his army, effectively ensuring the survival of the fledgling United States. Grand plantations, among them Berkeley, Shirley, Sherwood Forest, and Westover, associated with old Virginia names—Harrison, Carter, Tyler, and Byrd—lined the banks of the James River. McClellan must have felt that the forces of history summoned him to reclaim the land where the United States was born.

In March 1862 the Army of the Potomac moved at last. First, though, McClellan acceded to Lincoln’s urging to capture the Confederate batteries at Freestone and Cockpit Points and elsewhere to end the embarrassing Potomac River blockade of Washington. He found the batteries empty, however, as the men and guns had withdrawn with the rest of Johnston’s army. McClellan also marched his army out to Centreville and Manassas Junction and back again, finding the Confederates gone and “Quaker guns” (logs painted black to resemble cannon) guarding the empty earthworks. Although McClellan had known of the *faux* artillery for several weeks, Washington’s newspaper reporters had not. Their claims that painted logs had fooled him into not attacking Johnston made the Union general look silly.

Beginning on 17 March and continuing for the next three weeks into early April, McClellan’s army steamed down the Potomac River from Alexandria on transports bound for Fort Monroe and the Peninsula. The logistics of moving so many men, horses, cannon, and supplies were daunting. Some 389 vessels (ranging from Long Island steamers to Philadelphia ferryboats) transported some 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,224 ambulances and wagons, 44 artillery batteries, and countless tons of equipment and supplies. Accompanied by bands and flags, the Army of the Potomac turned its short voyage into a grand procession.

The army’s destination already had experienced warfare both on land and on the water. Almost a year earlier, on 18–19 May 1861, two United States gunboats duelled with Confederate batteries at Sewell’s Point near Norfolk as they attempted to enforce the Union blockade of Hampton Roads, the main shipping lane between the James River and Chesapeake Bay. Capt. Henry Eagle, U.S.N., of USS *Monticello*, with support from USS *Thomas Freeborn*, fired on the batteries, commanded by Capt. Peyton H. Colquitt, on 18

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May, and then alone the next day, until the gunboat exhausted its ammunition. Neither side suffered serious damage.

The next month, on 10 June 1861, the first land battle in present-day Virginia took place on the western edge of Hampton in York County at a community called Big Bethel (an engagement at Philippi, in what is now West Virginia, had occurred on 3 June). Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe, sent converging columns from Hampton and Newport News against advanced Confederate outposts at Little and Big Bethel. The 1,500 Confederates, led by colonels John B. Magruder and D. H. Hill, abandoned Little Bethel and fell back to their entrenchments behind Brick Kiln Creek, near Big Bethel Church. The Federals, totaling some 3,500 and under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer W. Pierce, pursued, attacked frontally along the road, and were repulsed. Crossing downstream, the 5th New York Zouaves attempted to turn the Confederate left flank, but were likewise repulsed. The Union forces retired to Hampton and Newport News. The Confederates lost 8 men killed and wounded, while Union casualties numbered 79, some from “friendly fire,” in this embarrassing Federal debacle that left their opponents in control of the Peninsula.

More to the point for McClellan and his men were the recent naval actions at Hampton Roads on 8–9 March 1862, the very days that Johnston withdrew from Centreville and Manassas Junction and McClellan found the Potomac River batteries abandoned. In June 1861 the Confederate secretary of the navy, Stephen R. Mallory, began an ambitious project to build an ironclad navy that would overpower its wooden Federal counterpart and break the Union blockade of the Southern Coast. The first such vessel, the former USS *Merrimack*, was clad in iron plates forged at the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond and renamed CSS *Virginia*. Ostensibly taking the boat on a shakedown cruise near Hampton Roads on 8 March, its commander, Capt. Franklin Buchanan, instead engaged the Union blockaders there. *Virginia* rammed and sank USS *Cumberland*, then turned on USS *Congress*—which ran aground in its futile effort to escape—and set it afire. Wounded in the latter action, Buchanan was replaced by Lt. Cmdr. Catesby ap R. Jones, who brought *Virginia* out again the next day. This time Lt. John L. Worden’s USS *Monitor*, the Union ironclad, came out to meet it. Neither vessel seriously damaged the other in the ensuing Battle of the Ironclads, although the sailors must have suffered headaches from the din of iron projectiles clanging off the metal hulls. *Virginia* withdrew first, but neither side could claim a victory. Although *Virginia* retained control of James River, Worden’s sturdy defense preserved the Union blockade and made the Hampton Roads anchorage safe for McClellan’s convoy.

Soon the area around Fort Monroe and Newport News turned into a great tent city as McClellan’s army disembarked and encamped. It had scarcely settled in, however, before the general called it out. On 4 April McClellan, with close to seventy thousand men and nineteen artillery batteries in the vanguard of his army, set forth on the march to Richmond. All that stood in his way, he estimated (accurately, for the only time in the campaign), was Magruder with about fourteen thousand Confederate troops. Magruder had built three lines of earthworks and fortifications that stretched southward across the Peninsula: the first, mostly for show, about a dozen miles west of Fort Monroe; the second and strongest from Yorktown to Warwick River, a tributary of the James, down the Warwick to Lee’s Mill, then westward to Skiffe’s

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Creek, which fed into James River; and the third around a key road junction just east of Williamsburg, between College Creek and Queen's Creek.

If the conflict could have been reduced to a battle of egos only, McClellan may have met his match in "Prince John" Magruder. A man who carried flamboyance to new heights, Magruder strutted about in a gaudy uniform, gave expensive banquets, delivered pompous speeches, and believed his own publicity. He disposed his troops in a thin array along his defensive line and calmly awaited McClellan.

When the Union commander encountered Magruder's Yorktown defenses on 5 April, his instinct for caution rose to the surface. Within hours McClellan had convinced himself (assuming it was not his plan all along), based on the inflated claims of a few Confederate prisoners, that he faced a hundred-thousand-man army and that the Yorktown line required a full-scale siege. On the Confederate side, in contrast, Magruder concluded that an attack was imminent and that Johnston, who was coming from Richmond with reinforcements, would be too late. McClellan sent word to his lieutenants to prepare for a siege; the resulting delay afforded Johnston plenty of time to reinforce Magruder.

Even with more troops, however, the Confederates numbered only about fifty thousand, roughly half the size of McClellan's army, and several weak spots existed in the Yorktown-Warwick line. On 16 April, the only battle near Yorktown occurred when McClellan probed the line at Dam No. 1 or Burnt Chimneys but failed to follow up on early success and was beaten back. McClellan delayed for two more weeks while he tried unsuccessfully to convince the navy to maneuver past the big Confederate guns at Yorktown and Gloucester Point and ascend the York River to West Point, thereby outflanking the Yorktown-Warwick Line. When the Union commander finally prepared to launch his attack on Yorktown on 4 May, he found the works empty. After a delay of some twelve hours, he pursued Johnston's rear guard vigorously and caught up to it at Williamsburg the next day.

The clash at Williamsburg was the first major battle of the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan's vanguard, consisting of almost 41,000 troops including two divisions led by Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker and Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, encountered Johnston's rear guard, some 32,000 men commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, about two miles southeast of the former colonial capital. A four-mile-long set of earthworks prepared by Magruder two months earlier, with Fort Magruder in their center, protected the Confederates. Smith and Hooker attacked, with the latter striking Fort Magruder, while a brigade led by Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock marched around Longstreet's left flank and assaulted from the northeast and rear, occupying two redoubts. Longstreet counterattacked and threatened to overwhelm Hooker until Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny's division arrived to stabilize the line. A counterattack against Hancock, led by Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, failed because it was hastily prepared and executed piecemeal. Early fell seriously wounded, while Hooker, because of his vigorous though unsuccessful assault on Fort Magruder, earned the nom de guerre "Fighting Joe." During the night, the Confederates slipped away from the field and continued their withdrawal. Federal casualties totaled 2,283, while those of the Confederates amounted to about 1,560.

Johnston posted Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith and his division at Barhamsville, in New Kent County, to guard the Confederate wagon train. On 6 May, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division

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disembarked from Federal troop transports at Eltham's Landing, on the south side of the York River across from West Point, and entrenched about a mile inland. Smith did not attack, waiting to see whether Franklin could be lured into the open; he sent for reinforcements from Johnston. The next day, with the entire Confederate army nearby, Smith ordered Brig. Gen. W. H. Chase Whiting to lead his division against the Federals. When he learned that the Confederate artillery could not reach the Union gunboats in the York River, and therefore could not protect Whiting's men from Federal bombardment, Smith broke off the advance. Confederate losses amounted to 48, and Union casualties totaled 194. Johnston continued to withdraw, his wagon train secure, and McClellan followed.

When Johnston pulled his army out of Yorktown, he left behind Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, commander of the Department of Norfolk, to protect Confederate interests on the south side of James River. Huger abandoned Norfolk and marched to join Johnston on 10 May when pressed by Federal troops under the command of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool. Now exposed to mass attack by Union artillery and gunboats, Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall, commander of the ironclad CSS *Virginia*, blew up his vessel when he found he could not lighten it enough to escape up James River. His action left the river open to the Union fleet, and a few days later several gunboats steamed toward Richmond to test the defenses there.

The Union ironclads *Monitor*, *Galena*, and *Stevens Battery (Naugatuck)* led the way under Cdr. John Rodgers, accompanied by two wooden warships, *Aroostook* and *Port Royal*. At Drewry's Bluff, located on the south side of James River in Chesterfield County a few miles below Richmond, heavy guns commanded a sharp turn in the river. When the Union flotilla approached the bluff on 15 May, it found that obstructions and weighted vessels sunk in the river blocked its way. Then the guns above opened fire, damaging *Galena*, while some of the Union ships could not elevate their cannon enough to hit the fort. The Federal fleet broke off the attack and retired, leaving Richmond's defenses intact.

Meanwhile, McClellan continued his pursuit of Johnston up the Peninsula. The Confederate commander hastened toward the Chickahominy River, which originated northwest of Richmond and flowed sluggishly, through swamps and floodplains, southeastwardly to the James. In the dry season the Chickahominy did not look like much, but when the spring rains struck, it flooded easily, becoming a substantial barrier. Johnston wanted the now-swollen river between his army and McClellan's. McClellan, moving slowly, advanced up the Pamunkey River, which flows parallel to the Chickahominy on the south and joins with the Mattaponi River on the north at West Point to form the York River. By 15 May he was at White House, the home of one of Robert E. Lee's sons, Col. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee, where he established an enormous supply depot. The army then slogged slowly on through rain and mud, or heat and dust, along the Richmond and York River Railroad toward Richmond.

Johnston achieved his goal, crossing most of his army over the Chickahominy and into strong defensive works north and east of Richmond, to counter McClellan as he approached from the Pamunkey. Toward the end of May the Union army trudged into position some six miles east of Richmond. The weary soldiers could see the church spires of the city, and to them as well as to McClellan, victory seemed near at hand.

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McClellan crossed his army over the Chickahominy River corps by corps, carefully rebuilding bridges destroyed or damaged by the retreating Confederates. Hearing reports of enemy troops advancing on Hanover Court House, to McClellan's right rear, the Union general dispatched Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter, a close friend, and one of his two divisions to eliminate the threat. On 27 May, at a crossroads two miles south of the courthouse village, Porter encountered Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch's brigade and defeated it in a confused, bloody fight. The Federals lost 397 men, the Confederates 930, most of the latter as prisoners.

By 30 May, McClellan had crossed two corps, his left wing, over to the south bank of the Chickahominy, while three—his right—remained on the north side. Johnston decided to strike McClellan's left flank, the corps of major generals Samuel P. Heintzelman and Erasmus D. Keyes, before the other corps could cross. Nature aided him in the form of a violent thunderstorm that evening; it washed away two bridges and raised the water level, effectively isolating roughly half of the Union army on the south side of the river. On 31 May, Johnston attacked at Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) in three columns. Along Nine Mile Road to the north, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet was to lead his corps, reinforced by Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting's division. On Longstreet's right, approaching on Williamsburg Road, would be Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill's division, and to Hill's right, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, on Charles City Road. Johnston's plan fell apart, however, as he had issued orders to Longstreet verbally instead of in writing. Longstreet marched down Hill's and Huger's roads instead of his own, entangling his command with Huger's. By the time the units sorted themselves out, the attack was hours late, and the various divisions entered the battle piecemeal rather than in concert. That evening, Johnston rode along his lines as the battle died away; suddenly, a bullet struck him in the right shoulder, followed immediately by a shell fragment in the chest. Command devolved on Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith.

The next day, the Confederates mounted a half-hearted attack, but when Longstreet was repulsed it ended. Smith's role as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia ended too, as President Davis replaced him with Davis's military advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee. Lee ordered an immediate withdrawal to the previous morning's lines so that his army might recover and reorganize. By the night of 1 June, both armies were in their original positions. Each had thrown about forty thousand men into the fight, but the Federals had suffered fewer casualties, about 5,700 to the Confederates' 6,100. The Confederates had also lost Joe Johnston, but they had gained Robert E. Lee. McClellan lost no ground, but the sight of all the mangled dead shocked him and, coupled with his vast overinflation of his opponents' numbers, reduced his will to fight.

McClellan harangued the Lincoln administration for more men and began to believe that he was the victim of a Republican plot to undermine his campaign. He also claimed to be heavily outnumbered by the Confederates. Whether in fact he believed this or inflated the numbers to win sympathy and gain reinforcements is subject to debate.

For the next two weeks, while McClellan heated up the telegraph wires to Washington, Lee had his army dig in and improve the trenches protecting Richmond, reinforcing his opprobrium as the "King of Spades." Lee also reconnoitered McClellan's lines, sending Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart on his famous "Ride

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Around McClellan" (an undertaking that Stuart would accomplish twice more against another Union general—the third time with grave consequences for the South) on 12 June. The ride cost Stuart only one death, Capt. William Latané, who was buried in the family graveyard at Summer Hill near Hanover town in eastern Hanover County, in a service conducted by the women of the house. A painting of the imagined scene, and the engravings made from it, later became cherished Southern icons. For the moment, however, Stuart's achievement bolstered Confederate spirits and gave Lee the valuable information that McClellan's right flank was "in the air"—not secured by any natural or manmade obstacle.

On 25 June, Lee prepared to take the offensive, beginning what would be called the Seven Days' Campaign. He had never intended to remain in his earthworks, of course, but instead strengthened them so that Richmond could be defended by a smaller force, leaving most of his army free to attack the Federals in the open. He planned to advance against McClellan's right, consisting of Porter's reinforced corps (about thirty thousand men), with some sixty thousand, including the army of Stonewall Jackson, just arrived from his successful Shenandoah Valley Campaign. The attack was scheduled for 26 June, but the day before it began, McClellan sent a reconnaissance in force westward guiding on the Williamsburg Road to probe the Confederate lines and bring Richmond within range of his siege guns. He struck Lee's army at Oak Grove, with Heintzelman's corps confronting Huger's four brigades. Most of the fighting took place forward of the Confederate lines; at the end of the day Huger's men were back in their earthworks, having halted the Federal advance. The Union army suffered 516 casualties, the Confederates 316.

The unexpected attack did not derail Lee's own plans for the next morning. The Confederates crossed the Chickahominy River and confronted Porter's corps east of Mechanicsville. The attack soon stalled, however, as the Confederate divisions of major generals James Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Daniel H. Hill awaited the arrival of Jackson, who was to strike Porter from the north, flanking him. Jackson, mentally and physically exhausted from the valley campaign, and confused by Lee's orders, never arrived on the field but stopped just short of his objective. In mid-afternoon, an exasperated A. P. Hill launched his own attack across Beaver Dam Creek near Ellerson's Mill, just east of Mechanicsville. The assault, over swampy ground and against dug-in Federals on a hillside, was repulsed with heavy losses as Porter's men threw back successive Confederate waves: some 1,300 Southern casualties to 360 Federal. Finally the attacks ceased with the darkness. During the night, aware of Jackson's nearness on his right, Porter withdrew on McClellan's orders a few miles south and east to a strong position behind Boatswain's Creek.

There, at Gaines's Mill, Lee struck again on 27 June. Porter arranged his corps in a semicircle on a bluff, and in mid-afternoon A. P. Hill attacked again and again across the soggy, uneven ground. Longstreet came to Hill's support, on his right, and Jackson and D. H. Hill, late, on Hill's left. Finally, under concerted Confederate attacks in the evening, Porter's line caved in. The Federals withdrew in good order, joining the rest of McClellan's army in its imminent retreat toward James River. The carnage, however, was dreadful: about 6,800 Union casualties and 8,700 Confederate.

While the Battle of Gaines's Mill raged north of the Chickahominy River, to the south occurred the opening phase of the battles of Garnett's and Golding's Farms. Magruder demonstrated against the

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Union line south of the river at Garnett's Farm. To escape an artillery crossfire, the Federal defenders from Heintzelman's corps pulled back ("refused") their line along the river. The Confederates attacked again the next morning a short distance away near Golding's (Gouldin's) Farm but were easily repulsed. Losses totaled 438 for the Confederates, 189 for the Federals. Though costly, these sharp probes heightened McClellan's fear that an all-out assault was under way both north and south of the river. The ferocity of Lee's attacks shocked the Union commander, who already had decided to "change his base" from White House on Pamunkey River to one of the James River landings (ultimately, Harrison's Landing at Berkeley plantation). McClellan justified the move as a strategic withdrawal, but his critics, including his own men, called it the "great skedaddle." By whatever name, it was a retreat, with Lee in hot pursuit.

The aggressive Lee was superbly suited to command an aggressive army, and he cultivated first-rate lieutenants to compensate for any gaps in his knowledge. As an engineer, he was expert in fortification design, and also understood the weaknesses of fixed positions; his last assignment in the United States Army had been in the cavalry, so he well knew the use of that arm, and now had Jeb Stuart besides; he could rely on the judgment of his other subordinates who were accomplished in the use of infantry and artillery; and he had an instinct for the jugular of his opponent. "Lee is audacity personified," observed one of his aides.

Lee's audacious nature contained potential flaws, however, that could lead to disaster in the wrong circumstances. He commanded through discretionary orders, trusting the field officers at the scene of the fight to adjust to the particular circumstances they faced, yet still achieve tactical success. This style of command suited the independent-minded Jackson perfectly, resulting in one of history's great military partnerships (though not immediately, during the Seven Days), but other generals needed closer direction, which Lee did not always provide. In June 1862, for example, Lee's discretionary orders only created confusion; Lee and his subordinates did not know each other well enough yet to be instinctive. And when Lee's "blood was up," as some observers put it, his aggressive nature could blind him to weaknesses in his plan of attack, as soon occurred east of Richmond, and as later happened at Gettysburg.

On 29 June, as McClellan changed his base, Magruder struck the retreating Federals at Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad north of Williamsburg Road. Lee had hoped for a more vigorous attack to pin the Union army against White Oak Swamp to the south, but Magruder assaulted McClellan's rear guard, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, with only part of his force. Jackson, occupied with operations along the north side of the Chickahominy, did not support Magruder's left, and Huger, moving slowly down Charles City Road, failed to support his right. Sumner held off the Confederate attack, enabling the rest of McClellan's army to escape through the swamp. Confederate casualties amounted to some 400 versus about 900 for the Federals, but when the Southerners swept through Savage's Station the next day, they captured 2,500 wounded or sick Union soldiers left behind at the field hospital in and around the Savage house.

Lee caught up with McClellan at Glendale and White Oak Swamp on 30 June, sending Huger's, Longstreet's, and A. P. Hill's divisions against the retreating Union army at Frayser's farm near present-day Glendale, a crossroads in eastern Henrico County. Longstreet's and Hill's attacks penetrated the Union

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defense near Willis Church, routing Brig. Gen. George A. McCall's division in McClellan's center and capturing McCall. Union counterattacks by Hooker's and Kearny's divisions sealed the break, however, and saved their line of retreat along the Willis Church Road, while felled trees stopped Huger's advance on the Charles City Road and protected the Union center. Jackson, directed to attack the Union right from the north, was delayed by Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's II Corps division and Brig. Gen. William F. Smith's VI Corps division under Franklin at White Oak Swamp. Confederate Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes made a feeble attempt to turn the Union left flank at Turkey Bridge but was driven back by Union artillery on Malvern Hill and by Federal gunboats in James River. Thus, Lee lost his best opportunity to cut off and destroy the Union army piecemeal during its retreat to James River at a cost of 3,600 casualties to his opponent's 2,800. That night, McClellan established a strong position on Malvern Hill, three miles south of the Frayser's farm battlefield.

The Battle of Malvern Hill brought the Seven Days' campaign to a bloody close on 1 July. Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter had prepared a strong defensive position there even as the previous day's battles had raged. Some forty Union cannon lined the crest of the hill, facing north and west, with another hundred and fifty in reserve and on the flanks. The rest of McClellan's army moved into position on ridges to the east of Malvern Hill to await the Confederate attack. Lee ordered Jackson's divisions into position on the Southern left, with Magruder in the center and Huger on the right. His plans went awry, though, when Magruder went astray and spent three hours marching and countermarching to the front. Other units arrived on the field piecemeal, and Lee ordered his artillery to engage Porter's; the resulting duel ended in the silencing of the Confederate guns. Lee then fed his infantry into the grinder in one futile frontal assault after another, and the Union artillery cut them down. McClellan lost some 3,200 men, while Lee suffered more than 5,300 casualties. D. H. Hill summed up the scope of the disaster when he later observed, "It was not war—it was murder."

Against the wishes of his generals, who hoped to counterattack after their initial success, McClellan ordered the retreat to continue, and in the night he disengaged and made his way east to Harrison's Landing. A member of the Union picket line left behind on Malvern Hill to observe Confederate activities noted that as he gazed down on the field of battle over the bodies of fallen Southerners, "enough were alive and moving to give the field a singular crawling effect."

During the Seven Days' campaign, the Army of Northern Virginia sustained some twenty thousand casualties, while the Union army lost about sixteen thousand. The fighting around Richmond (including Seven Pines) resulted in 20 percent casualties for McClellan and a staggering 30 percent for Lee. Lee's savage attacks, despite their high cost, drove McClellan from the outskirts of Richmond, and Southerners hailed the Confederate general as the city's savior.

It was McClellan, not Lee, who emerged from the 1862 contest with his reputation in tatters. All his boasting had been for naught: with the largest army then on the planet, he failed to defeat a force smaller than his. McClellan's overestimations of his opponent's strength, coupled with his lack of aggressiveness, caused him to lose the campaign although he won most of the battles.

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Lee won the campaign but lost most of the battles because of poor Confederate coordination, confusing orders, and battle plans that were too complicated for the terrain. Too often, his forces were stalled—as were McClellan’s—by swollen rivers, murky swamps, thick undergrowth, and abysmal roads. But Lee and his generals learned much about each other during the Seven Days and, once on better ground, Lee’s tactical style would come into its own. More importantly, the new partnership between Lee and Jackson soon would produce an almost unbroken year-long string of the Confederate commander’s greatest offensive victories.

NORTHERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN

Gen. Robert E. Lee kept a wary eye on Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac for several days following the end of the Seven Days’ Campaign on 1 July 1862. The Union army had successfully evaded Lee’s attempts to crush it, thanks to both the sturdy defense mounted by its soldiers and the usually uncoordinated attacks by Lee’s lieutenants, and still presented a formidable front behind its strong fortifications at Harrison’s Landing on the James River. Lee mustered about 72,000 men of his Army of Northern Virginia to face McClellan’s 90,000.

In addition to McClellan’s force in Charles City County, Lee faced threats in two other parts of the state. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, freshly arrived at Fort Monroe with 7,000 men from his successful expedition against Confederate strong points on the North Carolina sounds, stood poised to march to McClellan’s aid if summoned from the eastern end of the Peninsula. To the north, President Abraham Lincoln had given Maj. Gen. John Pope command of three armies, one of which recently had pursued Stonewall Jackson unsuccessfully up and down the Shenandoah Valley. Pope’s combined force, dubbed the Army of Virginia, totaled some 40,000 men.

McClellan claimed to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, the newly appointed general-in-chief of the United States Army, that he could defeat Lee’s force, which he as usual overestimated at 200,000 men, if only he had Pope’s and Burnside’s armies with him, and some 20,000 soldiers from the western armies as well. He had spelled out his plans to Lincoln as well when the president made a visit to Harrison’s Landing on 8 July. Both of McClellan’s superiors were cool to McClellan’s ideas, however, and on 3 August Halleck wired him to evacuate his army from the Richmond front and join forces with Pope. McClellan objected to no avail; he had been replaced as commander of an active Union army in the field.

About that time, Lee learned from Lt. John S. Mosby, who had been captured by the Federals and then released at Fort Monroe (a major mistake, they would later realize), that Burnside had been ordered north. When he saw McClellan’s army embarking on its steamers, Lee knew that the campaign against Richmond from the Peninsula was over, and that the next theater of war would open in northern Virginia. He also understood that if he moved quickly enough, his principal opponent would be Pope, not McClellan.

John Pope was a difficult man to like, and most of his associates quickly gave up the effort. Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis spoke for dozens of officers when he declared, “I don’t care for John Pope one pinch of owl dung.” Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, a close friend of McClellan, referred to Pope as “an ass.”

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If possible, Pope was even more full of himself than McClellan—pompous, impetuous, abrasive, loud-mouthed, and a braggart. Given to windy proclamations, he allegedly datelined his pronouncements “headquarters in the saddle.” Both Union and Confederate wags quickly joked that his headquarters were where his hindquarters ought to be, and he didn’t know the one from the other.

Even Pope’s detractors, however, usually admitted that the man was highly intelligent and personally courageous as a field commander. His recent promotion had come on the heels of his successful campaign against several Confederate positions along the Mississippi River. A staunch Republican, Pope had the support of his friend President Lincoln. Pope’s tendency to hog the credit for success while delegating the blame for failure to every subordinate from general to private soldier, however, soon made him unpopular in certain quarters of his new command. Officers especially were incensed by a patronizing proclamation in which he stated that “I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies.” The implication that the reverse was true in the East, and that John Pope had arrived to turn cowards into heroes, angered many in the army.

Pope also angered Virginia civilians by threatening to wage war on them as well as on the Southern armies. In Missouri, where Pope had served, a guerrilla war was raging within the state in addition to the larger conflict. Perhaps anticipating similar tactics by supposedly “noncombatant” Virginians, Pope threatened to hold them responsible for actions by Confederates against Union forces in their counties, even to the point of summary execution. He also ordered his army to “subsist upon the country,” that is, to commandeer supplies from civilians without recompense. At a period of the war when some semblance of chivalry still existed in both eastern armies, such orders appalled many military men on both sides as well as their intended objects or victims. Some of Pope’s officers were in a state of near mutiny as the campaign opened.

It must be remembered, however, that although some army commanders were notoriously “political” in their ambitions—McClellan and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler are two obvious examples—the Union army was riddled with officers holding strong political opinions and friendships. Many of them were ready to accuse others of dereliction of duty, refuse to obey orders themselves, or even hold back troops in battle to ensure the failure of those with whom they disagreed. Some, conservatives like McClellan and his friend Porter, opposed Pope’s “radical” policies (and opposed Lincoln, who approved them, as well). McClellan was not alone in plotting ways to oust Lincoln and the Republicans from power; on the other side, Lincoln and Pope seized any opportunity to belittle McClellan. A political struggle for control of the United States government was waged simultaneously with the military effort to preserve the Union.

Pope’s army consisted of three corps spread in an arc across north-central Virginia from Sperryville, at the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains, to Falmouth, just above Fredericksburg. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, a veteran German officer, led Pope’s right flank at Sperryville, replacing Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, who had resigned. Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, the loser at the First Battle of Manassas and subsequently commander of the defenses of Washington, held the left flank at Falmouth, with one of his divisions (Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts’s) separated and stationed at Waterloo Bridge a few miles west of

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Warrenton. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks led the third corps, which was positioned in the center of Pope's line at Washington (usually called Little Washington), in Rappahannock County. Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's brigade was detached from Banks's command and stationed some twenty miles in advance of the main line at Culpeper Court House, accompanied by Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch's cavalry. Banks had been Jackson's unfortunate opponent in the Shenandoah Valley, and he was eager for a rematch. After Lee learned that Crawford was in Culpeper, he countered the threat to his rear even before he was certain of McClellan's intentions. He divided his army and on Sunday, 13 July, ordered Jackson to march toward Pope, "to observe the enemy's movements closely, to avail himself of any opportunity to attack that may arise." While Jackson ultimately would have about 24,000 men with which to confront Pope's growing army (its numbers had risen to almost 50,000), Lee retained most of the Army of Northern Virginia under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet near Richmond while McClellan threatened the capital. Lee gambled in entrusting Jackson with semi-independent command after Stonewall's poor showing during the Seven Days' Campaign, but Jackson soon demonstrated that Lee's confidence was not misplaced.

By 19 July Jackson reached Gordonsville, a key railroad junction that was thought to be Pope's objective. There, the Virginia Central Railroad, which linked Richmond with the Shenandoah Valley, touched the southern terminus of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Gordonsville became Jackson's headquarters, his army's supply depot, and his base for operations against Pope.

Jackson's army drilled and resupplied itself until early August, when word arrived that part of Pope's army was moving south from Culpeper Court House. Pope's plan, unknown to Jackson, was to march to the Rapidan River, an east-west tributary of the Rappahannock that separated Culpeper County from Orange County to the south. Once there, he planned a southwestward feint toward Charlottesville, to compel Jackson either to fall back in that direction, split his force, or head north to offer Pope combat. Jackson chose the last-named course, intending to meet and defeat the van of Pope's army before the rest could arrive in support. His army marched out of Gordonsville on the afternoon of Thursday, 7 August.

August in Virginia means summer at its hottest and most humid, and both Jackson's and Pope's armies suffered dreadfully as they marched toward each other on the Culpeper-Orange Road (today in some parts U.S. Route 15 and in others two-lane parallel county roads). The dust rose in clouds, choking men and horses, and soldiers straggled and fell by the roadside, prostrated by the intense heat.

The two armies collided on Saturday, 9 August, at Cedar Mountain in southwestern Culpeper County, about four miles north of the Rapidan River. Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and his division led Jackson's column, followed by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder's division, with Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill and his division in the distance bringing up the rear. Late in the afternoon, Jackson deployed his army across the Culpeper-Orange Road, with his right, under Ewell, anchored on the northern base of Cedar Mountain and his left, commanded by Winder, in a woods to the west of the road. Banks threw a division into the fight. Jackson's left crumpled and Winder fell mortally wounded. Just as the Union attack ran out of steam, Hill arrived to reinforce the left flank, and it was the Union line's turn to collapse under the renewed Confederate assault. Jackson's men pursued Banks's even after darkness fell, overrunning Pope's headquarters far to the Federal rear before breaking off the engagement. The battle, not well managed by

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Jackson, was nonetheless a clear Confederate victory. Jackson had more than 18,000 men engaged and suffered some 1,300 casualties, while Banks committed about 8,000 and lost around 2,400. Once Jackson had accomplished his goal of stopping Pope's advance at Cedar Mountain, he retired with his army to Gordonsville and sent cavalry probes northward to search out other avenues for attack. Lee arrived by train at the town to confer with Jackson on the afternoon of 14 August. Pope, Jackson informed Lee, had encamped most of his army (now some 70,000 men) on the "peninsula" formed by the confluence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers in the southeastern corner of Culpeper County. Pope's best route of withdrawal, should the need arise, was the Rappahannock Station railroad bridge at present-day Remington, on the Union right flank. If the Confederates could seize the bridge, Pope would be trapped between the two rivers. Lee grasped the opportunity at once but paused until his cavalry and the supply train for Longstreet's men arrived. He sent Jackson stealthily forward to the Rapidan River, but on 18 August, just before Lee's planned advance, fugitive slaves revealed his scheme to Pope, and the Union army began to withdraw across the Rappahannock. Lee then resorted to probes along the Federal front, with the idea of swinging Jackson's valley army, which now constituted the left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia, around Pope's right flank for an assault on the Union flank and rear.

At the Rappahannock Bridge, McDowell's corps still clung to the south bank of the river. Concerned that Pope could use the bridgehead to launch an attack against his army's rear as it moved around the Union right, Lee ordered Longstreet to attack McDowell and capture the bridge. At the same time, Pope ordered McDowell to withdraw across the bridge and destroy it, and thereby secure his right flank and rear from direct assault. Both orders were executed more or less simultaneously on Saturday, 23 August, with Longstreet attacking the bridgehead as McDowell's rear guard defended his departure with artillery fire from both banks of the Rappahannock River. The Federals then burned the bridge, inadvertently accomplishing Lee's goals as well as their own.

The next day, Lee met with his generals. McClellan, Lee had learned, was moving his army to Aquia Creek on the Potomac River. If he joined Pope, the combined armies might number 130,000 against his own 55,000. Lee had to act before that happened.

He proposed sending Jackson on a broader sweep around Pope's right flank than he had earlier envisioned, to drive toward Manassas Junction, where the Manassas Gap Railroad joined the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Such a turning movement would disrupt Pope's supply line and put part of the Confederate army on a course toward the defenses of Washington. Surely Pope would react to such threats without waiting for the slow-moving McClellan, Lee thought. If Pope moved against Jackson, Lee and Longstreet would press him, and the two wings of the Confederate army would crush Pope between them.

That afternoon, Jackson prepared his wing to move out at his favorite time for sudden marches, "early dawn," about 3:00 A.M. on Monday, 25 August. At the appointed time, he marched his men northwest toward Salem (present-day Marshall) on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Pope, to whom the move was reported, thought Jackson was returning to the Shenandoah Valley and was unconcerned. Jackson drove his men hard all day, forcing them to eat while walking, and by dark the army had covered the twenty-six miles to Salem.

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At dawn on Tuesday, 26 August, Jackson began his Manassas Junction operations by trekking eastward toward Manassas Junction by way of Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, which Jackson found unguarded. When the army reached Gainesville, where the road forked, Jackson swung his army to the right, southeastward toward Bristoe Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. An hour before sunset, his vanguard swept away a small Union force and tried but failed to derail a passing train bound for Manassas Junction. The Confederates soon had better luck when they threw a switch and derailed a second northbound train, then watched as a third plowed into its rear. The engineer in a fourth train spotted the mess ahead in time to reverse to Warrenton Junction. Now both Washington and Pope would know that Confederates were approaching Manassas Junction. Jackson ordered an unusual night attack on Manassas Junction; it succeeded, and he now controlled two key railroad depots.

The Union commanders thought, however, that all this activity meant that Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart was on another of his famous raids. Telegraph messages flew up and down the Federal wires, and a Union brigade under Brig. Gen. George W. Taylor headed to Manassas Junction on 27 August to drive the intruders away. Meanwhile, Jackson had posted much of his army in a strong defensive position near the junction, leaving most of Ewell's division at Bristoe Station as a rear guard. When Taylor approached Manassas, the Confederates almost obliterated the Federal expedition. Now Pope knew for sure that this was no cavalry raid.

Jackson, aware that Lee and Longstreet would arrive by way of Thoroughfare Gap, withdrew his force from Manassas Junction northwest to Groveton, first destroying all the supplies that could not be eaten or carried off. His army occupied a ridge just north of and out of sight of the main east-west road there, the Warrenton Turnpike, with its left flank on Dogan's Branch and his right near the farmhouse of John Brawner. On Thursday, 28 August, Pope sent the vanguard of his army northeast through Manassas Junction, then west on the turnpike toward Jackson, who was notified of the move early in the afternoon. Neither commander was certain of the other's intentions: Jackson thought that perhaps Pope was about to rendezvous with McClellan, while Pope suspected Jackson was retreating. Jackson worried over the whereabouts of Lee and Longstreet, hoping that they had passed Thoroughfare Gap and were about to reinforce him.

About that time, the head of Longstreet's 28,000-man column reached Thoroughfare Gap and fought a brief engagement with the division commanded by Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts. Ricketts had marched his men from their camp at New Baltimore, on the Warrenton Turnpike about four miles northeast of Warrenton, along the east side of the Bull Run Mountains to the gap. They arrived at the gap from one side about the same time (3:00 P.M.) as Longstreet's vanguard, composed of Georgia regiments, approached from the other. After a sharp firefight, Ricketts gave way and Longstreet began his march through the gap, with the Texas Brigade in the lead.

Located some nine miles east at the Brawner farm, Jackson could not hear the fight at the gap. About 5:00 P.M., Brig. Gen. Rufus King's division, one of three in McDowell's corps, swung into Jackson's line of view. At 6:30, as it marched without a cavalry screen up the turnpike, Jackson attacked, beginning the Second Battle of Manassas.

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The Brawner farm engagement lasted for some two and a half hours. After the shock of the initial Confederate assault, King's men recovered and fought hard. As night fell, the fighting died away, as much from exhaustion as from any other factor. The evening was given over to the cries of the wounded. Jackson rode a mile west of his lines toward Thoroughfare Gap, hoping that Lee, who had sent him a message earlier in the day, had arrived with Longstreet's half of the army, but he found the road empty. He rode back to his lines with some apprehension, because he knew that Pope was now certain of his location, and in the morning he would face the entire Federal force.

When the dawn came, Jackson found some 25,000 of Pope's men to the east, deploying against his own 20,000. Pope hoped to position another 25,000 to the west of Jackson and crush the Confederates between the two forces. Jackson responded by drawing his army back to the grade of an unfinished railroad that ran to the northeast just behind the Brawner farm. The bed cut deeply into the ridge in places, was built up above it in others, and formed a strong defensive position. Here Jackson awaited Pope's attack and Lee's arrival.

Pope opened the day's combat about 6:30 A.M. on Friday, 29 August, with probes all along Jackson's line. Shortly before noon, the Union general prepared to launch a massive assault against the Confederate left. To the west, a gray column appeared on the Thoroughfare Gap road, and a courier rode forward to inform Jackson that Brig. Gen. John B. Hood's division, which included the Texas Brigade, had arrived. Longstreet was entering the field, though most of his force was still far to the west. Jackson assigned the Texans to reinforce his right flank, then braced for the attack. It began about 2:00, when Pope's men attacked six or seven times in successive waves. At one point, temporarily out of ammunition but unwilling to retreat a single step, some of the Confederates at the railroad cut grabbed stones and hurled them at the Federals. Finally, as on the day before, darkness ended the fighting, which had been unusually brutal.

Late in the afternoon Lee set up his headquarters on Stuart's Hill, a partly wooded knoll to the southwest of the battlefield that afforded a good view of the action. Longstreet's forces arrived behind Lee, who kept them out of sight in the woods at the hill's eastern base. After the fighting ended, Jackson reported to Lee but found his tent empty, as the commander was away on a reconnaissance. Jackson laid down in another tent and promptly fell asleep; when Lee returned he refused to wake him, so Jackson slept through the night for once.

The next morning, Saturday, 30 August, the battle resumed about 8:00 A.M. with some desultory shelling of Jackson's line by the Federals. Then an ominous silence settled over the battlefield. Jackson, awake and refreshed, reviewed his lines and then returned to Stuart's Hill, where he joined Lee, Longstreet, and J. E. B. Stuart. The silence stretched into the afternoon.

For some reason, Pope ignored reports of Longstreet's arrival on the field. He had convinced himself that Jackson would retreat rather than face his army without support. Pope waited until about 3:00 in the afternoon, then unleashed his "pursuit." The attacking Federals marched directly into massed cannon and musketry, and the effect was devastating. Attack followed attack, and once again some Confederates ran out of ammunition and repeated the "rock fight" of the day before as the artillery blasted holes in the

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oncoming Federal lines. Suddenly, as the third rank of Union soldiers began to crumple, Longstreet's 25,000 men swept onto the field, rolling over the long blue line from the Union left like an irresistible wave. The Federals fled, ironically, to the safety of Henry Hill, where Jackson had stood like a stone wall little more than a year before. Now the Union line re-formed and, as darkness fell, the weary men fended off the last Confederate assaults.

All night long, rain poured down on the living, the wounded, and the dead. Lee and Jackson conferred on the gray morning of Sunday, 31 August. Lee's "blood was up," as those who knew him put it, meaning that he was ready to go in for the kill now that he had crippled his prey. He proposed to send Jackson on another flanking march, this time to the north of Pope and into his rear, pin down the Union army, and then follow up with Longstreet and destroy it. The chances of success seemed far better than during the Seven Days' Campaign, as Lee and Jackson and Longstreet now functioned as a team. There would be no more misunderstood orders, uncoordinated attacks, or lost divisions.

Jackson set off in pursuit that afternoon. By dark his corps had marched ten miles north and encamped in rain and mud at Pleasant Valley Church after turning southeastward on the Little River Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 50). The rain finally stopped about 8:00 A.M. on Monday, 1 September, but the sky remained darkly overcast. Jackson resumed his march down the turnpike toward Fairfax Court House. Stuart arrived to report Union soldiers around a plantation named Chantilly, near a low ridge called Ox Hill. Pope may have been a blustering blowhard, but he was no fool; his cavalry had detected Jackson's move, and the Union commander was ready for it.

About noon, Jackson halted his column to give Longstreet time to catch up. When he learned that the other corps was now only a couple of miles behind him, Jackson resumed the march. At Chantilly he found the Union line strongly posted and settled down to wait for Longstreet, as Lee had ordered.

Pope decided not to wait, however. About 4:00, he launched an assault against Jackson's line. Jackson responded with a strong counterattack just as a massive rainstorm burst over the battlefield. For some two and a half hours, both sides fought viciously while the drenching rain soaked gunpowder, reduced visibility, and so muffled the sounds of combat that commanders could hardly see or hear the enemy. The Union force disengaged first, after Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny, one of the best and most experienced field officers in the Federal army, rode into Jackson's lines in the confusion and was shot down. Jackson remained in place, Longstreet arrived, and darkness fell.

The next morning found Pope successfully withdrawing past Fairfax Court House to the defenses of Washington, with the Army of Virginia seriously damaged but not destroyed. Some of the bloodiest fighting of the war had taken place: the Union army suffered some 17,000 casualties during the campaign, the Confederates about 11,000. Most of the dead and wounded fell at Manassas—a bloody precursor of what lay ahead in Maryland. John Pope was the final casualty: on 2 September Lincoln replaced him with McClellan.

The initiative remained with Lee, who decided for several reasons to move north. If he remained in northern Virginia to await a renewed Union attack, his army would starve. The countryside had been picked clean and the Federal depots at Manassas Junction and other stations had long since been consumed

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or destroyed. Lee's blood was up, and now was the time to carry the war into the North and give his adversaries a taste of what Virginia had suffered. In addition, Lee believed that Maryland, just across the Potomac River from Virginia, was considered by many on both sides to be a Southern state held in the Union by military occupation alone. Lee hoped that sympathetic residents would respond favorably to the arrival of his army by feeding and joining it. Finally, if Lee could operate successfully on Northern soil, both he and President Jefferson Davis believed that one or more European countries might support the Confederacy, at least with diplomatic recognition and, perhaps, with material and military assistance.

Lee's first invasion of the North, later called the Antietam Campaign, began when the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River on 4 September at White's Ford northwest of Leesburg, near the Ball's Bluff battlefield. To protect his rear and secure his supply line, Lee divided his army again, sending Jackson west to capture Harper's Ferry and then rejoin the main force. A copy of Lee's order detailing his strategy was lost, found by a Union soldier, and carried to McClellan, who had sallied forth from Washington with the Army of the Potomac in pursuit. Boasting that he could beat the separate elements of the Confederate army "in detail," McClellan nonetheless dallied, enabling Jackson to reunite his corps with Longstreet's at Antietam Creek, just east of the town of Sharpsburg. On Wednesday, 17 September, the approximately 75,000 soldiers in McClellan's command engaged close to 50,000 in Lee's, in what was the bloodiest single day of the war. The battle lasted twelve hours, and at its conclusion 12,469 Federals were dead, wounded, or missing, and 10,318 Confederates. Neither army drove the other from the field despite a day of desperate charges and countercharges. The next day they simply faced each other, seemingly too stunned by the carnage to resume the fight. During the night of 18-19 September, Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia withdrew across the Potomac, while McClellan pursued cautiously.

Lee's invasion of the North ended in failure. The western Maryland civilians were wary of his army, contributing or selling food grudgingly and hardly flocking to enlist. Desertions, in fact, increased in frequency, perhaps because some Confederates could not bring themselves to do what they accused the Federals of doing—invade another's country. Far from encouraging European recognition of the Confederacy, Lee's invasion and repulse became instead a propaganda coup for Lincoln, who issued a preliminary emancipation proclamation freeing slaves in unoccupied Confederate states on 22 September.

Jackson's corps occupied the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley around Winchester, while Longstreet's encamped at Culpeper Court House. McClellan eventually moved most of his army to Warrenton and only inched toward Lee until an exasperated Lincoln relieved him for the second time on 7 November. In his place Lincoln put Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, an amiable man with impressive side whiskers who already had declined the appointment twice, expressing doubts in his own abilities. While Lee's army reorganized and refitted, Burnside seized the initiative by marching on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg, around Lee's right flank. Lee countered by moving Jackson from the Shenandoah Valley to reunite the army near Fredericksburg.

FREDERICKSBURG AND CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGNS

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During the night of 18-19 September 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River after its unsuccessful foray into Maryland and the bloody Battle of Antietam on 17 September. The army's commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, stationed the second of his two corps at Winchester, in the northern Shenandoah Valley, and the first in Culpeper, in the northern Piedmont. He selected these positions to defend the valley from attack by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, and to defend central Virginia and Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, should McClellan make a thrust south from northern Virginia instead.

Lee's corps commanders, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson (called "Old Jack" by his men) and James Longstreet (his soldiers called him "Old Pete"; Lee referred to him as "my old war horse"), were promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in October 1862 when Lee restructured his army and formalized the corps arrangement. In contrast, McClellan fared badly. Most of the Army of the Potomac was encamped near Warrenton, about twenty miles northeast of Culpeper, while McClellan's headquarters was located in Rectortown, some fifteen miles northwest of Warrenton. Late in the night of Friday, 7 November, as McClellan sat in his tent writing a letter to his wife, a knock came on the tent pole and two general officers entered. One, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, sported an awesome set of jaw whiskers (hence the later name for them, sideburns); the other, Brig. Gen. Catharinus P. Buckingham, bore a letter from President Abraham Lincoln that relieved McClellan of command and appointed Burnside in his place. The next day, after his farewell proclamation was read to the army, McClellan departed. He never again held a military command but ran for president against Lincoln in 1864 on the Democratic ticket. McClellan lost, resumed his career as a civil engineer, served three terms as governor of New Jersey, and later wrote his memoirs.

Ambrose Burnside was a hearty, likeable man who deeply doubted his own abilities. He had declined offers of high command before, feeling ill-suited for the responsibility. Burnside had performed well in a North Carolina coastal campaign and, rewarded with promotion to major general, seemed adequate as a subordinate commander. At Antietam, however, his blind determination to cross the creek there at a stone bridge that has since been called "Burnside's Bridge" delayed his entry into the battle and perhaps prevented a clear Union victory. Burnside's bullheadedness and self-doubts later would have consequences on another battlefield. In November 1862, however, while most of the officers and men were angered by McClellan's removal, they bore Burnside no grudge and resolved to soldier on under his leadership.

Burnside's tenure began well enough, with a reorganization of his 130,000-man army's command structure and plans to seize the initiative from Lee with an aggressive late autumn campaign. Maj. Gen. Edwin V. "Bull" Sumner commanded the Right Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker the Center Grand Division, and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin the Left Grand Division. Sumner, a courageous, blustery old soldier whose bellow could be heard above the din of battle, was regarded as a good follower of orders but utterly lacking in imagination. Hooker, an aggressive field commander, was also known for his overweening ambition; in addition, allegations of low moral character had surfaced during the Mexican War and resurfaced during the Civil War. Franklin, a staunch McClellan partisan,

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shared his hero's reputation for slowness on the battlefield. Burnside would be challenged to whip these subordinates, and the demoralized men under them, into fighting shape.

Burnside's plan—a turning movement—called for a rapid march by his army from Warrenton southeast to Fredericksburg, a distance of roughly forty miles, in order to get around Longstreet's right flank and march on Richmond. As Richmond lay to the south of the Rappahannock River, Burnside planned to cross the river at Fredericksburg using pontoon bridges. His maneuver, he reasoned, would impel Lee to waste time changing his front, and would enable the Army of the Potomac to get between him and the Confederate capital. The ruse depended, unfortunately, on speed of execution—a talent that this army had not exhibited during earlier campaigns.

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, on the other hand, possessed precisely that talent, as well as tactically superior cavalry that served as the commander's eyes and ears. Nonetheless, Lee was surprised when, on 15 November, the Union army suddenly began disappearing from his front. Sumner's Grand Division covered the distance to Falmouth, just north of Fredericksburg, in two days, and by 19 November the whole army was in place on the hills east and north of Fredericksburg, with only the Rappahannock River to cross. Unfortunately, Burnside's brilliant maneuver then stopped dead, for the pontoons that he needed to cross the river and that were to be sent to the town from Washington, were nowhere in sight, thanks to logistical bungling in the capital. While Burnside stewed, Lee moved, and by the time the pontoons arrived on 25 November, Longstreet's corps occupied the high ground on the opposite bank, overlooking the town. Now Burnside faced two choices: withdraw, or fight a battle where he had not planned to fight one.

Although Burnside was not responsible for the delay in acquiring the needed pontoons, he erred when he did not allow Sumner to force a crossing and establish a foothold on the opposite bank before Longstreet's vanguard arrived there. Burnside probed the downstream fords but found them all covered by Confederates, so he reverted to his original plan, to cross at the town despite the guns bristling from the heights, where Lee waited.

The First Battle of Fredericksburg began in a foggy dawn on Thursday, 11 December. Federal engineers struggled to lay five pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock River, three at Fredericksburg and two downstream. Confederate sharpshooters on the southern bank, some concealed in buildings in the town, drove them off there. As the fog slowly lifted, Union gunners began a daylong bombardment of Fredericksburg that failed to dislodge the sharpshooters. Eventually Union infantry crossed the river in boats and drove the Confederates from the town and the engineers finished their work. The next day, most of Sumner's and Franklin's grand divisions (Hooker's remained in reserve) passed over the pontoon bridges and Burnside gave orders for an assault, over the objections of some of his subordinates.

By then the 78,000-man-strong Confederate line stretched for some seven miles, with Longstreet on the left, overlooking the town from a series of hills collectively named Marye's Heights, and Jackson on the right, downriver atop Prospect Hill and in front of it behind a railroad embankment. At dawn on Saturday, 13 December, fog again blanketed the ground (the temperature at sunrise was just above freezing, and by afternoon it was in the fifties). Franklin's Left Grand Division struck Jackson's line and almost

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broke through a gap created by swampy ground, but reinforcements plugged the opening and drove the Federals back. On the Confederate left, wave after wave of Sumner's and Hooker's men spent themselves in brave but futile assaults against Marye's Heights; the slaughter evermore haunted the participants on both sides. Burnside's generals persuaded their distraught commander to cancel his plans to resume the assaults the next day. Lee, contemplating the large number of Federal cannon on Stafford Heights north of the river, refused to attack Burnside, and the day following the battle passed with some skirmishing. During the night of 15 December, the Union army withdrew across the river and the Fredericksburg campaign ended. Federal casualties totaled 12,600; the Confederates lost 5,300.

A Congressional investigation followed this crushing defeat, and Joseph Hooker used the opportunity to advance his own cause while criticizing Burnside, who finally tendered his resignation to Lincoln; in March, Lincoln assigned him command of the Department of the Ohio. The president appointed Hooker in Burnside's place on 25 January 1863, praising the new commander's military skill while chastising him for undermining his former superior. Hooker set to work at once, reorganizing the army yet again (he abolished the grand division scheme on 5 February) and giving each corps its own badge. A good organizer, Hooker helped restore Union morale and pride. He also created a separate cavalry corps, first under the command of Maj. Gen. George Stoneman and then, after 7 June, under Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. Placing the cavalry under a single command enhanced its performance and soon ended the days of Confederate domination.

Hooker was admired for his courage and aggressiveness, as his nom de guerre, "Fighting Joe," suggested. He also had a reputation, however, as a hard drinker and a man of loose morals dating from the time of the Mexican War. The nickname for prostitutes has, somewhat unfairly, been ascribed to him. In actuality, the name gained popularity in America about 1845 from a section of New York City called the Hook and known for its brothels. It was coincidence that Hooker's name became famous about the same time as the slang term.

For the rest of the winter, Hooker's Army of the Potomac trained and refitted while keeping an eye on the Army of Northern Virginia across the Rappahannock. Hooker employed elements of his new cavalry corps to annoy the Confederates and probe their lines, and Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart responded in kind. At dawn on Tuesday, 17 March, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell led about 2,100 troopers from his division across the river at Kelly's Ford to attack Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade near Culpeper Court House. Pickets at the ford sent word to Lee, who soon rode to the river with some 800 cavalymen; Stuart and his brilliant young artillery chief, the twenty-four-year-old Maj. John Pelham ("The Gallant Pelham," Robert E. Lee called him), rode along to see the action. The fighting started about noon and continued until the Federals withdrew across the ford about dusk. For the first time, the Union cavalry fought its Confederate counterparts almost to a standstill, in what was the largest all-cavalry battle until that time in the East. The combined casualties on both sides amounted to about 200. Tragically, one of them was John Pelham, who fell mortally wounded by a shell fragment while impetuously racing to overtake the hard-charging 3d Virginia Cavalry. Stuart wept bitterly at the news, as did many others in the army, for Pelham was much loved by all who knew him.

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During the late winter and early spring of 1863, Hooker devised a strategy not only for getting around Lee but for beating him in battle and then marching on to Richmond. Taking a page from Lee's book, Hooker would send his cavalry corps sweeping around the Confederate left flank to cut Lee's communications with the Confederate capital. Then he would assault Lee's left flank and rear by marching north with three corps of his army, crossing the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, and driving southeast.

Three others would attack directly across the river at Fredericksburg, largely as a diversion, while the remaining corps remained conspicuously in sight across from Fredericksburg and at Banks's Ford. "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none," Hooker allegedly boasted. After whipping Lee, he told Lincoln, he would march on to Richmond. It was a solid plan, and it very nearly succeeded. In February 1863, Lee unintentionally assisted Hooker in his plans by reducing the size of his army near Fredericksburg to about 60,000. Responding to Federal threats in Tidewater Virginia and North Carolina, Lee dispatched Longstreet to southeastern Virginia with instructions to counter any Union initiatives and also to gather supplies for the main army. Accompanied by major generals George E. Pickett and John Bell Hood and their divisions (some 20,000 men), Longstreet departed on 17 February on his assignment, and from 11 April to 4 May conducted the Siege of Suffolk while Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill operated against the Federals in coastal North Carolina. Longstreet's siege of the town and its 25,000 Union defenders under Brig. Gen. John Peck produced two engagements. The first, at Norfleet House, occurred on 14-15 April when Union gunboats on the Nansemond River attempted to run past the Confederate battery there, just downriver from the town. The attempt failed when the battery's fire crippled the gunboat *Mount Washington*. Overnight, the Federals built their own batteries across the river, concealed behind brush and small trees. On 15 April, they unmasked their guns and drove the Confederates from the Norfleet house position. The second engagement took place downriver at Hill's Point, where the Confederate left flank rested on the river in an old fortification that dated to the War of 1812. Renamed Fort Huger, this stronghold was open in the rear toward Suffolk. On 19 April, Union gunboats raced past the fort and landed an infantry force just upstream; it attacked from behind the defenders and drove them off, thereby reopening the river to Federal shipping. The two sides suffered fewer than 200 casualties in these engagements. At the end of April, Lee ordered Longstreet to break off his unproductive siege and return to the main army. The last of Longstreet's task force left the area on 4 May.

On Monday, 27 April, Hooker launched his campaign against Lee. He left 40,000 troops at Fredericksburg under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick to make a diversionary attack that would freeze the Confederates in their works, and marched with the remainder of his army northwest from Falmouth to Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock River. Part of his force remained on guard downstream at Scott's Ford and United States Ford while the rest crossed at Kelly's Ford and marched south to pass over the Rapidan River at Germanna and Ely's Fords. Stoneman's cavalry corps had departed on 13 April on its raid against Lee's communications with Richmond; the raid would be largely ineffective and deprive Hooker of essential flank protection. By the evening of 30 April, three of Hooker's seven infantry corps were concentrated near the Chancellor family home on the Orange Plank Road called Chancellorsville. A few miles east, at Zoan Church, in a desperate attempt to prevent the envelopment of the Army of Northern

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Virginia, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson dug in across the plank road and the Orange Turnpike. Lee divided his army and ordered Jackson to march to Chancellorsville and challenge Hooker; Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early and 12,000 men remained behind to occupy the Fredericksburg line, and thereby block Sedgwick from reinforcing Hooker. Thus far, Hooker's plan had succeeded brilliantly: he had virtually enveloped Lee, who had divided his force, already outnumbered two-to-one, into yet smaller components; victory lay within Hooker's grasp.

Jackson collided with Hooker on Friday, 1 May. Hooker's men had emerged from the Wilderness, a tangle of brush and small, second-growth trees, when Jackson confronted them and a firefight ensued. The sound of battle reached Hooker, who had occupied the Chancellor house as his headquarters. There, in the early afternoon, with success seemingly assured, Hooker ordered his army to fall back and assume defensive positions. As Fighting Joe is reputed to have explained, "for once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it." The prospect of directly facing Lee in battle with sole responsibility for the outcome may have been more than Hooker could bear. His generals received his orders with stunned disbelief, then anger. One rode to headquarters to confirm them, threatening the messenger that if he found them to be false he would have him shot.

Hooker had passed the initiative to Lee, who reacted with breathtaking audacity. During the night of 1–2 May, he and Jackson sat on hardtack boxes at the intersection of the Orange Plank Road and a smaller road that led westward past Catharine Furnace and around the Federal right flank, which Stuart reported to be "in the air" (not anchored on a natural defensive feature). The generals pored over a map and discussed the situation. Lee made his decision, confirmed by another conference just before dawn: he would divide his army yet again and send Jackson and 32,000 men on a wide movement to outflank Hooker's envelopment. Lee, meanwhile, would remain in Hooker's front with 14,000 soldiers and "demonstrate" to distract him and his 70,000-man army.

Jackson's march, a twelve-mile-long sweep to the west, south, and north, then east, got underway about 7:30 A.M. on 2 May. It occupied most of the day and remained a secret only for an hour. Hooker, like Pope before him, misinterpreted the move and thought it augured a retreat by Lee. He did warn his right-flank commander, and he also sent a force toward Catharine Furnace to find out what was happening, but the warning largely went unheeded and the expedition merely drew needed troops away from his line. By 5:00 Jackson was in position, his battle line formed in a north-south direction across the turnpike and plank road in the Wilderness. A few minutes later, he launched the assault.

An "acoustical shadow" hung over the Wilderness, not unlike that at Seven Pines during the Peninsula Campaign the previous year. The soldiers cooking their suppers on the Union right flank heard nothing of the approaching Confederates, but suddenly deer, rabbits, and wild turkeys came racing through their camps, driven by the onrushing line. The Confederates followed fast behind, rolling up the Federal flank. As so often happened, Jackson's sudden success resulted in as much confusion among the attackers as the attacked. By dark both the Union and the Confederate lines were in wild disarray, in some cases intermingled, and little firefights broke out here and there along the front as units collided with one another.

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In the early evening, Jackson and several others rode toward the Union line to reconnoiter in anticipation of continued attacks that night. Jackson turned to reenter his own lines about 9:30 P.M. Just then, another burst of shooting erupted, and the 18th North Carolina Infantry opened fire on the horsemen riding down on them in the dark. Three bullets struck Jackson, and several in his party were killed. Helped down from his horse, Jackson lay on the ground with his left arm shattered; he was nearly captured before his men got him to a safe area, where Dr. Hunter H. McGuire amputated his arm. Soon he was on his way to Guiney Station on the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, where his condition improved slowly.

Stuart assumed command of Jackson's corps. He pounded the Union line relentlessly from the west and southwest, starting at dawn on 3 May, driving the Federals east toward Chancellorsville. The Union soldiers fought tenaciously, and casualties mounted on both sides. By 9:00 A.M. the Federal line was almost a perfect circle around the Chancellor house, Hooker's headquarters, where the general stood on the porch to receive a report. A Confederate solid shot struck one of the columns, shattering it and slamming half of it onto Hooker, who fell to the porch floor unconscious. Although he soon regained his senses, Hooker never regained his offensive momentum, and when Lee pressed his army from the south about 10:00, he ordered it to fall back toward the Rappahannock into prepared positions. A sturdy defense by Hooker's artillery held off the oncoming Confederates long enough for the infantry to move back as ordered. With Stuart attacking from the west and southwest and Lee from the southeast, both wings in concert, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had accomplished by noon what he tried to do at the Second Battle of Manassas—crush the opposing army in the jaws of a vise—and had achieved his greatest victory.

Lee's victory was not quite complete, however, for trouble lurked behind him. In what has been called the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Union general John Sedgwick overwhelmed Jubal Early and threatened to attack the rear and right flank of Lee's force. In the morning, Sedgwick had attacked Marye's Heights twice without success, but the third time proved the charm. Early fell back to the south, and word of Sedgwick's breakout reached Lee at noon. Again, audaciously, Lee divided his army; leaving 20,000 men to keep Hooker in his works, he headed east on the turnpike with two divisions. At Salem Church, atop a long north-south ridgeline, the Confederates blocked the Federal advance, and the next day, Lee hemmed them in on three sides and pushed them back toward the river. The next morning he found that Sedgwick had led his army across the Rappahannock at Scott's Ford; at Chancellorsville two days later, Hooker retreated as well. Lee's victory was complete.

The victory came at a terrible cost in casualties. About 60,000 Confederate soldiers had fought some 135,000 Union soldiers; 12,764 Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured, compared with 17,287 Federals. One casualty loomed larger than all the rest in consequences: Stonewall Jackson. After a few days of seeming improvement, Jackson began a steady decline. His wife and baby daughter were rushed to his side from Richmond. Despite Dr. McGuire's best efforts, infection and possibly pneumonia set in; Jackson sank into delirium. In his mind he was back on the battlefield, issuing orders: "Push up the columns!" Finally he grew quieter, calmer. The great warrior's last words were of peace: "Let us cross

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Over the river and rest under the shade of the trees." He died at 3:15 P.M. on 10 May, a Sunday. He had always wished to die on a Sunday, he had said that morning.

The effects of Jackson's death on the Confederate cause are impossible to overstate. The soldiers, particularly those in his corps and his old brigade, were devastated. When the news reached the camps, "the sounds of merriment died away as if the Angel of Death himself had flapped his muffled wings over the troops." Men wept openly, heaving with sobs. When Lee first heard of Jackson's wounding, he refused to accept the prospect of his death: "Surely General Jackson will recover," he prayed, "God will not take him from us, now that we need him so much." When he learned of Jackson's death, he wept for the passing of his friend as well as his lieutenant, and could not speak of it. In the midst of their greatest victory, Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had suffered their greatest loss. A Lexington girl echoed the feelings of all Confederates, civilians as well as soldiers, when she wrote that when Jackson died, "for the first time it had dawned on us that God would let us be defeated."

The war went on, of course. Having defeated the Army of the Potomac, Lee convinced President Jefferson Davis that the time was right for another invasion of the North. His army needed fresh supplies, and Virginia's storehouses were empty. It was the North's turn to feed his men. Fresh from Chancellorsville, their spirits and confidence high despite Jackson's death, Lee's soldiers surely would give him another great victory, this time on enemy soil. Surely, foreign recognition would follow. Lee's blood was up; he would invade Pennsylvania.

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

More trees have been felled and more ink spilled for the publication of books about the Gettysburg campaign than any other episode of the Civil War. It is also safe to say that more armchair generals and military historians have delivered themselves of weighty judgments on the subject—with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight—than there were soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac combined.

The debate over the campaign and battle began to rage almost as soon as the guns fell silent. Two questions are at the center of the controversy: Should Gen. Robert E. Lee have invaded Pennsylvania? Who is responsible for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg?

Regarding the first question, it is important to understand that despite the brilliant victory of Lee over Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, by early May 1863 the Confederacy was in a state of crisis. In the West, along the Mississippi River, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant maneuvered his Federal army against Vicksburg, a Southern stronghold that controlled shipping on the mighty river. A siege of the city seemed imminent, and if Vicksburg fell the Confederacy would be split down the middle.

Lee traveled to Richmond in mid-May to discuss the situation with President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. Some of the Confederacy's problems resulted from the fact that it consisted of a loose

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confederation of states without as powerful a central government as its opponent possessed. The principle of decentralization affected the army as well, and its effects were especially felt in the West at this crucial moment, where the Confederate command was divided. Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton commanded a 32,000-man garrison at Vicksburg but Grant outnumbered him about two to one. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Davis's theater commander in the region, led an army of some 30,000 but was uncertain of his role and authority beyond his own force. The situation was ripe for disaster.

In Virginia, Lee alone commanded. He enjoyed Davis's unwavering support and arrived in Richmond on 14 May with a plan for carrying the war north and relieving some of the pressure on Pemberton and Johnston. First, however, he had to contend with an alternative plan. Several high-ranking Confederates, including Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard and Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Lee's senior corps commander, favored a strategy of reinforcing the western theater while Lee adopted a defensive position in Virginia. Longstreet would march with his corps to Tennessee to reinforce Gen. Braxton Bragg and join with Johnston to defeat first the Federal army under Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans and then Grant and his force.

Lee's plan called for giving Johnston the authority to redistribute troops as he saw fit and then leaving it to him to attack Grant and relieve Vicksburg. In the meantime, Lee would invade Maryland and Pennsylvania, in part to resupply his army with Northern goods rather than further strip the already depleted farms of northern Virginia. He wanted to defend the South in the North. He wanted to win the conclusive victory that had eluded him so far and win it on the enemy's home soil. If he annihilated the Army of the Potomac in Pennsylvania, then whatever happened to Vicksburg would be less important. Furthermore, such a victory as Lee envisioned could cause the North to sue for a negotiated peace, and might even result in foreign recognition of the Confederate states. Time, Lee recognized, was not on the side of the South. The weight of Northern manpower and manufacturing was beginning to tell; Lee wanted a quick, decisive victory before the scales tipped too far. These, then, were Lee's reasons for invading the North; their validity continues to be debated.

Davis approved his plan, together with Lee's proposed reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia. Instead of two large infantry corps, there would be three smaller ones, commanded by Longstreet, Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, and Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, and one cavalry division (usually called a corps) under Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Each corps would have its own artillery reserve. This arrangement would remain basically intact for the rest of the war.

Lee's four corps commanders were veterans he trusted and admired. Longstreet, whom Lee referred to as "my Old War Horse," was his senior lieutenant, dependable yet sometimes in need of prodding. Ewell, feisty and prickly, had served Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson as a division commander and now took over Stonewall's old corps. Hill, who had feuded with Jackson openly, was often bold but sometimes hesitant; he suffered from the ill effects of gonorrhea and was absent from duty frequently. Stuart, Lee's flamboyant and innovative cavalry commander, served as the army's "eyes and ears." Each man. Lee was convinced, was the best at his job in the Confederate army, yet each would fall short of his

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expectations on this campaign. Lee was fifty-six in the third spring of the war, Longstreet forty-two, Ewell forty-six, Hill thirty-seven, and Stuart thirty.

Who was responsible for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg? Traditionally, the finger of guilt has been pointed at Lee's lieutenants. Stuart, perhaps to compensate for being caught napping at Brandy Station, left Lee blind and deaf to the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac by absenting himself and his corps to raid Union wagon trains and make another grandiose ride around the enemy's army. If he had stuck close, the argument goes, Lee would not have been surprised by the initial encounter at Gettysburg and could have offered combat on better terrain. Ewell, "Old Bald Head" to his men, who usually was as aggressive as he was excitable, failed to seize Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill on the first day of the battle, thereby yielding the high ground to the Federals and dooming Lee to a series of futile, costly assaults. Hill, on the second day, did not exercise enough control over his portion of the attack on Cemetery Ridge and contributed to the Confederate failure there by bringing on a battle prematurely on 1 July before the army was concentrated and on 2 July by assaulting with a thin, unsupported line.

For every finger pointed at Stuart, Ewell, and Hill, however, a dozen have been pointed at James Longstreet. The chorus of condemnation began soon after the war, when Longstreet began publishing his reminiscences, most of which sought to justify his actions at Gettysburg. His autobiography, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, first appeared in 1896.

Longstreet supported the plan to reinforce Johnston in the West and require Lee to assume a defensive posture in Virginia. He claimed that when the strategy to invade the North was adopted instead, Lee agreed with his suggestion that the army wage an essentially defensive campaign there and seek to avoid a pitched battle. Longstreet therefore felt betrayed when Lee determined to stand and fight at Gettysburg; he argued against the frontal assault now popularly called Pickett's Charge and advocated instead a flanking movement around the Union left flank. But Lee's "blood was up," and when he could not be dissuaded, Longstreet hesitated to commit reinforcements because he knew the tactic would fail and the losses would be horrific (some historians contend Longstreet simply went into a pout when he did not get his way). The blame for the defeat at Gettysburg, Longstreet concluded, rested on Lee's shoulders.

Longstreet's version of events brought an avalanche of outrage down on his head. Most of it, as Thomas L. Connelly ably pointed out in his seminal 1977 work, *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society*, was the result of a campaign orchestrated by former Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, the self-appointed defender of the Lost Cause and of the role of Virginians in leading it. Early, the author of *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War* and *Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States*, countered any criticism of Virginia generals, particularly Lee, with a blizzard of letters and articles. It was largely due to Early's efforts, Connelly argues, that Lee the fallible, fascinating human being became Lee "the Marble Man," saintly and perfect and beyond reproach. Longstreet was guilty of three unforgivable sins, in Early's eyes: he dared to criticize Lee, his lack of support for Lee at Gettysburg cost the Confederacy the victory and ultimately the war, and he was a South Carolinian by birth and a Georgian by choice, not a Virginian. That he was at least half right in his assessment sealed his fate as a pariah.

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What is the truth about the loss at Gettysburg? Lee, at least, knew where the responsibility lay, and he knew it at once. When Pickett's shattered division staggered back to Seminary Ridge, Lee said, "All this has been my fault—it is *I* that have lost this fight." On 31 July, Lee wrote to Davis, "I am alone to blame." A week later, on 8 August, Lee tendered his resignation to Davis as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia; Davis of course declined to accept it.

Emory M. Thomas, the author of the acclaimed 1995 biography, *Robert E. Lee*, agreed with Lee's assignment of blame. Lee, wrote Thomas, relied too much on suggestions, or discretionary orders, rather than explicit commands, once he decided to fight at Gettysburg. Such methods had served him well in the past, most notably in his relations with Jackson, but at Gettysburg, it seems, the law of averages caught up with him. Stuart galloped off on a riding tour, Ewell decided it was not possible to seize Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill, and Longstreet sulked. But if his subordinates betrayed his trust, it was Lee who decided to stand and fight, Lee who abandoned his flanking tactics, Lee who did not withdraw to more favorable terrain, Lee who did not wait for the Federals to attack him, Lee who ordered the fatal assault on the center of the Union line. Lee made the strategic errors; his lieutenants made the tactical ones.

And, as more than one historian has pointed out, the Federals had something to do with the Confederate defeat. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac after 28 June, and his subordinates took advantage of Lee's and his generals' errors. The Union army occupied a strong defensive position and refused to budge, tantalizing Lee into attacking. The Federal commanders showed initiative and the soldiers fought like demons. The Union artillery devastated the Confederate ranks at crucial moments. The Federal cavalry fought well and countered Stuart's every move. The result at Gettysburg was as much a Union victory as it was a Confederate defeat. Coupled with Grant's capture of Vicksburg on 4 July, the day after Longstreet's attack on Cemetery Ridge (popularly called Pickett's Charge), the Union success at Gettysburg dealt the Confederacy a telling blow just two months after Lee's great victory at Chancellorsville.

Lee began his march to Pennsylvania on 3 June, within two weeks of his return from Richmond to his field headquarters near Fredericksburg, by moving two of his three infantry corps from the banks of the Rappahannock River to Culpeper Court House. Hill was left temporarily in strong earthworks above Fredericksburg to block any Federal attack in the Confederate rear. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, probed Lee's line to find out what was happening, but did not succeed. Rumors ran rampant that Lee planned a big cavalry raid by Stuart, a flanking movement to get between Hooker and Washington, or even an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania.

Finally ascertaining that the head of the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrating in Culpeper County, on 7 June Hooker ordered Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to conduct a spoiling raid there, "disperse and destroy" the column and its supplies, and generally disrupt Confederate plans, whatever they might be. Lee arrived in Culpeper the same day and responded affirmatively to an invitation from Stuart to attend a grand review of his cavalry corps on 8 June. Stuart already had held two reviews, the first on 23 May and the second on 5 June, on the plains between Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station, a depot on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad half a dozen miles northeast. The second had been a grand affair indeed, with mock combats, special trains from the

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courthouse town bearing bebies of beauteous belles, and Stuart's horse bedecked in flowers—and Stuart promised to repeat the show on 8 June for Lee's benefit. The third performance was scaled back, but even so both cavalymen and newspaper reporters grouched that the reviews did little more than exhaust the horses and feed Stuart's ego.

After the review, which Lee enjoyed and described in a letter to his wife, Stuart and his horsemen moved into bivouacs in and around Brandy Station. Lee intended for Stuart to begin in the morning to screen the infantry's march toward the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Shenandoah Valley by crossing the Rappahannock River and striking the Union army's advance posts. While Stuart slept atop Fleetwood Hill overlooking the depot, however, Pleasonton slipped into position at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords, two important river crossings just a few miles northwest and southeast of Stuart's headquarters.

The Battle of Brandy Station on 9 June came as a surprise to all on both sides of the river. Pleasonton had divided his 11,000-man force (seven cavalry brigades, two infantry brigades, and six artillery companies) in two: Brig. Gen. John Buford commanded the first part and Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg the second. Buford approached Beverly's Ford stealthily over two days, bivouacking about a mile from the ford in Fauquier County on 8 June. Gregg encamped farther away from Kelly's Ford, about six miles downstream from Beverly's, and arose before dawn to ride to the crossing. Pleasonton's plan called for both commands to cross simultaneously at dawn, unite at Brandy Station, and ride to Culpeper Court House.

Pleasonton knew the fords would be guarded by Confederate pickets on the western bank of the Rappahannock, hence his methods of approach. He did not know, however, that Stuart's entire corps, some 9,500 men, was bivouacked close by. Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade was at Oak Shade Church, a few miles northwest of Brandy Station; Brig. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee's was around the Welford house, Farley; Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones's slept around Saint James's Church on the Beverly's Ford road (present-day Rte. 677); Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson's was around the Barbour house, Beauregard; and Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton's Legion had encamped just north of Stevensburg, a village about four and a half miles south of Brandy Station.

Buford's crossing took place on time; Gregg's did not. Buford's cavalymen drove through Stuart's pickets and charged down the Beverly's Ford road toward Fleetwood Hill, but were stopped at Saint James's Church by Jones's hastily assembled defense and driven back up the road by effective Confederate countercharges. The Federals gradually pushed Jones's men back to the church, but Hampton arrived to lengthen and strengthen the line there and Rooney Lee threatened the Union right flank at the northern end of Fleetwood Hill, in an area known as the Yew Hills. Buford was forced to fight on two fronts: the combat on his right flank, focused on a stone wall seized by Lee's men on the Cunningham farm, soon reached a stalemate; the fighting straight ahead (south) around the church resulted in Jones's and Hampton's cavalymen falling back slowly southwest to Fleetwood Hill. Their evacuation exposed Rooney Lee's right flank, and he was compelled to abandon the stone wall and retire toward Farley as Buford pressed west.

Gregg, meanwhile, crossed at Kelly's Ford; the Confederate pickets raced to Brandy Station to bring the news to Stuart, who at first disbelieved them. He sent Robertson and his brigade toward the ford,

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and they encountered a Union infantry brigade there. Robertson formed his men in a blocking position across the road from Brandy Station (today's Rte. 674) on the Brown and Brannin farms, the scene of the Battle of Kelly's Ford on 17 March. There the two brigades faced each other all day, scarcely firing a shot, while Gregg rode off in the direction of Stevensburg (on present-day Rte. 672) with his cavalry force.

Gregg divided his command near Carrico Mill. He and about 2,400 of his men rode northwest toward Brandy Station (on today's Rte. 669), while Col. Alfred N. A. Duffié led a smaller number toward Stevensburg. There, Duffié was to turn north and ride to Brandy Station (on present-day Rte. 663).

About noon, as Jones's and Hampton's cavalymen held their own along the Saint James's Church line, Gregg's column arrived at Brandy Station and surprised Stuart for the second time that day. Stuart's adjutant, Maj. Henry B. McClellan, held off Gregg with a single cannon long enough for some of Jones's troopers to reach the crest of Fleetwood Hill at the same time as Gregg's. What followed was a classic cavalry confrontation as the two forces collided: mounted charges and countercharges, horse against horse and saber against saber. None of the participants ever forgot it, and the fighting raged for several hours as first one side and then the other swept across the broad hilltop. The arrival of Hampton's brigade finally tipped the scales for the Confederates.

When Hampton raced to Jones's aid early that morning, he left Col. Matthew C. Butler and the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry to guard the road from Stevensburg to Brandy Station. Butler learned of Duffié's approach and rode through Stevensburg to form a mile-long blocking line across the road and along the eastern crest of Hansborough Ridge. Meanwhile, Col. Thomas T. Munford, who commanded Fitz Lee's brigade that day, ordered Col. Williams C. Wickham's 4th Virginia Cavalry to assist Butler. Wickham rode south from Brandy Station, arriving just as Duffié charged Butler's thin line, and the 4th Virginia broke and ran for the rear. Pursued through Stevensburg, Butler formed a new line facing south across Mountain Run, about a mile north of the village. A lucky shot from a Federal cannon seriously wounded Butler and killed Will Farley, one of Stuart's favorite scouts. Butler's troopers, and Wickham's, pulled back another mile to Jonas Run; Duffié, receiving orders to hasten to Gregg's assistance, turned away from this new line, retraced his route all the way to Carrico Mill, and rode to Brandy Station along Gregg's path but arrived too late to pitch into the fray.

As the afternoon wore on, Stuart at last organized an effective counterattack using reinforcements from Fitz Lee's brigade. While Rooney Lee charged Buford across the Yew Hills, pushing the Union commander back toward Beverly's Ford, another Confederate charge swept the Federals from Fleetwood Hill, through Brandy Station and across the eastern plain toward the Orange & Alexandria Railroad bridge over the Rappahannock River at Norman's Ford (near present-day Remington). As the sun set, Pleasonton's command crossed to safety at Beverly's, Norman's, and Kelly's Fords. Pleasonton reported some 900 casualties, Stuart 500.

Tactically, the Battle of Brandy Station—the largest mounted cavalry fight of the war—ended in a draw, although both sides claimed victory. Strategically, the advantage went to Pleasonton, Buford, and the Union cavalry corps, although they had failed in their immediate mission as defined by Hooker.

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Instead, they had surprised Stuart twice, battled his vaunted troopers effectively all day long, and withdrawn from the field under their own steam, not because they had been defeated. While Federal morale soared, many Southern newspapers pilloried Stuart, taking satisfaction that the flamboyant cavalier had received a comeuppance. Stuart responded in kind, but privately he felt the sting of his critics. His narrow escape and the resulting damage to his ego are thought by some historians to have influenced his behavior on the remainder of the Gettysburg campaign, causing him to miss the first day's battle in Pennsylvania while attempting to recover his former glory by riding around the Union army, and thereby contributing to Lee's defeat. Brandy Station marked the turning of the tide in favor of the Federal cavalry, although neither side realized it.

Lee professed pleasure over the outcome at Brandy Station and complimented Stuart on his quick reactions. Then he continued his infantry's march toward the Shenandoah Valley unimpeded by Hooker. Because of the army's size, about 75,000 men, the three corps took different routes west to the valley and north to Pennsylvania. Ewell, leading the advance, marched through the Blue Ridge Mountains at Chester Gap, then down the valley through Front Royal toward Winchester. Longstreet's corps, which Lee accompanied, entered the valley at Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, while Hill followed Ewell's route through Chester Gap after Hooker abandoned Fredericksburg on 14 June to begin his pursuit of Lee. Stuart's cavalry screened the army's flank between Hooker and the Blue Ridge.

Ewell and his corps materialized south and east of Winchester on 13 June. The next day, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division approached from the south and east while Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's attacked from the west; Ewell ordered Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes and his division to first to Berryville and then to Martinsburg, north of Winchester. Now the Federal garrison, commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy, was effectively surrounded.

The Second Battle of Winchester began about 6:00 P.M., when Confederate artillery opened on the Union positions as a prelude to Early's infantry assault at 6:45. An earthwork was overrun before darkness fell, and Milroy decided—as he should have done days earlier—to retreat. The withdrawal began at 1:00 A.M. on 15 June, and Ewell moved swiftly to block it. Although Rodes could cut off Milroy's retreat into Maryland, Ewell wanted to stop Milroy before he got that far, so he ordered Johnson to march quickly around Winchester and intercept the Federals. At 3:30 A.M., in a rare night attack, Johnson struck Milroy's column near Stephenson's Depot on the Winchester & Potomac Railroad four miles northeast of Winchester. The fighting was intense, and resulted in a humiliating Union defeat as about half of Milroy's force soon surrendered (Milroy himself escaped). Some 4,000 Federals were captured and about 450 killed or wounded; Ewell lost 50 killed or missing and about 200 wounded. The Confederates also captured 23 cannon, 300 wagons and the same number of horses, and a large quantity of stores. More importantly, Ewell had cleared the way for Lee's advance into Maryland and Pennsylvania without the threat of attack by Union forces in the valley or northern Virginia. Rodes's command led the way across the Potomac River the same day.

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Stuart, meanwhile, continued to screen the army's march. On 17 June, Pleasonton sent three brigades under Gregg from Manassas Junction to Aldie, a milling village at the intersection of three highways, to search out the Confederate army. The first highway at Aldie, Little River Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 50), led east through Fairfax Court House to Alexandria. The second, Snicker's Gap Turnpike (today's Rte. 734), ran northwest to the gap, where other roads continued to Berryville and Winchester. The third, Ashby's Gap Turnpike (U.S. Rte. 50), extended southwest through Middleburg, Upperville, and Paris to the gap, and eventually to the Valley Turnpike just south of Winchester. Since the Army of Northern Virginia was marching by way of, or crossing, the latter two of these roads, driving Gregg out of Aldie and eastward became a priority for Stuart.

Gregg's command consisted of the brigades led by Duffié, Brig. Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick, and Col. J. Irvin Gregg. He ordered Duffié to march through Thoroughfare Gap and then to Middleburg on a roundabout route, then rode to Aldie, located some five miles east of Middleburg, with his other brigades and accompanied by Pleasonton. They arrived at the village about 4:00 P.M., just as Fitz Lee's brigade, temporarily commanded by Munford, prepared to bivouac there overnight. The result was a short, sharp fight.

The engagement at Aldie surprised both combatants. The Confederates approached the village from the west, while the Federals passed through it from the east, and the two forces collided just northwest of the village on the Snicker's Gap Turnpike. Dismounted sharpshooters from both sides skirmished first, followed by mounted charges and countercharges, then a brief artillery duel. Additional mounted combat eventually pushed Munford and his command west toward Middleburg, but the Federals suffered heavy casualties in this four-hour-long engagement.

Duffié, meanwhile, arrived south of Middleburg in the late afternoon and drove in the Confederate pickets there. Stuart, who was in the town, evaded Duffié, while Munford's and Robertson's brigades attacked and routed his command in an early morning assault on 18 June as Duffié tried to break out toward Aldie. The principal engagement at Middleburg occurred the next day, 19 June, when Col. J. Irvin Gregg's brigade advanced west from Aldie. Stuart formed his command in a line just west of Middleburg along a ridge top and repulsed Gregg's charge. Stuart counterattacked, then fell back to another defensive position a half-mile farther west. In this action, Maj. Heros von Borcke, a Prussian officer and aide to Stuart, fell wounded with a bullet in his neck; he recovered and was at Stuart's bedside when he died the next year.

Little skirmishing occurred the next day, but about 7:00 A.M. on 21 June Pleasonton made a concerted effort to pierce Stuart's screen by advancing on Upperville, located about nine miles west of Middleburg. Col. Strong Vincent marched with his infantry brigade directly down the Ashby's Gap Turnpike, along with Col. J. Irvin Gregg's and Brig. Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry brigades, while Brig. Gen. John Buford led his cavalry division north and west in the main attack against Stuart's left flank. Buford's maneuver bogged down when he encountered Jones's and Col. John R. Chambliss's brigades; Stuart withdrew, fighting furiously, to take a strong defensive position in Ashby's Gap.

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The week of cavalry combat resulted in some 800 Union casualties and about 240 on the Confederate side. Although Pleasonton thought he had done well to drive Stuart west, in fact he had learned almost nothing about the movement of Lee's infantry into Maryland and Pennsylvania.

Stuart, heartened by his success at screening the Army of Northern Virginia, now made a fateful decision. He received vaguely worded discretionary orders from Lee the next day, 22 June, and early on 25 June began his ride through and east of the Army of the Potomac, effectively severing communications with Lee. After raiding Union supply lines, Stuart finally rejoined Lee at Gettysburg, but not until the day after the two armies had blundered into one another on 1 July and become fully engaged.

Joseph Hooker had submitted his resignation as commander of the Army of the Potomac on 27 June, and Lincoln appointed Maj. Gen. George G. Meade in his place early the next morning. After his victory at Gettysburg, Meade was criticized for not pursuing the retreating Confederates with vigor, but the Union army was hardly in a condition to rush into another fight. The casualty figures after three days of combat were enormous: on the Union side, 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5,365 missing; on the Confederate, 3,903 killed, 18,735 wounded, and 5,425 missing. Both sides needed to recuperate.

Lee crossed the Potomac River into Virginia at Falling Waters and Williamsport, Maryland, on 13-14 July and withdrew up the Shenandoah Valley. Meade crossed east of the Blue Ridge and paralleled Lee's route. On 23 July, Meade ordered the III Corps under Maj. Gen. William H. French to force a passage through Manassas Gap and cut off the retreating Confederate columns at Front Royal. Brig. Gen. Henry H. Walker's Confederate brigade of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division guarded the gap; at first light, French began pushing Walker back slowly. About 4:30 P.M., a strong Union attack drove Walker's men until they were reinforced by Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division and artillery. By dusk, the Federals abandoned their poorly coordinated attacks, and during the night the Confederate forces withdrew into the Luray (Page) Valley. The next day, the Union army occupied Front Royal, but Lee's army was safely beyond pursuit.

Lee's invasion of the North accomplished some of his objectives, disrupted Federal plans for a summer campaign in Virginia, and enabled his men to subsist on Union supplies instead of Virginians'. But the cost had been high, too high. The Army of Northern Virginia had received a blow from which it would never recover, Vicksburg had fallen to Grant, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans had maneuvered Gen. Braxton Bragg's army out of middle Tennessee, and the dream of European recognition had vanished. Northern war aims had received a desperately needed boost. The Confederate tide had crested at Chancellorsville; it began running out at Gettysburg.

BRISTOE STATION AND MINE RUN CAMPAIGNS

The Army of Northern Virginia and its commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, were never the same after the Gettysburg Campaign. Of the 75,000 soldiers who marched to Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863, almost 28,000 were killed, wounded, captured, or missing by the end of the campaign. The departure in

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September of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet and his corps for Georgia and Tennessee reduced the army's strength to 45,000.

Lee's health deteriorated. According to Longstreet, that fact as much as his acceptance of responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg caused him on 8 August to submit his resignation to President Jefferson Davis, who refused to accept it. Lee had been ill in March with what he and his doctors called "rheumatism" but in fact was likely angina pectoris or a mild heart attack. By late summer Lee found himself increasingly short of energy and experiencing frequent bouts of "rheumatism." On 10 October he felt so indisposed that he could not mount Traveller and instead rode in an ambulance wagon.

Lee's army faced critical shortages of manpower, horses, and supplies. Desertion threatened the life of the army, and to keep his men in the ranks Lee resorted to both carrots and sticks—furloughs and exhortations to patriotism on the one hand, courts martial and executions on the other—with modest success. Half of the cavalry and artillery were dismounted due to a shortage of horses and mules. Southern cavalymen brought their own horses to the war (the United States government supplied them to Federal troopers), and when a steed was killed or lost, its rider became a foot soldier until he could acquire another one. The supply shortage, which included the slow replacement of arms and equipment lost at Gettysburg, caused morale to suffer, which in turn fed the desertion rate.

On the Union side, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac faced desertion problems too, mostly among new conscripts, and Meade tried tactics similar to Lee's, with similar results. Surprisingly, Meade also faced shortages of cavalry horses and supplies. There was not a horse shortage as such, but rather a lack of mounts sturdy enough to withstand the approaching summer's heat and humidity. Meade's supply problem, however, was far less severe than Lee's; he needed food for his horses, not for his men. And the numbers of his men kept increasing, from roughly 68,000 (Gettysburg had reduced their ranks by 23,000), to about 81,000 in the fall. Many of the new men were draftees, mostly Irish and German immigrants, and ethnic and social conflicts ran high. Meade worried about the battlefield effectiveness of this new army.

Despite these problems, each commander found himself under pressure to resume field operations. Meade did not enjoy the full support of President Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet members, many of whom thought that his pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg had been dilatory. Although Meade had several excellent military reasons for proceeding cautiously, Lincoln and his advisors were quick to assume that Meade suffered from the same "disease" that had infected Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and other Union commanders: reluctance to face Robert E. Lee in combat. This was not true of Meade, but as usual perceptions were more important than reality, and Meade realized that he would have to take to the field soon.

Lee, too, felt the pressure, although he received Davis's unflinching support and encouragement. It was not so much the Confederate president's urging as Lee's own nature and the growing predicament facing the army that hurried him toward combat. Lee could not afford to wait for Meade to attack his smaller force; outnumbered and poorly supplied, Lee knew that inaction meant death for the Army of Northern Virginia. He must attack.

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As it recuperated, the Confederate army concentrated in Culpeper and Orange Counties in Piedmont Virginia, north of the Rapidan River and west of the Rappahannock River. In August and September 1863 the Army of the Potomac occupied much the same positions on the north bank of the Rapidan as it had the year before when Maj. Gen. John Pope commanded it; Meade ordered cavalry forays across the river fords to keep the Confederates off balance. Both armies were stripped of divisions or corps to meet the demands of the war in the West: Longstreet and two divisions departed for Georgia and Tennessee in September (and helped secure the victory at Chickamauga) and Meade's XI and XII corps were ordered late in September to the Chattanooga area, to help secure Middle Tennessee for the Union. Later, that gateway town would serve as a base of operations for Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's Georgia campaign. Meade sent more troops to Tennessee when he learned of Longstreet's reassignment, and Lee decided to resume the offensive when he discovered that the Army of the Potomac had lost two entire corps.

Lee had three objectives: to drive Meade back toward Washington, to defeat his army, and to prevent the transfer of any more Federal troops to the western theater. The Confederate victory at Chickamauga on 19–20 September had heartened Lee, the condition of the roads and the weather were conducive to campaigning, and the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia had recovered physically from the effects of the Gettysburg campaign. These conditions favored Lee's plans.

Several facts militated against it, however. Longstreet, Lee's ablest corps commander, was in the West. Neither of the other two was Old Pete's equal: Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's reputation had suffered after the defeat at Gettysburg, while Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill often was impetuous and since Gettysburg seemingly ill whenever a crisis threatened. Horses remained in short supply, many of Lee's soldiers lacked shoes, and Meade's army outnumbered Lee's, 76,000 to 45,000.

After considering all the factors, Lee chose to take his army into the field and to employ much the same strategy as he had late in August 1862: leave a rear guard on the Rapidan River and execute a turning movement to the north toward Washington with the rest of his troops, thereby forcing the Federals to abandon their Rapidan line to defend the capital and fight the Confederates on ground favorable to the Army of Northern Virginia. The plan had worked once before; it might work again. But Lee did not have Stonewall Jackson to lead the march around Meade's army, nor did he have Longstreet on the Rapidan, nor did he have an entire corps to station there. Instead, he would leave Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's three-brigade cavalry division and three infantry brigades to guard the crossings along several miles of riverfront. He would accompany Ewell and Hill as they swept around the Union right, with Ewell swinging farther north than Hill. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart would lead Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton's cavalry division ahead of the infantry to clear the way.

On Thursday, 8 October, Hill's Third Army Corps began its march north from Orange Court House through Madison Court House. The corps consisted of three divisions. Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division contained the brigades of Col. John C. C. Sanders, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey, Brig. Gen. William Mahone, Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright, and Brig. Gen. Edward A. Perry; Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's consisted of four brigades led by Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, Brig. Gen.

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Henry H. Walker, and Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland; Maj. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox's mustered four brigades under Brig. Gen. James H. Lane, Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin, Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas, and Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales. Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke commanded an unattached brigade of North Carolinians. Ewell's Second Army Corps, like Hill's corps, consisted of three divisions. The first, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, included the brigades of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays, Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon, and Col. John S. Hoffman. The second, under Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, consisted of the brigades commanded by Brig. Gen. James A. Walker, Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, Brig. Gen. John M. Jones, and Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson. The third, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's, contained five brigades, commanded by Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel, Brig. Gen. George P. Doles, Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle, Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur, and Brig. Gen. Robert D. Johnston. Stuart's cavalry corps, which had been reorganized on 9 September, contained two divisions, the first commanded by Hampton (who had been wounded at Gettysburg and was away recuperating) and the second by Fitz Lee. Hampton's division consisted of three brigades commanded by Col. Pierce M. B. Young, Col. Oliver R. Funsten, and Brig. Gen. James B. Gordon; Lee's three brigades were under Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr., Brig. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax, and Col. Thomas H. Owen. Maj. Robert F. Beckham commanded Stuart's Horse Artillery, while the rest of the army's artillery was organized into two five-battalion divisions to support Ewell's and Hill's infantry corps, with Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long commanding one division and Col. Reuben L. Walker the other.

Meade's Army of the Potomac consisted of five infantry corps (I, under Maj. Gen. John Newton; II, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren; III, Maj. Gen. William H. French; V, Maj. Gen. George Sykes; VI, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick), each with its own artillery brigade; a cavalry corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton; and an artillery reserve with six brigades under Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Each infantry corps, as well as the cavalry corps, contained three divisions. In I Corps, they were commanded by Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler, Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson, and Brig. Gen. John R. Kenly; II Corps, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays; III Corps, Maj. Gen. David D. Birney, Brig. Gen. Henry Prince, and Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr; V Corps, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres, and Col. William McCandless; VI Corps, Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe, and Brig. Gen. Henry D. Terry; Cavalry Corps, Brig. Gen. John Buford, Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg, and Brig. Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick.

Lee's march did not go undetected by Meade and his generals. Not only were Union spies more numerous than before, and their reports more accurate, but watchers with telescopes occupied observation posts atop such heights as Cedar Mountain in Culpeper County. In addition, the Federal signal corps had cracked its Confederate counterpart's code; by 6 October, Union signal officers knew an offensive was imminent. On 8-9 October they reported Lee's troops on the march, and Federal soldiers were issued five days' rations in preparation for the coming campaign. Meade himself climbed Cedar Mountain on 9 October to peer through a telescope at his enemy.

Meade remained uncertain, however, about just what the Confederate activity signified. Was Lee attempting a turning movement against the Union right flank, or was he about to fall back toward

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Richmond? The Union commander ordered Buford to seize Morton's Ford on the Rapidan River in case a push to Orange Court House might be productive against a Confederate retrograde toward Richmond. He also strengthened Kilpatrick, who held James City (present-day Leon) on the Union right flank by dispatching Prince's infantry division to him in support. By 10 October, Meade had positioned troops to counter either move by Lee without overcommitting his forces.

Lee launched his campaign at 3:00 A.M. on Saturday, 10 October, when Stuart began a diversionary attack down the road to James City with Gordon's brigade in the lead. His troopers struck at Russell's Ford on the Robertson River about 6:30, just after dawn, and broke through the Federal cavalry guarding the crossing. This sector of Meade's line belonged to the youngest general in the Union army, twenty-three-year-old Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer, who had leaped to that rank from captain after distinguishing himself in heroic cavalry charges at Aldie and elsewhere. Custer's men withdrew in good order and joined Kilpatrick at James City following a brief engagement with Southern cavalry at Bethsaida Church.

A day-long action at James City followed. Kilpatrick's force occupied a ridge north of the village and Stuart's men secured one to the south. Each side shelled the other with artillery, and skirmishers fired their weapons from one crest to the other, while citizens huddled in the village between the two heights and listened to the rounds buzzing overhead. Neither side assaulted the other; Stuart hesitated to push hard, and Kilpatrick could not persuade Prince to come to his aid. Prince was relieved of divisional command that winter.

Buford, meanwhile, had ridden southeast from Stevensburg and crossed the Rapidan River at Germanna Ford, then circled west to Morton's Ford. The plan called for Buford to attack the Confederates at the ford on 11 October while Newton's I Corps infantry assailed it from the north. Meade, however, decided that the action at James City meant that Lee intended either to outflank him on the right or withdraw toward the Shenandoah Valley, not Richmond. He canceled Newton's march and ordered the army to new positions north of the Rappahannock River; word did not reach Buford until 7:00 A.M. on 11 October. Buford decided to push across the ford and return to Stevensburg. After a sharp action he succeeded.

When Stuart discovered on the same day that Kilpatrick had withdrawn from James City, he set off in pursuit, headed for Culpeper Court House. Late in the morning he caught up with Kilpatrick at Brandy Station, scene of the great cavalry battle of four months earlier. As the fight developed, other columns (those of Buford and Fitz Lee) converged on the battlefield from the south and pitched into the fray. The result was a wild, disjointed engagement with charges and countercharges along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad line between Brandy Station and the Rappahannock River bridge to the east. Stuart, hampered by the exhaustion of his mounts, was unable to trap the Union cavalry as he had hoped, and spectacular charges led by Custer among others enabled the Federals to cross the river to safety. By nightfall, Meade's headquarters were at Rappahannock Station (present-day Remington), Lee's were at Culpeper Court House, and Hill's and Ewell's corps were marching northeast (roughly along Rte. 229) toward Warrenton.

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Meade and his commanders spent part of the night revising orders for the next day's march. Now that it was clear from scouting reports that Lee was moving roughly northeast, Meade sought to parallel his route along the railroad and attack Lee if the opportunity arose. In the morning, however, Meade received word that Confederate infantry had been engaged at Amissville, about ten miles west of Warrenton and on the route that Jackson had taken to Thoroughfare Gap in August 1862. Was Lee also heading for the gap?

In reality, the Confederate logistical situation precluded such a move. The horses were in no condition to take such a roundabout route, forage was scarce, and the soldiers did not have enough supplies. The infantry at Amissville was Hill's; it was marching northeast ahead of Ewell's and west of him on roughly parallel roads. Hill would unite with Ewell at Warrenton, and then both corps would head east.

Meade's misapprehension of Lee's destination caused him to change his plans: he decided to withdraw up the Orange & Alexandria Railroad to Centreville, and once there to defend Washington and to prepare a new offensive. He also altered the army's order of march. As corps attempted to pass each other on unfamiliar roads to find new places in line, the resulting confusion delayed some units for hours. Fortunately for Meade, Lee's army made little progress because of its supply shortages.

On 13 October, Stuart reconnoitered toward Catlett's Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad to discover what had become the Union left flank (since Meade's army was marching north instead of facing south). Lomax's brigade left Warrenton and rode southeast toward the station by way of Dumfries Road (present-day Rtes. 605 and 667). Stuart followed an hour or so later with Gordon's and Funsten's brigades; Lomax halted at Auburn, a hamlet roughly halfway to his objective, and waited for Stuart to catch up. While he waited, Lomax sent scouts out to check the rolling, wooded countryside for enemy troops. They found a huge wagon park and Buford's cavalry division at Warrenton Junction (today's Calverton) but failed to reconnoiter Three Mile Station on the Warrenton Branch Railroad, about halfway down that line between Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, and some three miles southwest of Auburn. If they had, they would have found Kilpatrick's and Gregg's cavalry divisions and the II and III Corps.

Stuart rode into Auburn about 1:00, noted Lomax's error, and dispatched Capt. William W. Blackford, a member of his staff, and a small escort to check Three Mile Station. Then he turned his attention to the wagons at Warrenton Junction, sent word for Fitzhugh Lee to join him quickly, and prepared to attack. Lee left Warrenton about 4:00 and traced Stuart's route to Auburn, bringing with him Owen's and Chambliss's brigades. He was approaching the hamlet about 4:15 when he encountered one of Stuart's staff officers riding toward Warrenton with a dispatch for Robert E. Lee. The officer had surprising news: a Union army corps was marching up the road from the direction of Three Mile Station directly for Auburn, thereby threatening to get between Stuart and the main army at Warrenton.

The III Corps had blundered down the wrong roads that morning under the leadership of French. Afflicted with facial tics (according to rumor, caused by heavy bouts with the bottle), French was called "Old Blinkey" by his men. Now he led his column into an unexpected clash with Lomax at Auburn. The brief action took place on the Old Carolina Road (Rte. 602) just south of Auburn. Lomax charged French's column, was driven back by effective artillery fire, and then held his position briefly with support from Lee

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and Chambliss before withdrawing to Warrenton. Now Stuart was alone with two brigades, sandwiched between marching columns of the enemy.

Stuart surveyed the situation and decided to conceal his brigades in a wooded ravine just east of Auburn. He dressed half a dozen volunteers in captured Federal uniforms and after dark sent them through French's column (they would have been shot as spies if captured) to inform Lee of Stuart's predicament. All six made it through safely and one reported to Lee, who ordered Ewell's corps to march to Auburn at dawn. Meanwhile, Stuart and his men passed the night nervously. First they listened to French's wagons creaking and his soldiers talking as they marched by in the darkness to bivouac at Greenwich; then Warren's corps pitched camp for the night just a few hundred yards away. The cavalry chief stood ready to make a run for it with his cavalymen if necessary, although he understood they would pay a high price in casualties. An officer later wrote that he had never before seen Stuart look so worried.

Lee's plans for 14 October called for dividing his army, then reuniting it. Hill's corps would pursue Meade's army eastward on the Warrenton and Alexandria Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 29). Ewell's corps would march to Auburn, help free Stuart, and then march northeast to rejoin Hill in time to strike Meade.

At dawn, Hill's corps left its bivouac west of Warrenton, marched east through the town, and set off down the turnpike, with part of Fitz Lee's cavalry division reconnoitering in advance. About 5:00 A.M., Ewell began his rescue mission. He split his corps into two wings and sent them to Auburn by different routes: Rodes's and Johnson's divisions marched down Dumfries Road from the north while Early's, supported by the rest of Fitz Lee's cavalry, used Double Poplars Road (Rte. 670) to approach from the west.

Just south of Auburn, meanwhile, Warren's II Corps, which had bivouacked there for the night rather than risk getting lost on strange roads in the dark, prepared to continue its eastward march. French's corps was now out of the way, followed by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, so Warren's route was clear. He knew of the previous day's engagement, and understood that Lee was in Warrenton trying to find and attack Meade's army at a vulnerable point. Warren, bringing up the rear of the column, *was* that point, and he took care to protect his line of march against an attack from the north.

Caldwell's division was closest to Auburn, about a mile south of the crossroads on the Old Carolina Road between Auburn and Three Mile Station. Hays's division camped just south of Caldwell's, and Webb's division was next, about two miles south of Auburn. Warren's corps supply train, more than two hundred wagons and ambulances, stretched some two miles in length, so it moved out before dawn on the Old Carolina Road and approached the ford at Cedar Run, just south of Auburn. There, slippery mud and early morning fog caused the train to bog down; rather than delay the infantry's march, Warren ordered Caldwell to lead the way through fields and woods west and north of the road and cross Cedar Run over a bridge. Once across, Caldwell's men deployed for defense and then settled down for coffee and breakfast on a hill (thereafter called Coffee Hill) on the north side of the stream while Hays followed them with his division.

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Stuart was thus trapped between Caldwell half a mile to the west and Warren's supply train the same distance to the south and east of his position. He knew that Ewell was approaching from Warrenton, and he cautiously deployed seven guns of his horse artillery on a hill some eight hundred yards east of Caldwell's position. Stuart then awaited the sound of rifle fire from the west to tell him that Ewell's skirmishers had made contact with Warren's corps.

The second engagement at Auburn began about 6:30 A.M., when vedettes from Gregg's cavalry division, which had been providing security for the infantry on the Old Carolina Road and Double Poplar Road, opened fire on Ewell's skirmish line. Stuart, as soon as he heard the shots, ordered his artillery to fire as well. Hays sent infantry toward Stuart's artillery, which soon withdrew, while in the meantime Caldwell moved his division to the reverse slope of Coffee Hill to protect it from the Confederate guns. Warren galloped to Auburn with his staff, having been informed that three enemy columns were converging there (one was Stuart's horsemen, who in reality were attacking only to escape). To the west of Auburn, Gregg's cavalymen needed assistance, and Warren ordered an infantry brigade to help them. He also ordered Webb's division ahead to support Hays.

Stuart, meanwhile, realized that the time had come for his departure. He ordered Gordon to lead his brigade in a charge against Hays's infantry approaching from the west while Stuart led Funsten's brigade eastward through the Union line. The maneuver succeeded; Gordon then followed Stuart in a trek south and west around Warren's corps, and Stuart soon reunited his detachment with Fitz Lee's.

Back on Coffee Hill, Union artillery had replaced Caldwell's division as soon as it moved to cover, to support Hays's infantry marching east against Stuart and his horse artillery. To the northwest, Fitz Lee's troopers and the vanguard of Early's infantry column pressed Gregg and the supporting infantry brigade sent by Warren, while Rodes attacked from the west. The Coffee Hill batteries turned around and began to fire at Rodes's men once Stuart had disengaged and escaped eastward. Confederates guns unlimbered to respond.

By 10:00 the Auburn engagement had become an artillery duel. Warren, realizing that the Confederates would not attack with their infantry, used the opportunity to extract most of his own infantry and cavalry and march southeast to the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, then northwest toward Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction. The cannon fire died away after an hour, and Warren's artillery pulled out under the protection of a combined rear guard of cavalry and infantry.

For his part, Lee did not plan to fight a battle with Warren, although had he realized that the II Corps was isolated from the main body of Meade's army, he might have changed his strategy. Instead, he likewise quickly disengaged and marched Ewell's infantry and Lee's cavalry (and Stuart) eastward as planned to strike Meade's flank or rear.

Hill had marched down the turnpike from Warrenton with Anderson's division in the lead, followed by Heth's and Wilcox's. By 8:30 A.M., the head of the column reached New Baltimore, a hamlet some five miles east of Warrenton. There, Hill received reports of Federal troops marching eastward south of his position; indeed, he could hear the rumbling of Union wagons. He knew that the road the Federals were using crossed the turnpike three or four miles ahead, near Buckland Mills, so he sent Anderson

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hastening ahead to block the intersection. He ordered Heth and Wilcox to leave the turnpike at New Baltimore and march southeast on the road to Greenwich (today's Rtes. 600 and 215), then to turn left and march northeast back to the turnpike to strike the enemy in the rear.

The enemy, however, was not to be found, except for Kilpatrick's cavalry around Buckland. Fitzhugh Lee arrived with his reunited cavalry division between 9:00 and 10:00 and hurried forward to engage Kilpatrick, who withdrew toward Gainesville with Lee in pursuit. Finding no other Federals near Buckland, Anderson turned south on the road to Greenwich. From that village, Hill marched with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions east on the road leading to Bristoe Station (Rte. 215), where he expected to find the rear of Meade's army that had eluded him so far. He marched blindfolded, however, for Fitz Lee's cavalry spent the rest of the day chasing Kilpatrick while Stuart covered Ewell's right flank some miles behind Hill. When he most needed it, Hill's reconnaissance capability had almost disappeared.

At noon, Meade was at Bristoe Station, pleased with the progress his army was making toward Centreville. He wired Warren, at Catlett's Station, to continue his march up the railroad but to be aware that Lee was on the Warrenton and Alexandria Turnpike and might send a column from Gainesville to Bristoe to intercept him. Meade ordered Sykes, who was approaching Bristoe Station with his V Corps ahead of Warren, to wait there until he spotted Warren's column. About 1:30 P.M., Sykes thought Warren had been sighted, so he ordered the last of his corps to cross Broad Run.

Just then, Hill and Heth arrived just north of the station and saw the end of Sykes's column passing over the stream. Believing that he had found the rear of Meade's army, Hill ordered an immediate attack, sending Heth forward. Although other Federals were observed near the railroad tracks to the west of Broad Run, Hill assumed they were a small rearguard detachment.

In reality, they were the vanguard of Warren's corps, which had marched up the railroad from Catlett's Station. Most of the Federals were concealed behind the high railroad bed just west of Bristoe Station; when Heth deployed his division to attack the rear of Sykes's column, Warren struck the Confederate right flank. Heth's commanders wheeled the division in a frontal assault against the unexpected threat, but the Confederate line crumpled under the hail of bullets and artillery shells. The stunned survivors stumbled to the rear, leaving hundreds of dead, dying, and wounded on the field.

Although Ewell's corps arrived before dark, Lee decided not to continue the battle. The Federals withdrew across Broad Run in the night, and after dawn on 15 October Lee and Hill surveyed the carnage together. Finally an angry Lee cut off Hill's admission of responsibility with "Well, well, General, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it." The Army of Northern Virginia had suffered some 1,400 casualties to the Federals' 550.

A chilly rain fell throughout the night after the engagement, adding to the misery of the wounded lying on the battlefield, and continued until Sunday, 18 October. Despite the soggy conditions, Lee probed the territory between Bristoe Station and Bull Run but realized the Federal position was too strong to attack. Once again the Army of the Potomac had eluded his grasp. Lee ended the Bristoe Station campaign and on 16 October ordered the Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw to Culpeper Court House.

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Lee's campaign was a failure; he had not brought on a decisive battle and he had not changed Federal strategy regarding the West. He had risked his army by marching beyond its supply line to outflank Meade, who had countered the Confederate maneuver effectively even though it meant pulling the Union army back to the Centreville defenses instead of attacking Lee. The outnumbered Confederates could not hope to drive through Meade's lines to Washington, so there was nothing else for Lee to do but withdraw. Meade, in contrast, was sitting on his supply base, his army had half again as many men as Lee's, and they had suffered far less during the campaign than their Confederate counterparts. President Abraham Lincoln pressed Meade to attack Lee, but he did not press him too hard. When Meade discovered that Lee was withdrawing down the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, however, he set off at once in pursuit.

Lee had his men tear up the track as they went, to hinder the Federals. About noon on Sunday, 18 October, the Confederates began crossing into Culpeper County at Rappahannock Station. Stuart, who had been screening the army's march, fell back to Gainesville as Kilpatrick pressed forward. The next day, Kilpatrick found that Stuart had vanished. Under orders to continue to Warrenton, Kilpatrick assumed the route was open.

Stuart had ridden down the Warrenton and Alexandria Turnpike to Buckland Mills, where the road crossed Broad Run. There, on the western bank, he set up a defensive line and sent word to Fitzhugh Lee at Auburn to come up and protect his right flank. Meanwhile, Custer approached at the head of Kilpatrick's column and a sharp fight developed. When Custer threatened Stuart's flanks, the Confederates withdrew toward Warrenton. Kilpatrick arrived shortly after 12:00 and set off in pursuit, ordering Custer to follow. Fortunately for the Federals, Custer allowed his men to eat lunch first; just after they crossed Broad Run, Fitz Lee struck them from the south, causing them to retreat across the stream. Had Custer followed his orders, Lee would have hit him from the rear, catching the entire Federal force between his division and Stuart.

Kilpatrick heard the shooting behind him just as he encountered Stuart's new line at Chestnut Hill, east of Warrenton. Stuart charged and drove Kilpatrick east on the turnpike toward Broad Run. Although the Federals at first fell back fighting and maintained their cohesion, eventually the pressure proved too much and the retreat became a headlong flight that the Confederates called the Buckland Races. For some five miles the Confederates pursued them, until the Union cavalry became so scattered that the chase was abandoned. Between them, the two combatants lost about 230 men, most of them captured Federal troopers.

For the rest of October and into November, Lee and Meade faced each other across the Rappahannock River. The Confederates held the crossings at Rappahannock Station and at Kelly's Ford, which lay about four miles downstream and had played a significant role in the cavalry combats of 17 March and 9 June 1863. Meade planned to cross the river at Fredericksburg instead, but Lincoln's administration disliked the idea, so he decided to reoccupy the ground between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers by forcing passages at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Station. Lee, once he divined Meade's scheme, planned to allow him to cross at the ford but hold him at the railroad bridge, then

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counterattack in force. The Confederate fortifications were on the east side of the river near the railroad bridge but on the west side at the ford.

On 7 November, Meade's offensive got underway. French's III Corps seized Kelly's Ford while Sedgwick's VI Corps attacked at Rappahannock Station. Sedgwick encountered resistance at the bridge, where part of Early's division held the Confederate works as the afternoon faded. After some hesitation, Sedgwick decided on a risky attack at dusk. Lee, assuming that the day's fighting would end at sunset, neglected to support the bridgehead.

Sedgwick's attack succeeded, shocking Lee and Early. After a brief, vicious bout of hand-to-hand fighting, Sedgwick's men captured the earthworks and about 1,600 defenders who did not swim the river to safety. Early had the western end of the railroad bridge burnt, delaying the Federal crossing.

In addition to the Confederate prisoners, and the two sides suffered about 900 other casualties. Lee ordered his army back across the Rapidan River to Orange County, abandoning Culpeper County to the Union army. Lee had crossed that river for the last time.

The Army of the Potomac occupied the Confederates' half-finished winter encampment between Brandy Station and Culpeper Court House, repaired the railroad bridge, and anticipated the end of the campaign season. Pressured by Washington politicians, however, Meade planned another offensive for the late autumn.

Meade discovered that the right of Lee's line, which stretched from Verdiersville in the east to Gordonsville in the west, was not anchored on a naturally defensible feature such as a river. He also found that small numbers of defenders held the many Rapidan River fords. The Confederates seemed vulnerable.

Hill's corps constituted Lee's left flank, while Ewell's (temporarily commanded by Early) formed the right. The two principal east-west roads, the Orange Turnpike (Rte. 20) and the Orange Plank Road (Rte. 621), ran behind Ewell's lines, thereby furnishing a route of attack against the Confederate rear. Meade planned to send his corps across several fords simultaneously, drive south to the highways, and sweep west, rolling up Lee's right flank.

Meade's Mine Run Campaign, as it became known, got off to a soggy start. He had scheduled it to begin on 24 November, but rain and high water forced a two-day postponement. Lee, learning of the Union army's maneuvers in the interim, used the delay to prepare his forces for battle. He did not know exactly where Meade planned to strike, but the same roads that afforded the Federals the opportunity to attack also gave Lee internal lines of communication and movement.

The Federal advance was stalled by mud and cold and the slowness of French's corps; Union forces had to be shifted from one ford to another, further delaying their progress. Meade bivouacked his army, then resumed the march and got all his corps across the river the next day, 27 November. Lee's lieutenants reacted to the reports of Federal crossings by acting swiftly to block the avenues of approach. Early sent Hays's (formerly Early's) and Rodes's divisions down the Orange Turnpike to Robinson's Tavern, and ordered Johnson's division up the road to Jacob's Ford. Hays and Rodes stopped Warren's and Sedgwick's corps at the tavern, while Johnson encountered French at Payne's Farm. French might have swept Johnson aside, but the Union general allowed the Confederate commander to bring him

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to a dead halt. Meade was furious, for he realized that Lee would grasp his intentions and act to counter them.

Lee was pleased that Meade intended an envelopment, for it gave him an opportunity to fight a defensive battle and watch the Federal army destroy itself in futile attacks. He withdrew to the western bank of Mine Run, a stream that ran north and south across the highways that Meade intended to take. Throughout the night, the Confederates labored to construct and strengthen earthworks along the stream.

Meade and his generals spent 28 November studying Lee's defenses, and Warren suggested an attack against the Confederate right the next day. On 29 November, however, a Confederate cavalry raid struck Meade's left flank and rear, causing him to wonder whether Lee intended a flanking movement of his own. The attack was postponed until the morning.

During the night, Hill's men strengthened the works on the Confederate right. When dawn came and Warren rode forward to study the terrain, he realized that an assault would fail and cause needless casualties. He canceled the attack and informed Meade, who at first was enraged but ultimately agreed with Warren. Meade held a council of war that night and decided to conclude the campaign and withdraw across the Rapidan during the night of 1–2 December.

Lee and his men, meanwhile, waited patiently behind their works for the attack that would never come. On 1 December, Lee decided to launch his own attack the next day. When morning arrived, however, Meade and his army were gone, and it was Lee's turn to be angry. He complained to his staff, "I am too old to command this army. We should never have permitted those people to get away."

Both armies went into camp for the winter, while Meade soon traveled to Washington to explain himself to Lincoln and his cabinet. The Mine Run campaign had cost him some 1,300 casualties, while the Confederates lost about 700, all to no advantage. Meade can be excused somewhat for his lack of success, however, because of the cold, the mud, the rain-swollen streams, and French's slowness. Meade's plan was good, but its execution was execrable. French soon disappeared from the field, relegated to garrison and administrative duties. Most critics eventually forgave Meade, perhaps realizing that it took considerable courage for him to cancel a campaign when he undoubtedly understood that a storm of outrage would be the consequence, even if his decision did save his army.

Meade went home to Philadelphia on furlough for a rest. In Washington, Lincoln considered replacing him as commander of the Army of the Potomac but decided against it. Instead, he would promote Ulysses S. Grant, who had engineered the relief of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The victory, which had come on 23–25 November as Meade crossed the Rapidan, would enable Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman to launch his march into Georgia in the spring. Grant was the same commander who had captured Vicksburg, Mississippi, on 4 July 1863 and secured the great river for the Union. This man of grim determination, Lincoln believed, might be just the general he had been searching for to lead his military machine to victory. He would promote Grant to lieutenant general, place him in command of all Union armies, and see what he could do when the winter ended.

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OVERLAND CAMPAIGN

“He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was about to do it,” wrote Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman.

“I can’t spare this man,” said President Abraham Lincoln. “He fights.”

“That man will fight us every day and every hour till the end of the war,” said Lt. Gen. James Longstreet.

The subject of these comments was a forty-two-year-old Ohioan, Ulysses Simpson Grant, whom Lincoln had summoned to Washington in March 1864. About five feet eight inches tall and weighing around a hundred and thirty-five pounds, Grant was as silent as he was spare, and rather than converse he preferred to chew on a cigar. He was a mystery to everyone who encountered him during that late winter, a bit seedy and unkempt in appearance, but bearing an aura of unshakable determination.

Rumors surrounded Grant, including whispers of drunkenness and emotional instability. Yet none could deny that this obscure West Point graduate, a failed businessman who once was reduced to peddling firewood in the streets of Saint Louis, had given the Union two of its greatest victories in the West: Vicksburg and Chattanooga. The first, with the surrender of Port Hudson four days later, had secured the Mississippi River for the United States and split the Confederacy in two. The second had ensured that the vitally important rail center in east Tennessee would supply Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s army group as he marched through northwest Georgia and on to Atlanta in 1864.

When Grant met with Lincoln on 9 March, the president demonstrated his respect for his new lieutenant general’s reputation and demeanor by promising not to micromanage him as he had his predecessors. In a subsequent letter to Grant, Lincoln declared his absolute confidence in him and added, “The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know.” Lincoln went on to offer Grant, now general-in-chief of the Federal armies, every assistance at the government’s disposal to help him succeed. In marked contrast to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s sulky message of two years earlier following the Peninsula Campaign, Grant replied graciously: “Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you.”

Lincoln’s willingness not to rein in Grant may have been due to the simplicity of the general’s plan for the spring campaign: to attack everywhere at once and keep attacking until the Confederate armies were defeated. He would pit Sherman against Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in the Deep South, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade against Lee in Virginia. His goal would be to destroy the opposing armies, not to capture and hold cities or territory. Grant himself would accompany Meade and the Army of the Potomac.

Grant’s decision to remain in Virginia perhaps arose in part from the confidence he felt in his old friend Sherman’s ability to command independently. Grant already knew the western armies and their officers intimately; rumor had it that he thought them superior to the eastern armies. In addition, Grant knew of Meade’s reputation as a dedicated but plodding leader who lacked aggressiveness, and no doubt thought he could supply the deficiency. On 10 March, in a downpour, Grant arrived at Brandy Station to

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confer with Meade, who had steeled himself to be replaced. Instead, Grant confirmed him in his position as commander of the Army of the Potomac.

How the monosyllabic, dour Grant managed to charm and win over the prickly, sarcastic Meade is one of the war's great mysteries, but win him he did, at least temporarily. Meade's letters to his wife were full of enthusiasm for his new commander. One line summed up his impression: "I was much pleased with Grant. You may rest assured that he is no ordinary man."

The soldiers were not so sure. To them he looked ordinary indeed, short, mud-spattered, careless of his appearance. He did not look like the commanding sort of general that the Army of the Potomac was used to, even astride Cincinnati, a magnificent bay Thoroughbred. He had paid little attention to the fanfare and the welcoming band at the station. Although the troops did not know it, Grant was tone deaf. He admitted that he could recognize only two tunes: one of them was "Yankee Doodle" and the other wasn't.

Lee's appearance contrasted sharply with Grant's. Lee was almost four inches taller (just under six feet), looked handsome with his well-groomed gray hair and beard, and made a striking and dignified appearance in his spotless gray uniform, especially when mounted on his gray horse, Traveller. But both men shared certain traits, however different their appearance. Each was determined and aggressive. Neither would quit until circumstances forced them to do so.

Each general also rode at the head of a great army. Lee's, the Army of Northern Virginia, numbered about 60,000. Many of the men were experienced, battle-hardened veterans who possessed an unshakable confidence in themselves and in Lee. They had fought the Army of the Potomac time and again over three years and, except at Gettysburg, had either beaten it or fought it to a draw despite being always outnumbered. Now, in the spring of 1864, their numbers down and their supplies short, they still had each other and Lee, a lethal combination. One brigadier observed, "General Lee, I have always thought, was the most belligerent man in his army." Devotion and aggression could be worth divisions.

But would they be enough? Meade's army, with Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps (which until the fourth week of May reported directly to Grant), contained some 120,000 men, a two-to-one advantage. Many of the soldiers, however, were new, foreign-born recruits; some spoke no English. And despite the army's superiority in numbers and supplies, serious self-doubts plagued its officers. Discounting the victory in Pennsylvania the year before, many of them doubted that they would meet with easy success on Lee's home ground. Some anticipated "our annual Bull Run Flogging" and greeted their new commander's air of grim determination with the comment, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." Later, when in the midst of battle in the Wilderness Grant thought his subordinates spent too much of their time worrying about Lee's tactics, he exploded: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault and land on our rear and both our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do."

Other Federal officers, however, realized that their new commander had brought a different attitude with him to the Army of the Potomac. They sensed that Lyman's metaphor about Grant was apt,

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that he *would* drive his head, and his army, through the brick wall or die trying. A defeat or two or ten would not deter him.

The opposing armies were organized along similar lines. The Army of the Potomac initially contained three infantry corps, each with three or four divisions, as well as the remnants of I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Newton, which was disbanded on 23 March 1864 and absorbed by V Corps. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock commanded II Corps, and Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow led the 1st Division, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon the 2d, Maj. Gen. David B. Birney the 3d, and Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott the 4th, with Col. John C. Tidball in charge of the artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren led V Corps, which contained Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin's 1st Division, Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson's 2d, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's 3d, Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's 4th, and Col. Charles S. Wainwright's artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick commanded VI Corps, and the 1st Division was led by Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, the 2d by Brig. Gen. George W. Getty, the 3d by Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts, and the artillery brigade by Col. Charles H. Tompkins. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside led IX Corps, which included Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson's 1st Division, Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter's 2d, Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox's 3d, and Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero's 4th (Ferrero's division, which was not engaged, contained six regiments of United States Colored Troops). Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, who Grant brought with him from the western army, commanded the cavalry corps. It contained three divisions, led respectively by Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg, and Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson.

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For most of the winter, the armies had faced each other across the Rapidan River while each one trained, resupplied, and conducted limited operations. Perhaps the boredom of camp life, and the knowledge that the war was about to enter its third year, encouraged dreamers and schemers in the Union army to concoct plans to capture or raid Richmond.

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Carolina had left Richmond lightly defended, he might seize the city with little difficulty. To distract the Confederates and prevent the capital from being reinforced, he requested that Meade's army make a demonstration along the Rapidan. Over the objections of Sedgwick, the army's temporary commander while Meade was on leave, the plan was approved.

On 6 February, II Corps (temporarily commanded by Warren) led the way to Morton's Ford while Newton's I Corps bombarded Raccoon Ford a few miles upstream and Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's cavalry division, even farther west, crossed Robertson's River and Barnett's Ford on the Rapidan. Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays's division spearheaded the assault at Morton's Ford, which at first was successful and caught the Confederates by surprise. Ewell's corps guarded this reach of the Rapidan and, under Ewell's personal direction, they reacted quickly. By sunset the Federals were effectively pinned down. The fighting continued into the night, with each side seizing prisoners under cover of darkness. When no headway was made the next morning, however, the Union force withdrew across all the fords to safety. The affair cost both sides some 700 casualties; ironically, Butler already had aborted his raid after learning that a deserter had revealed his scheme to the Confederates. The waste of lives disgusted Warren and Sedgwick.

At roughly the same time, Brig. Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick hatched another plan, this time to raid Richmond, free Union prisoners, and—if documents found later were indeed authentic—burn the city and kill President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. Kilpatrick, a self-promoting, reckless cavalry division commander whose high casualty rate earned him the nickname "Kilcavalry," found an eager co-conspirator in the person of Col. Ulric Dahlgren, an adventurous twenty-two-year-old aide to successive commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

The Kilpatrick–Dahlgren Raid began on the evening of 28 February when Kilpatrick led some 4,000 horsemen across Ely's Ford on the Rapidan and south through Spotsylvania Court House to Mount Pleasant in the southern part of the county. There the force divided, with Dahlgren taking about 500 cavalymen with him southwest to Goochland Court House, roughly twenty miles west of Richmond, while Kilpatrick led the remainder south toward Richmond. The plan called for Dahlgren to cross the James River and enter the city from the south while Kilpatrick executed a diversionary attack from the north.

Despite driving rain and sleet, each part of the force made good progress through 29 February, but the next day the raid began to fall apart. Kilpatrick's nerve failed him as he approached Richmond's lightly held intermediate defenses on 1 March, and he quickly withdrew. Although he briefly considered a night attack, he himself was assaulted from the north by some 300 of Hampton's cavalry that had been pursuing him. Kilpatrick ordered a retreat down the Peninsula toward Federal lines.

Dahlgren, meanwhile, was frustrated by high water that prevented him from crossing James River, and decided to enter the city from the west instead. He had not even reached the outskirts, however, when the home guard confronted him on the afternoon of 1 March; in the ensuing skirmish he and about 100 horsemen got separated from the remainder of his force. Hoping to find Kilpatrick, he galloped north in a wide arc around the city to the north and east.

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On 2 March, Dahlgren and his men crossed the Mattaponi River into King and Queen County and rode east past the hamlet of Walkerton toward King and Queen Court House. About three miles northwest of the courthouse, at a road junction today called Dahlgren's Corner, the home guard and a detachment of the 9th Virginia Cavalry ambushed Dahlgren. In a brief firefight, Dahlgren was killed instantly and most of his command was captured.

The raid cost the Federals about 300 casualties and the Confederates far fewer. Although the raid itself was a fiasco, it caused a great uproar in the South when Dahlgren's body was examined and papers recovered that called for the murder of President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, as well as the burning and looting of Richmond. Lee wrote Meade a letter demanding an explanation; Meade and Kilpatrick declared that "neither the United States Government, myself, nor General Kilpatrick authorized, sanctioned, or approved the burning of the city of Richmond and the killing of Mr. Davis and cabinet, nor any other act not required by military necessity and in accordance with the usages of war." Northerners claimed the papers were Southern forgeries calculated to inflame the citizenry. Recent tests have led knowledgeable historians to conclude that the documents were indeed written by Dahlgren. Considering the small number of men he had with him, however, they appear to reflect Dahlgren's wishful thinking, not authentic orders from higher authorities. The failure of the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid put an end to such schemes. For the rest of the winter, the Army of the Potomac instead prepared for the approaching campaign season.

As April 1864 faded into May, the two armies faced each other across the Rapidan River. The Army of Northern Virginia was encamped south of the river, with Longstreet's headquarters at Gordonsville, Lee's and Hill's at Orange Court House, and Ewell's near Morton's Ford. The Army of the Potomac, whose camps were visible from the Confederate observation post atop Clark's Mountain south of the river, sprawled across eastern Culpeper County from Culpeper Court House to Rappahannock Station in Fauquier County. Lee ascended the mountain on Monday, 2 May, and with his generals studied the peaceful-looking scene north of the river.

Unknown to Lee, Grant had selected Wednesday, 4 May, to begin his spring offensive. On or about that same date, Union forces all over the country would launch attacks. Sherman would strike southeast from Chattanooga against Johnston's army in Georgia. From New Orleans, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was to march on Mobile, Alabam (however, disasters in Louisiana caused the Federals first to postpone and then to cancel Banks's thrust). In Virginia, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel would drive south up the Shenandoah Valley while Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler would lead the Army of the James on transports up the James River from Hampton Roads to City Point and Bermuda Hundred, a first step on the road to Petersburg and Richmond, which Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard defended. Earlier, in southwestern West Virginia and Virginia, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell and Brig. Gen. George Crook would launch a series of infantry and cavalry raids against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad. In a matter of days the Confederacy would find itself under attack everywhere.

For Meade's Army of the Potomac, Grant set the task of crossing the Rapidan River, drawing the Army of Northern Virginia out, and destroying it in battle. The Federals faced enormous logistical challenges to accomplish their goals. The army could stretch for thirty miles if its soldiers were placed in

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double columns, and its six thousand supply wagons could occupy fifty miles of roads. Grant's plan of attack called for Warren's V Corps and Sedgwick's VI Corps to cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford at dawn on 4 May, with Hancock's II Corps crossing half a dozen miles east at Ely's Ford. The wagon train would cross at Ely's and Culpeper Mine Fords, and Burnside's IX Corps would follow Warren's and Sedgwick's corps across Germanna Ford after detaching Ferrero's division to guard the trains. Warren and Sedgwick would encamp beyond Wilderness Tavern while Hancock would head for Chancellorsville, the scene of Lee's great victory the year before, and then on to Todd's Tavern and Spotsylvania Court House.

Grant sought to lure Lee into the open by threatening both the Confederate right flank and the capital at Richmond. At the same time, by keeping his army between Lee and the Rappahannock River, Grant would protect his army's projected supply route via the river and the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad. The plan had only one obvious weakness: the challenge of getting this huge force safely through the seventy-square-mile Wilderness, an area south of the river and west of Chancellorsville that was thick with scrub pines and briar tangles and narrow wagon roads, and out onto open ground to maneuver effectively against Lee. Many of the troops remembered vividly the horrors of the place from the previous years' battle there—the tangled terrain that destroyed unit coherence, the enemy invisible in the thick undergrowth, the fires ignited by exploding gunpowder that burned alive the helpless wounded. No one wanted to fight there again.

Lee knew that Grant planned to attack. But having the smaller army, and possessing a ready-made defensive line constructed in December 1863 along Mine Run during Meade's aborted campaign, Lee was content to let Grant make the first move. If Grant waited too long, however, Lee planned to strike the Federals.

The vanguard of Warren's corps, preceded by Wilson's cavalry, left its camp about 3:00 A.M. on 4 May and splashed across Germanna Ford, driving away the Confederate pickets there. Sedgwick's corps followed. The advance of Hancock's corps repeated the scene at Ely's Ford, and the campaign was under way.

When dawn came about 5:00, great clouds of dust revealed the Union troop movement to Confederate observers atop Clark's Mountain. They sent word to Lee that the Federal objectives appeared to be Germanna Ford and then perhaps Fredericksburg. By midmorning, Confederate columns prepared to march as the Union columns, slowed by the trains, were compelled to halt in the Wilderness, well short of the day's goals.

Ewell's corps, encamped near Morton's Ford on the Rapidan River, headed southeast to the Orange Turnpike (present-day Rte. 20) at Verdiersville, then turned east toward Wilderness Tavern. Hill's corps, accompanied by Lee, moved east from Orange Court House to the Orange Plank Road (Rte. 621) and then marched toward Parker's Store. Longstreet's corps, which had the greatest distance to march, approached the Wilderness from the southwest near Gordonsville. By late morning elements of each army were in striking distance of the other, with Lee ready to smite Grant's line of march on its right flank the next morning if it remained in the Wilderness.

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About 6:00 A.M. on 5 May, Ewell's column made contact with Warren's corps and began entrenching at the edge of Saunders's Field. At midday the fighting began in earnest as the Federals attacked Ewell unsuccessfully. The tinder-dry brush and grass caught fire, and much of the fighting took place amid smoke and flames in the undergrowth of the Wilderness.

To the south, the main conflict erupted around the intersection of the Orange Plank Road and Brock Road (Rte. 613) as both sides contended for this crucial junction. Hill's corps fought elements of Hancock's corps and Getty's division of Sedgwick's corps through the late afternoon and evening for possession of the place, but at the end of the day it remained in Federal hands. During the night, each corps strengthened its position and fed more troops into its line.

Soon after dawn on 6 May, the Federals charged out of their hastily constructed Plank Road works and struck Hill's corps, pushing it back. Lee watched his artillery buy time for Longstreet and his corps to march to the front. When the head of Longstreet's column, the Texas Brigade, approached Lee, he joined it and cheered the men forward, waving his hat and shouting "Texans always move them!" Suddenly realizing that Lee intended to lead the counterattack himself, the horrified soldiers grabbed at Traveller's reins and implored him to "Go back!", then refused to advance unless he rode to the rear. One of Lee's aides at last persuaded him to withdraw. Satisfied, the brigade charged, was soon reinforced by other brigades, and pushed the Federals back. Longstreet's counterattack culminated in an effective assault on the Union left flank.

By 12:30 P.M., after a morning of brutal fighting, Hancock's corps had been driven into its earthworks and Lee was planning to take advantage of the Confederate momentum. At this crucial moment, Longstreet suffered a serious wound in a "friendly fire" episode reminiscent of Jackson's mortal wounding a year earlier. Unlike Stonewall, however, Lee's "Old War Horse" would recover in four months' time.

Ewell authorized an attack for 6:00 that evening. Although at first he was successful, his attempt soon failed as Grant fed troops into the fray to reinforce Sedgwick's corps. By nightfall the fighting ended with neither side having gained or lost ground, and the next day only desultory skirmishing occurred. Essentially a draw, the Battle of the Wilderness had cost the Federals some 18,000 in dead, wounded, and missing and the Confederates about 11,000 casualties.

Early in the morning on 7 May, when Lee's past opponents would have retreated, Grant instead ordered Meade to make a night march to occupy Spotsylvania Court House; accordingly, Meade sent Warren's corps southeast on Brock Road past Lee's right flank. Grant's decision surprised the men in his army, and doubtless some of his own aides as well, who did not think the Army of the Potomac measured up to the Federal force in the West. Grant had not intended to fight a battle in the Wilderness and therefore refused to alter his strategy of compelling Lee to fight in the open.

Lee and his men considered the Battle of the Wilderness a strategic victory; they fully expected Grant to follow the example set by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker the year before at Chancellorsville, and retreat. By the early morning of 7 May, however, Lee concluded after the Federals took up their pontoons at Germanna Ford that Grant was executing a flanking movement, either toward Fredericksburg or in the

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direction of Spotsylvania Court House. Lee ordered Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's corps, to march to the courthouse village and defend the important road junction there.

Anderson won the ensuing "race" to the courthouse, although neither side (each marched on parallel roads in the dark) knew that a contest existed until it was over. Meade was furious when he found out that the Confederates already were building fortifications across Brock Road. Disjointed Federal attacks in the afternoon failed to dislodge them.

The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House consisted of a series of engagements fought over a two-week period while the Confederates built and strengthened their earthworks. Lee's men had acquired a reputation as masters at such tasks, for they could erect incredibly strong fieldworks in a matter of hours. At Spotsylvania, however, they made an error in placement that soon cost them dearly. Moving into a new position under cover of darkness and digging in at the edge of a wood line on a plateau, Ewell's corps built a section of the line that projected beyond the neighboring works, thereby forming a salient. In addition, it was located so far up the slope that in places the view of the bottom was obscured. Because of its odd shape, this salient was nicknamed the Mule Shoe; a short time later, part of it became known as the Bloody Angle.

On 9 May, elements of each army continued to trickle into the area north of the courthouse. By evening, Hancock's II Corps had marched around Lee's left flank to the vicinity of Block House Bridge, a crossing over the Po River on the Shady Grove Church Road (Rte. 608). That night, Lee ordered units from Heth's division and Brig. Gen. William Mahone's division—formerly Anderson's—to block and attack Hancock's corps. The attack took place on 10 May as Hancock received orders to withdraw and assault the Confederate line elsewhere.

Piecemeal Federal attacks occurred in several places that day, most significantly at the Mule Shoe. Col. Emory Upton, commander of the 121st New York Infantry, led the assault, which succeeded at first in breaching the Confederate line. The attack involved twelve regiments from Sedgwick's VI Corps, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright since Sedgwick's death from a sharpshooter's bullet on 9 May. The assault failed for lack of support.

Heartened by Upton's initial success, Grant decided to attack the Mule Shoe with Hancock's entire corps, holding Wright in support. Hancock's soldiers would charge across an open field at dawn on 12 May, storm the Confederate works, and shatter the center of Lee's line. Grant sent a telegram to Washington on 11 May announcing his resolve: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

During the night of 11-12 May, Ewell's men heard Union soldiers and wagons marching across their front from west to east. Anticipating a Federal flanking movement, Lee ordered the artillery out of the Mule Shoe and to the rear. Then, near dawn, the noise stopped. Frantic, the occupants of the salient sent word to bring back the cannon, but before Lee approved their return, Hancock's corps charged. The time was 4:35 A.M., and for the next twenty-three hours there would be almost constant combat at the Mule Shoe.

Most Civil War actions were over in minutes, or perhaps a few hours, and hand-to-hand combat was rare since one side or the other usually gave way quickly. The fight for the Mule Shoe was unique, not

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only for its length but for the carnage it wrought as both sides slaughtered each other with every resource available. Later, some of the survivors tried and failed to put the experience into words in their letters home. Men who had lived through Antietam and Gettysburg could only report that this battle surpassed them both in its viciousness and gore.

At first Hancock's attack succeeded. Protected from Confederate fire by a swale at the foot of the ridge, his men were able to assault en masse and overwhelm the Mule Shoe's defenders. The Federals drove through to Ewell's rear, but Lee reacted swiftly and threw reinforcements into the breach to push them back, even trying on two occasions to lead the men forward himself until they compelled him to withdraw. Soon most of Hancock's men were driven back to the line of entrenchments first captured, but they refused to retreat any farther and held their ground. Both sides fought with shot and shell and bayonets and clubbed muskets, and with fists and knives when the ammunition ran low. The combat lasted far into the night. About 2:00 A.M. on 13 May, an oak tree some twenty inches in diameter, its trunk cut through by Union bullets, crashed to the ground behind the Mule Shoe.

The battle for the Mule Shoe left both sides sickened and exhausted. During the night, the Confederates withdrew to a second, more easily defended line. Two days of drenching rain, coupled with the severe losses and the tasks of burying the dead and caring for the wounded, brought a brief pause in the fighting. Casualty estimates vary, but the Federals may have lost between 6,000 and 9,000 killed, wounded, and missing to the Confederates' 6,000 to 8,000, many of whom were captured in the initial attack.

As horrific as the casualty figures were, and as ominous as they were for the Confederate army, no single death affected Lee as much as one that was reported to him in the midst of the Spotsylvania battle. On 12 May, in Richmond, J. E. B. Stuart died of a mortal wound he received the day before at Yellow Tavern.

After the Battle of the Wilderness, Sheridan had proclaimed so loudly that his cavalry could "whip Stuart" if only "headquarters would stay out of our hair" that Meade wanted to press charges for insubordination. Grant, however, decided to turn Sheridan loose to attack Lee's communications lines with Richmond and see if he could draw Stuart out. On 9 May, accordingly, Sheridan and some 10,000 cavalymen circled east and then south around Lee's right flank and that evening struck Beaver Dam Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, then headed for the northern outskirts of Richmond.

Stuart, once he had divined Sheridan's intentions, countered by dividing his cavalry corps and sending part of it to attack the Federal rear while he led the rest to intercept Sheridan near the capital. The two forces collided on 11 May at Yellow Tavern, an old unpainted stagecoach stop a few miles north of the city. Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's dismounted cavalymen charged through Stuart's line before the Confederates pushed them back. Stuart, astride his horse, was shouting and firing his huge LeMat revolver at the retreating Federals when one of them, Pvt. John A. Huff, of the 5th Michigan Cavalry, turned and fired his revolver. The bullet struck Stuart in the abdomen and he reeled in the saddle. Led away from the action, Stuart was placed in an ambulance and taken to Richmond. His last words on the battlefield, directed at some retreating Confederates, were "Go back! Go back! I'd rather die than be whipped!"

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Die he did, in agony, at the home of his brother-in-law, Dr. Charles Brewer, on Grace Street. The end came shortly after 7:30 P.M. on 12 May. Stuart had hoped to survive long enough to see his wife one last time, but she arrived just a few minutes too late. After a funeral the next day that was attended by members of the Confederate Congress, Stuart was buried in Hollywood Cemetery.

Excepting Stuart's death, the Battle of Yellow Tavern was a small affair that cost the two sides some 800 casualties. Sheridan's expedition did little damage, but it deprived both armies of their "eyes and ears" when they were needed by Grant and Lee in Spotsylvania County. Lee, visibly distraught when informed of Stuart's wounding and subsequent death, commented that Stuart "never brought me a piece of false information."

The battles around Spotsylvania Court House ground on, as the Federals lengthened their left flank by shifting the II, V, and VI Corps to the east on 14-15 May, to the left of the IX Corps. This maneuver realigned Grant's line along the Fredericksburg Road (Rte. 208) in a north-south direction, with its guns pointing west. Two Union corps attacked Lee's new line behind the Mule Shoe on 18 May but were repulsed. The next day, Ewell marched his corps north and east in an attempt to locate the new position of the Union right flank on the Fredericksburg Road. He collided with some heavy artillerymen newly arrived from the defenses of Washington. After a vicious and bloody engagement in which the gallant gunners fought as infantry, Ewell withdrew. The Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse had ended. Two days later, Grant disengaged his army and marched it south, continuing to maneuver around Lee.

Lee followed suit, marching the Army of Northern Virginia south on roads paralleling the route taken by the Army of the Potomac. On the afternoon of 22 May, the Confederate vanguard arrived at the North Anna River and stopped to bathe and rest while the rest of the army caught up. Lee expected Grant and his men to pause to regroup after two and a half weeks of near-constant combat, but the Federal commander surprised him by pressing on to the North Anna and attempting to cross the next day.

The battle for the North Anna River began on the afternoon of 23 May, when Hancock's II Corps captured a redoubt guarding Chesterfield bridge on Telegraph Road just west of today's U.S. Rte. 1. The Confederates attempted to burn the bridge that night but failed. They succeeded, however, in destroying the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad bridge just downstream (the abutments can still be seen). Upstream at Jericho Mill, meanwhile, Warren's V Corps forded the river with little opposition. Hill launched a counterattack while the Federals prepared their evening meal, but Union artillery and infantry reinforcements drove his men back.

That night, Lee and his generals conferred at Hanover Junction. With Union forces across the river at two points, a defensive line on the high south bank alone was not tenable. If he withdrew south toward Richmond, Lee would not have room to maneuver his army and would be forced to retreat behind the city's defensive works. But he had to keep his army between Grant and Richmond.

The Confederates still held Ox Ford, so Lee decided to make that the center of his new line, which would be shaped like an inverted V. Hill's corps was assigned the left flank, which extended from Ox Ford southwest to the Little River, opposing Warren. Anderson's corps formed the center, from the ford southeast along the North Anna River, while Ewell's held the right flank facing the Telegraph Road bridge

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and Hancock. Grant, Lee reasoned, would have to divide his army to attack either flank, or hold back long enough to capture Ox Ford. Lee hoped to stall Grant and then launch his own attack against either Warren or Hancock.

On 24 May, finding Lee's forces pulled back from the II Corps and V Corps fronts, Grant assumed that they were retreating to Richmond and ordered a pursuit, strengthening Warren with Wright's VI Corps. The Army of the Potomac pressed forward and ran into a hail of lead. Burnside's IX Corps failed to capture Ox Ford when, during a thunderstorm, Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie (who was drunk) led his brigade in a futile charge against the Confederate works. Along Telegraph Road, a Confederate skirmish line fought with such tenacity that it stopped a II Corps division in its tracks. As darkness fell, Grant realized that Lee's position was virtually impregnable and ordered his men to entrench.

For the next two days, the armies skirmished but did not engage in heavy fighting. The North Anna campaign had cost the Federals some 2,600 casualties, the Confederates about 1,800. During the night of 26–27 May, Grant withdrew to the north side of the river, then swung east and continued south around Lee's right flank. Why did Lee not execute that part of his plan calling for an attack on one of Grant's flanks? On 24 May, Lee fell so ill with diarrhea that he kept to his tent; Hill and Ewell also were unwell. There was little Lee could do but mutter, "We must strike them a blow—we must never let them pass us again—we must strike them a blow." But Grant did pass him, and Lee ordered his army to fall back toward Richmond.

As the Army of Northern Virginia retreated, the Army of the Potomac advanced, with two of Sheridan's cavalry divisions and an infantry division in the lead. The force marched east along the North Anna and then crossed the Pamunkey River. On 28 May, Lee and Grant sent part of their cavalry on reconnoitering missions to locate the opposing army. The horsemen collided at Haw's Shop, a machine shop that stood at the intersection of three roads in eastern Hanover County.

The Federal expedition consisted of Gregg's division, with Torbert's following in support. Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee rode toward them from the west with parts of their divisions, while two newly arrived South Carolina regiments trailed behind. About 10:00 A.M., Gregg reached the intersection and established a dismounted skirmish line. Half a mile west, Hampton's men arrived about the same time. Hampton attacked but was driven back by a Federal counterattack; the Confederates formed a defensive line near Enon Church. Gregg resumed the assault, and for some seven hours the combatants fought a bloody, indecisive engagement. Finally, Hampton decided to withdraw, since he had learned from prisoners that Union infantry had indeed crossed the Pamunkey—the information he had been sent to gather. Just as he began to disengage, however, Custer led the Michigan cavalry in a final assault. The tally of casualties for the day's action amounted to about 340 Federals and perhaps 400 Confederates. It had been the largest and bloodiest eastern cavalry engagement since Brandy Station in June 1863.

On 28 May, Lee set up a new blocking line on the south bank of Totopotomoy Creek, a tributary of the Pamunkey River about halfway between it and the Chickahominy River. More a series of swamps than a clear-cut watercourse, the sluggish, eastward-flowing creek lay only nine miles north of Richmond in eastern Hanover County. The broad bottomland made infantry assaults difficult but not impossible, and

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on 29 May the Federals took up positions on the north side of the creek with the intention of dislodging Lee.

For two days Lee and Grant traded attacks and counterattacks. The Union corps commanded by Hancock, Warren, and Burnside probed across the creek to Lee's lines on 29 May. Meanwhile, Wright's VI Corps maneuvered east around the Federal right flank and turned south the next day to strike Lee's left flank but bogged down in swampy Crump's Creek and failed to get into position. On 30 May, Hancock's II Corps attacked Lee and breached the first line of earthworks; the main Confederate line held, however. Burnside's IX Corps drove in Confederate pickets on the Shady Grove Road to the left of II Corps, while Early launched an attack against Warren's V Corps on the Union far left at Bethesda Church. Although Early failed to crush Warren's vanguard, the attack spoiled any plans for an overall Federal advance, and Warren fell back to Shady Grove Road. The two days of fighting resulted in an equal number of casualties (about 1,100) on each side, but neither combatant gained any advantage.

Far more ominously for the Confederates, on 30 May Torbert's cavalry division began searching for a way around Lee's right flank. Grant had ordered the Federal horsemen to clear a route to Cold Harbor, a hamlet where five roads intersected, and from which one road led to the Union supply base at White House on the Pamunkey River. Torbert found his path blocked near Old Church and Matadequin Creek, a tributary of the Pamunkey that flows south of and roughly parallel to the Totopotomoy. There Torbert confronted the South Carolinians commanded by Brig. Gen. Matthew C. Butler, who defended the steep crossing point at Matadequin Creek. They did not hold for long, however, and soon fell back to Cold Harbor, from which they, although reinforced by Fitz Lee, were driven the next day by more of Sheridan's cavalry. The capture of the crossroads meant that Grant could change his front to face Lee's right flank on a north-south line, thereby compelling Lee to do likewise. The fighting at Old Church and Matadequin Creek cost the Federals 90 casualties; the Confederate losses are not known.

Cold Harbor (actually Old Cold Harbor; New Cold Harbor stood about one mile southwest) consisted of little more than an ancient tavern set among fields and woods and a network of roads. Grant and his staff never got the hang of the hamlet's seemingly nonsensical name, rendering it variously as "Coal Harbor" and "Cold Arbor." There was a cluster of trees that may have been considered an arbor, but no harbor, or coal either, and it is not particularly cold there except at certain times of the winter. The name instead may have derived from an old English term for a tavern that did not offer hot food. On the other hand, the tavern that stood there in 1864 had two chimneys and presumably did prepare fresh-cooked meals. Regardless of the place-name's meaning, within a few days Cold Harbor would be known for a battle that was as hot as the weather from which the men of both armies suffered as they filed wearily into their positions on 31 May.

Sheridan's cavalymen had seized the crossroads earlier that day, driving the Confederates west and repelling several counterattacks. During the night, both sides entrenched and extended their lines north and south as additional troops arrived (including Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's Confederate division from the Richmond defenses), a trend that continued for two days. On 1 June, Lee ordered Anderson to recapture

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the ground in coordination with Hoke, but Sheridan's horse soldiers fighting dismounted and using Spencer repeating carbines repelled the attempt, and about noon Wright's VI Corps replaced the cavalymen.

Grant realized that his best hope for holding Cold Harbor and defeating Lee lay in attacking before the entire Army of Northern Virginia assembled and entrenched. He ordered Wright to lead an assault as soon as Maj. Gen. William F. Smith's XVIII Corps arrived from Bermuda Hundred south of Richmond. The attack was delayed for hours, however, when Smith was misdirected by orders issued by Grant's headquarters; finally, about 5:00 P.M., the Federals charged Anderson's and Hoke's position. At first they succeeded in breaking through the Confederate line, but soon countercharges erased most of their gains.

Grant, frustrated, decided to launch a coordinated attack at dawn on 2 June and ordered Hancock's II Corps to march all night to join in the assault. Hancock's march did not end until well after the hour appointed for the attack, however, as his men were too exhausted to move quickly. Grant postponed the charge until late in the afternoon and then, when delay followed delay, until 4:30 the next morning.

The postponements gave Lee the opportunity he needed. Lee was a master at moving his army quickly to block Grant's path, and his men were experts at entrenching. By dawn on 3 June, the Confederates had constructed the strongest network of fortifications they had yet built in Virginia—stronger even than the works at the North Anna River. Extending for almost seven miles, the trenches were several lines deep, with interconnecting works to protect the soldiers, large batteries, and interlocking fields of fire. Sensing that capturing them would be no easy task, many Federal soldiers wrote their names on scraps of paper and stitched them to their uniforms so that their bodies might be identified later.

At 4:30 A.M., almost 50,000 men of the II, VI, and XVIII Corps attacked along a three-mile front. Only on the Union left, and only for a moment, did they break through the lines. Sheets of flame greeted the Federals, and men fell in heaps. Within an hour, 5,500 of them lay slaughtered, dead or wounded, as the Confederate entrenchments lived up to their promise. Then they simply disintegrated under the withering fire from rifles and cannon, and retreated. Later in the day, attacks and counterattacks along Warren's and Burnside's front cost the Federals another 1,500 casualties.

In retrospect, Grant admitted that the attack had been a dreadful mistake. But he had believed that one grand assault, launched before Lee was fully prepared, might have ended the war, and in that he may have been correct. Lee had taken Grant's mistake and turned it into his last major victory of the war.

Both sides reeled from the butchery, and little action occurred for the next several days. On 12 June, Grant used the cover of darkness to slip away east and south again, intent on moving far around Lee and threatening Richmond from the south, from the direction of Petersburg. The Cold Harbor battles, from start to bloody finish, had cost the Federals some 12,000 casualties and the Confederates about 2,500.

To distract the Confederates, Grant had ordered Sheridan to ride westward and destroy track along the Virginia Central Railroad, which connected Richmond with the Shenandoah Valley. Sheridan departed on 7 June with some 6,000 cavalymen. Lee, as usual, soon learned of the Federal movement and sent Hampton and roughly 5,000 troopers in pursuit. On 11 June, Hampton caught up with Sheridan near Trevilian Station, a stop on the railroad in Louisa County just west of Louisa Court House.

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The two forces had bivouacked within five miles of each other on 10 June, with Hampton's men camping near the station and Louisa Court House and Sheridan's just south of the North Anna River. On the morning of 11 June, opposing patrols encountered each other and the battle began. The day went well at first for Sheridan, who drove a wedge between Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's divisions and pushed the former back to the station, where Custer had attacked the Confederate rear. Hampton's men quickly regrouped, however, and soon had Custer surrounded on three sides. He and his troopers cut their way out, and the first day of the battle ended as much from mutual exhaustion and ammunition shortages as from the approaching darkness.

On 12 June, the fighting resumed in the morning with an unsuccessful attack by Sheridan against the Confederate line along the railroad. When he tried again in the afternoon, Sheridan's assault was broken by Hampton's strong counterattack that nearly shattered the Union force. Again darkness ended the fighting, and by dawn the next day Sheridan and his men were withdrawing toward White House on the Pamunkey River.

The two-day battle at Trevilian Station was the bloodiest cavalry encounter of the war. Sheridan lost 1,000 casualties, Hampton somewhat fewer. The expedition had resulted in little damage to the railroad, although it had accomplished its goal of drawing most of the Confederate cavalry away from the action at Cold Harbor. Given the nature of the fighting in Hanover County, however, the absence of the cavalry meant little. After the battle, however, the Confederate cavalry's absence helped Grant begin his movement south undetected by Lee. Sheridan and Hampton rejoined their armies just after Grant and Lee began to maneuver toward Petersburg.

Grant's Overland Campaign had failed in its goals of drawing Lee into open battle and crushing him, then capturing the Confederate capital. Lee assumed the defensive, a role dictated by his decision to send Early's corps to the Shenandoah Valley. It was a role he kept for the remainder of the war and executed with precision while searching unsuccessfully for opportunities to attack Grant. For his part, the Federal commander had continued to maneuver around Lee's right flank toward Richmond, thereby reinforcing Lee's defensive posture.

The cost was ghastly, with each side losing about 45 percent of its strength. Grant began the campaign on 4 May with about 120,000 men, Lee with about 60,000. By 12 June, when Grant disengaged his army at Cold Harbor and began the march that would take him to Petersburg, he had suffered about 55,000 casualties. Lee's losses amounted to roughly 27,000. The total number of effectives for the Army of the Potomac stood at about 65,000 by mid-June; the Army of Northern Virginia had about 33,000. Both sides soon received reinforcements.

The Overland Campaign ended in stalemate, but the horrific losses were far more serious for Lee than for Grant, especially since Grant's overall strategy had proven effective. Sherman was thrusting into northwestern Georgia, while Maj. Gen. David Hunter was marching through the Shenandoah Valley. Lee could do nothing to help Johnston against Sherman, but he could and did divide his army and send first Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge and then Early to counter Hunter. This decision virtually eliminated any possibility that Lee could maneuver against Grant and attack him successfully. For the rest of the war, Lee

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and the Army of Northern Virginia would be restricted to trench warfare and, eventually, a desperate escape from Petersburg that would end at Appomattox Court House.

BERMUDA HUNDRED CAMPAIGN

When Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States on 10 March 1864, he initially favored a major advance on Richmond from Suffolk by way of Raleigh, North Carolina. He reasoned that such an approach would cut Gen. Robert E. Lee's vital supply lines to the rest of the South and compel him to fight a major battle to restore them. Eventually, however, Grant abandoned this plan in favor of an overland campaign south from the Army of the Potomac's winter encampment in Culpeper County.

Besides the new campaign, Grant ordered two other offensive operations in Virginia. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel would lead a force through the Shenandoah Valley, and another army would ascend James River, land at Bermuda Hundred, seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south, in effect forming the left wing of the Federal offense. This army also would accomplish Grant's earlier goal of severing the Confederate lines of supply and obliging Lee either to fight in the open or retreat behind the Richmond defenses. To lead this force, Grant was compelled to appoint Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, the commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.

Butler was perhaps the most politically well-connected general in the Union army. Many professional soldiers, however, such as the former army general in chief, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, heartily despised Butler, who in turn scorned them. Although Butler was widely regarded as incompetent in the field, his political associations and his acknowledged administrative skills rendered him impossible to ignore and all but impossible to remove. Grant would have preferred Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith as commander of what would soon be called the Army of the James, but after conferring with Butler on 1–2 April 1864 he decided to assign him the direction of the campaign up the Peninsula.

The conference established Butler's plan of attack, which would begin at the same time as Grant's overland campaign. The Army of the James would ascend James River and establish a supply base about nine miles east of Petersburg at City Point, as well as two defensive posts downriver—Fort Powhatan on the south bank opposite Weyanoke, and Fort Pocahontas farther downstream at Wilson's Wharf on the north bank—to protect Federal vessels and the depot. Butler's army would then establish its base of operations at Bermuda Hundred, a peninsula above City Point between the James and Appomattox Rivers. After entrenching there, Butler would threaten Petersburg, send cavalry against the railroads to the south, and move on Richmond. If all went well, both armies would link up somewhere west of Richmond ten days or so after the beginning of the campaign.

Although Grant's strategy seemed clear, Butler misinterpreted a key element of it. Naturally cautious, Butler assumed that Grant wanted him first to take the time to fortify Bermuda Hundred strongly so as to secure his base, then march against Richmond. Grant, on the contrary, intended Butler to entrench

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sufficiently to protect his army and then to concentrate on getting to Richmond as quickly as possible. Many of the subsequent difficulties between Grant and Butler can be traced to this misunderstanding.

The 39,000-man Army of the James consisted of two corps: X Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore and XVIII Corps by Smith. Each corps contained three infantry divisions, each of which was supported by an artillery brigade. The X Corps divisions were led by Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, Brig. Gen. John W. Turner, and Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames, while Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, and Brig. Gen. Edward W. Hincks commanded the XVIII Corps divisions. Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz led the cavalry division, which consisted of two brigades and unattached troops and arrived at City Point on 10 May.

Opposing Butler was the Confederate garrison at Petersburg commanded by Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett. Pickett was not a happy general. After his division had been badly cut up at Gettysburg, he had been appointed head of the Department of North Carolina, which included southern Virginia. His principal task, defending Petersburg and the rail connections with the rest of the South, was rendered virtually impossible for the lack of troops. As April wore toward May and rumors arose of Federal activity aimed in his direction, Pickett grew even more frustrated, especially when his urgent messages to Richmond frequently were ignored.

On 15 April 1864, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard was appointed department head to replace Pickett. Beauregard, however, was instructed to proceed to Weldon, North Carolina, not Petersburg, to await further orders, while Pickett marked time in the Virginia city until Beauregard arrived to relieve him. Beauregard's command was as spread out as the two commanders: some elements were en route to Richmond from Charleston, South Carolina, others from Wilmington, North Carolina, while still others were engaged in an offensive against New Bern, North Carolina.

After it finally assembled near Petersburg in mid-May, Beauregard's army consisted of four infantry divisions commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom Jr., Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt, and Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting. Ransom's and Hoke's divisions contained four brigades, Colquitt's and Whiting's two. Brig. Gen. James Dearing commanded the cavalry brigade, and more than a dozen artillery batteries supported the infantry and cavalry. Other units moved in and out of the command at various times during the campaign; probably the total never amounted to more than 18,000 troops.

On 5 May, Butler's army sailed up the James River in a wide variety of military and civilian vessels. Elements of the force boarded transports at various wharves en route, gunboats escorted the flotilla, and the 1st and 2d U.S. Colored Cavalry Regiments trotted parallel to the fleet on the north bank of the river. At Wilson's Wharf, half of Brig. Gen. Edward A. Wild's brigade—the 1st and 22d Regiments of U.S. Colored Troops and two sections of Company B, 2d U.S. Colored Artillery Regiment—disembarked to construct Fort Pocahontas there. The remainder of Wild's brigade, the 10th and 37th U.S. Colored Troops, supported by two sections of Company M, 3d New York Artillery, disembarked at Fort Powhatan several miles upstream on the south bank to occupy and improve the abandoned Confederate fortification there.

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About 4:00 P.M., the lead elements of the Army of the James stormed ashore at City Point, achieving tactical surprise and capturing several prisoners. The rest of the army steamed a mile and a half upriver to Bermuda Hundred Landing, which it likewise occupied without resistance. There, the disembarking of the Army of the James continued throughout the evening and well into the night. In Petersburg, meanwhile, Pickett sent a steady stream of telegrams to Richmond to inform the Confederate government of Butler's progress and beg for instructions and assistance. The wire traffic only flowed one way, however, as Pickett heard nothing from Richmond. He had better luck with his telegrams to Beauregard, who immediately began rounding up troops to send him.

While Pickett and Beauregard struggled to scrape together a defensive force, Butler, flush with the expedition's early success, considered a night march on Richmond. Cooler heads prevailed among his subordinates, however, and the advance was put off until dawn on 6 May. Soon after the sun rose, the Army of the James was on the march west from Bermuda Hundred Landing.

The XVIII Corps led the way, with Brig. Gen. Charles A. Heckman's brigade of Weitzel's division in the vanguard. Two miles inland, at Enon Church, the road forked, with one branch leading southwest toward Petersburg and the other continuing west. The XVIII Corps took the left-hand fork while the X Corps marched straight ahead. At Ware Bottom Church, some four miles farther on, Gillmore's men halted and began construction of the northern half of Butler's defensive line. To the south, Smith's XVIII Corps eventually would build its half of the line, which would then extend across Bermuda Hundred from the James to the Appomattox River. In midafternoon, Butler ordered Heckman to advance to the junction of the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad and an abandoned branch line that led east to Port Walthall.

Pickett, meanwhile, struggled to anticipate Federal troop movements and block them with his scattered forces. He stationed Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood's brigade, recently arrived from South Carolina, at Port Walthall Junction; the men had barely settled into place when Heckman attacked late in the afternoon. As Hagood himself had not yet arrived at the junction, Col. Robert Graham coordinated the defense, which held off Heckman until he withdrew for lack of support and under the mistaken belief that he faced two Confederate brigades.

That night, Butler ordered another attack to seize the junction and destroy track, while Pickett strengthened the defenses there with Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson's brigade called up from eastern Tennessee, bringing the total number to about 2,600. Five Union brigades, some 8,000 men under the command of Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, marched west on the morning of 7 May. They encountered stiff opposition from the Confederates at first, but almost collapsed the line with an envelopment of Johnson's left flank. The defenders rallied and held, however, and at the end of the day Brooks withdrew after destroying very little of the railroad. The Federals suffered some 300 casualties and the Confederates 200.

The Confederates were jubilant over their victory but their high spirits subsided quickly, however, as late that night Pickett ordered Johnson to withdraw south from Port Walthall Junction across Swift Creek. Pickett, assuming that Butler's ultimate objective was Petersburg, feared he did not have enough troops to protect the city and sought to tighten his defensive perimeter. He fretted over the continuing

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absence of Beauregard and the silence in Richmond, and increasingly felt abandoned. His decision to withdraw Johnson left the rail line to Richmond unprotected, although it did strengthen the Petersburg defenses.

South of the city, in contrast to Brooks's foray, the Petersburg Railroad (also called the Weldon Railroad) to Weldon suffered serious if temporary damage as the result of a raid by some 2,500 cavalrymen led from Portsmouth by Kautz. The raid, which began on 5 May and ended five days later when Kautz's troopers entered the Union lines at City Point, disrupted the transportation of Beauregard's reinforcements from North Carolina to Petersburg. As a result, the force opposing Butler remained vulnerable.

Fortunately for Pickett and Richmond, Butler failed to exploit his opportunity. Concerned about the fate of the Army of the Potomac, which at that moment was locked in combat with the Army of Northern Virginia in the Wilderness, and about that of his own army should the Confederates be able to concentrate their forces against him, Butler was content to spend the next day improving his fortifications across the neck of Bermuda Hundred.

On 9 May, Butler resumed his attempt to cut the rail link between Richmond and Petersburg. Several divisions from both corps marched to Port Walthall Junction and Chester Station on the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad, then turned south toward Petersburg. At Swift Creek, they encountered Hagood's and Johnson's strong line that protected the turnpike and railroad bridges. The Confederates launched a counterattack across the creek that was overwhelmed by superior Federal numbers, but Butler did not follow up on his success.

In coordination with the Swift Creek attack, five Union vessels shelled Fort Clifton, which was located on the Confederate right flank overlooking the Appomattox River downstream and north of Petersburg. Counterfire from the battery there damaged a gunboat and foiled a planned assault by Hincks's division of U.S. Colored Troops. The casualties for the day, probably all suffered at Swift Creek, numbered about 140 for each side.

During the night, having received optimistic reports of Grant's progress toward Richmond after the Battle of the Wilderness, Butler decided to withdraw his corps inside the Bermuda Hundred line and await Grant's seemingly imminent arrival. To protect the route of withdrawal for the troops destroying track at Chester Station, on 9 May a small blocking force had been placed at the intersection of the Richmond Turnpike and the road leading to Bermuda Hundred (today's U.S. Rte. 1 and Rte. 10) and another at Ware Bottom Church. A Confederate reconnaissance failed to dislodge them.

On 10 May, Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom Jr. led two of his brigades south toward the Bermuda Hundred road to reconnoiter in force. Near the Henry A. Winfree dwelling just west of the turnpike intersection, they encountered the Federal blocking detachment, which had been reinforced in the night almost to brigade strength. A heavy action developed as fresh Union regiments were fed into the engagement and the Federal line was extended, eventually threatening to outflank the Confederates. Late in the afternoon, Ransom broke off the engagement and the Union troops began withdrawing to Bermuda Hundred, while the Confederates retired toward Drewry's Bluff. The Federals suffered some 280 casualties and the Confederates about 250.

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On the day of the battle, Beauregard, who had been delayed in part by illness, finally arrived in Petersburg. He relieved the overworked Pickett, who promptly took to his bed, exhausted. To the north of Richmond, meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan was leading most of his cavalry command on a raid against the Confederate defenses, a raid that culminated in the Battle of Yellow Tavern on 11 May. Anxious to relieve the pressure and prevent an attack on the capital from two directions, President Jefferson Davis and his military advisors urged Beauregard to attack Butler. Beauregard appeared eager to oblige, but complications in the deployment of his command delayed a general advance.

While Butler's men washed clothes and strengthened their entrenchments on 11 May, Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke led his division north from Petersburg to reconnoiter and to make contact with Ransom's division. Late in the day, he united with Ransom near Drewry's Bluff and bivouacked his troops near Proctor's Creek. There he formed the left wing of the Confederate line, Ransom the right.

Butler, meanwhile, had decided to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond. At dawn on 12 May, Smith led the XVIII Corps through the Bermuda Hundred line to the Richmond Turnpike, then north toward the capital city. About a mile up the road, at Redwater Creek, Smith encountered a Confederate skirmish line; it delivered such a stiff fire that Smith stopped to reconnoiter. His attempts to determine the strength and dispositions of the Confederates were hampered by the weather, as the hot and dusty conditions of the previous week had been replaced by torrents of rain and thick mud. After some skirmishing, he stopped for the night.

Gillmore and X Corps, meanwhile, followed Smith out of the works and then marched west on the road to Chester Station and likewise bivouacked. At dawn on 13 May, Gillmore marched on in the rain through Chester Station to Chesterfield Court House, then north on a road that led to the western end of the Confederate defensive line above Proctor's Creek. Smith, meanwhile, cautiously crept up the turnpike toward the main part of the line near Drewry's Bluff. Late in the afternoon, while Smith reconnoitered, Gillmore struck the Confederate left flank. Ransom's troops crumpled under the onslaught, rallied and counterattacked, and finally fell back to the main line. The next day, Smith and Gillmore launched coordinated attacks that drove through the first defensive line but stopped short of the second, which appeared stronger. The Federals dug in.

On the Confederate side, meanwhile, Beauregard planned an all-out counterattack for 16 May. While Hoke demonstrated against the Federal center and left, Ransom would attack and turn the Union right flank. Whiting, who had been left in charge of the troops in Petersburg when Beauregard rode to the front on 13 May, was to attack the rear of Butler's army.

Shortly before 5:00 A.M. on 16 May, Beauregard's offensive began despite a thick fog that had rolled in during the night. Ransom attacked first, driving the Federal right flank south to Butler's headquarters at Half-Way House, an eighteenth-century tavern located on the turnpike midway between Richmond and Petersburg. Butler repeatedly urged Gillmore, holding the Union left, to attack Hoke, but Gillmore delayed until he got orders to withdraw late in the morning. The Federals began to fall back toward the safety of Bermuda Hundred.

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Whiting's force had advanced from Petersburg as ordered but halted at Port Walthall Junction in the face of slight opposition rather than pushing forward. There Whiting, who was ill and also had gone without sleep for three days (Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise thought he was drunk), became increasingly befuddled and uncertain of what he should do. While he dallied and Beauregard waited impatiently, Butler and his army slipped out of the Confederate trap. Each side lost about 3,000 men killed, wounded, and captured.

Once within the Bermuda Hundred stronghold, Gillmore's X Corps occupied the right half of the works, Smith's XVIII Corps the left. Beauregard looked for an opportunity to attack, but President Jefferson Davis ordered him to send several brigades north to reinforce the Army of Northern Virginia, then embroiled at Spotsylvania Court House. The troops began departing in the evening of 19 May. The next morning at dawn, Beauregard launched a limited attack against the Federal lines in order to secure ground that could be defended with a relatively short line of entrenchments and a small number of troops.

Most of the combat took place near Ware Bottom Church in Gillmore's sector. Whiting's division drove in Gillmore's pickets, captured their rifle pits, and pressed forward in some places for more than half a mile. In the afternoon Gillmore counterattacked and regained some of the lost ground. At the end of the day, however, Beauregard pronounced himself satisfied that his goals had been accomplished. The Confederates suffered about 800 casualties, the Federals some 700. Soon Beauregard's men would construct fieldworks called the Howlett Line for the farm of Dr. John Howlett that was located near the northern end of the line. Butler's Bermuda Hundred campaign had ended.

In the opinion of some observers, the Howlett Line effectively "bottled up" Butler at Bermuda Hundred. Although any movement overland to the west was inhibited, Butler remained able to cross both the Appomattox and the James, as later events proved. Butler's natural caution and his conclusion, as he wrote his wife, that he had accomplished most of the goals established when he met with Grant in April, contributed more to his decision to remain on the peninsula than any immediate Confederate threat. Finally, as Lee fell back toward Richmond, Butler was well positioned to threaten either Petersburg or Richmond, or to take the field and assist Grant.

The outpost at City Point gained in importance, too, when Grant arrived in mid-June and it became the principal supply depot—indeed, one of the largest "ports" in the country—for the Army of the Potomac. Likewise, the fortifications strengthened or erected at Fort Powhatan and Wilson's Wharf (Fort Pocahontas) protected the vessels carrying troops and supplies to City Point.

On 24 May, however, the Confederates launched an attack on Wilson's Wharf in Charles City County. Incensed by largely contrived reports in the Richmond newspapers of "atrocious outrages" committed by the U.S. Colored Troops there against white civilians in the neighborhood, and anxious to clear the north bank of the James River of Federal forces, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee led some 2,500 cavalrymen against the place. After Lee's initial attack was repulsed, he sent forward a flag of truce to demand surrender, with the promise that the black soldiers would be treated as prisoners of war—and an implied threat that if they resisted they might be slaughtered as at Fort Pillow. Brig. Gen. Edward A. Wild,

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commander of the 1,500-man garrison, refused to surrender and repulsed Lee's second attack. The Confederates withdrew during the night, having suffered almost all the 165 casualties.

Bermuda Hundred, and the James River below it, remained in Federal hands. Soon, Grant would arrive to launch the next phase of his campaign against Richmond and Petersburg.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGNS OF 1864-1865

When Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant planned his campaign strategy for spring 1864, he decided on two major Union thrusts. One aimed to destroy Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee and occupy Atlanta, the South's most important railroad hub. The other sought to crush Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond, the capital of the Confederate States of America. The Virginia campaign consisted of three components: the attack toward Richmond, an advance up the James River to threaten the rail center at Petersburg, and the destruction of the railroad at Staunton and Lynchburg, thereby severing Confederate links with the fertile Shenandoah Valley. To accomplish the third objective, Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel to lead a small army south through the Valley, in what Grant considered a sideshow compared to the thrust south from Germanna Ford.

Sigel and his 9,000-man army marched south from Winchester on the Valley Turnpike on 2 May 1864. Sigel advanced slowly, his progress impeded by Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden's Confederate cavalry brigade, which harassed his column.

Imboden's tactics bought time for Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, a former vice president of the United States as well as a former senator from Kentucky, to whom Gen. Robert E. Lee had assigned the task of stopping Sigel with a makeshift Confederate force. By the second week of May, as Sigel marched into Shenandoah County, Breckinridge had scraped together a 5,300-man army consisting of two infantry brigades, Imboden's cavalry brigade, fourteen pieces of artillery, some militia, and 258 teenage boys from the Virginia Military Institute, the entire corps of cadets there.

On 15 May the two forces confronted each other at New Market, a farming village at the southern edge of Shenandoah County on the Valley Turnpike. Sigel blocked the turnpike a mile north of town but Breckenridge, although outnumbered, attacked. Putting his infantry and a regiment of dismounted cavalry in line of battle, Breckinridge ordered his force to advance through New Market. Sigel ordered a withdrawal to a hill half a mile farther north and deployed his cannon effectively against the oncoming Confederates. Reluctantly, Breckinridge gave the command to "Put the boys in" to attack the Union artillery position just as a battery was withdrawn to replenish its ammunition. The cadets advanced in battle line with the rest of the Confederates across a field so muddy that it sucked shoes from many feet, and then charged the guns under heavy fire. At a cost of 10 killed and 47 wounded, some 20 percent of their number, the corps raced up the hill and captured a cannon abandoned by the fleeing Federal artillerists. His right flank endangered, Sigel retreated across the North Fork of the Shenandoah River to

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Strasburg and abandoned his campaign. For the moment, the Valley was secure for the Confederates. The Battle of New Market cost Sigel about 840 casualties, Breckinridge 540.

Maj. Gen. David Hunter replaced Sigel four days later. On 26 May, Hunter led his army, now strengthened to about 12,000, up the Valley from Cedar Creek. He planned to rendezvous near Staunton with forces commanded by Brig. Gen. George Crook and Brig. Gen. William W. Averell. By 29 May, Hunter's army was at New Market, where it paused to rest and rebury the dead from the earlier battle there.

Once again, the Confederates scrambled to meet the Union threat, as Lee had summoned Breckinridge and his command to the North Anna River. Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones's infantry brigade hurried north from Bristol by rail, while Imboden's cavalry blocked Hunter's advance at Mount Crawford. Augmented by local militia, Jones's command amounted to some 5,600 troops.

Hunter sidestepped the Confederate blocking force by marching around it to the east and crossing the North River at Port Republic. Jones and Imboden, reinforced by additional cavalry under the command of Brig. Gen. John C. Vaughn, countered by marching southeast and occupying ground around Piedmont, a hamlet located about seven miles southwest of Port Republic. The infantry formed a defensive line of fence rails and felled trees in an arc northwest of Piedmont, while Vaughn's cavalry held a position southeast of the hamlet.

On 5 June, Hunter crossed the river at Port Republic and encountered Imboden's cavalry outposts at Mount Meridian. Hunter's cavalry forced the Confederates back to their main position at Piedmont, where they dismounted and joined Vaughn's men. Shortly after noon, Hunter launched the first of a series of attacks against Jones that revealed a gap in his line. A Union brigade assaulted the gap while Jones dashed from one point to another to reposition and rally his men. At the height of the battle, a bullet to the head killed Jones instantly, and the Confederate line collapsed. Only a stiff rearguard action on the road south of Piedmont held off the Union pursuit. The Confederate defeat was costly: 1,600 casualties (including more than 1,000 captured) versus 875 for the Federals. Now the upper Valley lay before the Union columns.

Hunter occupied Staunton the next day and Crook joined him two days later, swelling his force to some 20,000. Hunter then embarked on a campaign of destruction and pillaging (Grant had ordered him to live off the land) south to Lexington. There, for three days, Hunter's army ransacked the town and burned many buildings, including the Virginia Military Institute. Then Hunter turned his attention to his primary objective, Lynchburg, and marched east through the Blue Ridge Mountains.

East of the mountains, meanwhile, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had been locked in combat with the Army of the Potomac throughout May and the first half of June. While Breckinridge fought Sigel at New Market on 15 May, the eastern armies had been struggling at Spotsylvania Court House. The news of Jones's defeat at Piedmont on 5 June reached Lee soon after the Battle of Cold Harbor, as he and Grant probed each other's lines. Then came Sheridan's raid against the Virginia Central Railroad and the Confederate victory at Trevilian Station, which saved the line at least temporarily. Now Hunter was rampaging through the upper Valley and threatening Lynchburg, the rail and canal center of the Virginia Piedmont.

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In consultation with President Jefferson Davis and Gen. Braxton Bragg, Davis's military advisor, Lee first returned Breckinridge's division to the Valley and then sent an entire corps of his army to save both Lynchburg and the Valley. The tactic entailed great risk for his army, but Lee had to act with vigor to preserve the western rail links and take some of the pressure off Richmond.

Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early commanded this corps, formerly Stonewall Jackson's. Early, it has been pointed out, was no Jackson, but neither was anyone else. "Old Jube" displayed strengths—principally aggressiveness, which earned him the enthusiastic support of his troops—as well as weaknesses, including rashness, abrasiveness, and feelings of insecurity that caused him to mistrust his most capable subordinates. Known for his profane language and acid tongue, Early provoked strong emotions in those who knew him; few were impartial.

Lee and Early conferred on 12 June. Early was to defeat Hunter, march north down the Valley into Maryland, and threaten Washington. Early's corps, with Breckinridge's division attached to it, numbered about 14,000.

On 13 June, the corps began its westward march by foot and rail to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, while Hunter and his army approached the city from the west. Both armies reached their objective on 17 June, with Hunter confronting the southern defensive works while the vanguard of Early's army rode railroad cars into the north side of town from Charlottesville. Early's corps rushed forward to man the earthworks while Hunter probed cautiously. After several skirmishes, Hunter ordered a retreat the next day, in part because he was short of supplies. His army fled southwest toward Big Lick (present-day Roanoke) with Early in pursuit.

The Confederates caught up with the Federals on 21 June just north of Salem at Hanging Rock. In a small, sharp engagement confined to a narrow valley by steep hills, Early delivered the final blow to Hunter that hastened his retreat into West Virginia. The route Hunter chose to reach the relative safety of Harper's Ferry ensured that he and his army would be out of the war for a month.

Now Early was free to carry out the remainder of Lee's orders: invade Maryland and attack Washington. The Confederates marched north down the Shenandoah Valley and on 9 July, near Frederick, Maryland, defeated a Union force under Maj. Gen. Lew A. Wallace at the Battle of Monocacy. Two days later, to the astonishment of the capital's inhabitants, Early's army appeared before the northwestern defenses of Washington. President Abraham Lincoln rode out for a look, while Grant ordered two divisions north from the Petersburg siege lines. Early probed the Federal lines but found them unassailable by his relatively small force and withdrew shortly after midnight on 12 July.

Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright pursued Early with elements of three army corps, some 25,000 men. Early's army crossed the Potomac River at White's Ford and marched west through the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap (present-day Rte. 7). Roughly three miles beyond the gap, where the road crossed the Shenandoah River at Castleman's Ferry, Early was brought to bay at a farm on the western side called Cool Spring. After Union cavalry confronted Confederate cavalry at one river crossing on 17 July and another the next day, Wright decided that Early's infantry had retreated to Winchester and therefore the Federal infantry might successfully force its way across. Early's infantry divisions were just out of sight to the west, however, and they quickly moved east to block Wright's advance under Crook and push it into the river. Col. Joseph Thoburn's Federal division, which had crossed the river and expected reinforcements

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that never came, found itself pinned down behind a stone wall near the riverbank. He and his men held out, repelling three Confederate assaults, until darkness permitted them to retreat across the river. A night artillery duel ended the brief but bloody engagement, which cost the Federals 422 casualties and the Confederates 397.

Early continued his retreat west to Winchester and then south to Strasburg, while Wright's force followed slowly. Then Early learned that a combined Federal detachment of cavalry supported by infantry and commanded by Averell was marching south from Martinsburg, West Virginia, on the Martinsburg & Winchester Turnpike to join Wright. Early detailed Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur's division to defend the northern approaches to Winchester. On 20 July, as Ramseur was getting into position to attack Averell at John Rutherford's farm northeast of Winchester, the Federals suddenly struck Ramseur's flank. Overwhelmed by the onslaught, Ramseur's division fled in a rout, and some 300 Confederates were taken prisoner.

Because of this defeat and Wright's slow approach, Early withdrew his army to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg. Wright concluded that the Confederates no longer posed a threat to Washington and ordered most of his detachment back to the capital preparatory to any early return to the Petersburg front. He left Crook at Winchester with three infantry divisions and a cavalry division to defend the northern end of the Valley.

No sooner had Wright departed than Early struck back at Second Kernstown. There, at the site of Jackson's defeat more than two years earlier, Early's cavalry skirmished with Averell's throughout the day on 23 July. The engagement was renewed the next day, in part to screen the march of Early's infantry north from Strasburg at first light. Crook deployed his divisions in time to meet Early's initial probe, which developed into a strong demonstration in Crook's front. Breckinridge, meanwhile, led his division in an envelopment of Crook's left flank, which soon crumbled. Crook's command fled north through Winchester and crossed the Potomac River near Williamsport, Maryland. The Federals lost some 1,200 men in the battle, the Confederates about 600.

Early quickly took advantage of his victory. In retaliation for Hunter's destructive work in Lexington, Early ordered an expeditionary force commanded by Brig. Gen. John McCausland to seize Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. McCausland and his troopers rode into town on 30 July and demanded \$100,000 in gold or \$500,000 in paper currency in retribution; when the town fathers refused, his men burned the center of town and destroyed more than four hundred buildings, almost three hundred of them private dwellings.

Crook's defeat and the subsequent burning of Chambersburg galvanized Grant as well as Lincoln, each of whom now considered the Shenandoah Valley a sideshow no more. The two men met at Fort Monroe on 31 July to discuss the organization of an army to reoccupy the Valley and the appointment of its leader. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, the commander of the Left Grand Division at Fredericksburg, were considered and rejected. Lincoln departed for Washington with the matter unsettled, leaving the decision to Grant, and the next morning Grant wired Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, the Federal chief of staff, with the name of his choice: Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, Meade's cavalry commander.

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Sheridan, like Grant, was a native of the Midwest. Barely five feet three inches tall with a short torso and long legs, Sheridan was called "Little Phil" by his troops. His bullet-shaped head, accentuated by his close-cropped hair, was remarked on by many who saw him. Like Early, Sheridan was naturally combative; he was also intense and energetic, giving an impression of being in perpetual motion. On horseback, although he cut a peculiar figure because of his small stature, Sheridan became particularly animated and charismatic. And few in the Federal army were as adept at inspiring men on the verge of battle.

Sheridan's 43,000-man army, called the Army of the Shenandoah, consisted of Wright's VI Corps, two divisions of the XIX Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Emory, the XIII Corps led by Crook, a dozen artillery batteries, and three cavalry divisions under Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert. On 7 August, when Sheridan arrived to take command, the army was encamped at Halltown, West Virginia, about three miles southwest of Harper's Ferry. There, almost 5,000 troops under Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson also were available to Sheridan.

Early and his Army of the Valley, as he styled it, were camped at Bunker Hill, West Virginia, on the Valley Turnpike some fourteen miles west of Halltown. The army consisted of about 14,000 men in three infantry divisions, five cavalry brigades, and three artillery battalions totaling nine batteries. Sheridan's force outnumbered Early's by better than three to one.

Grant's orders to Sheridan were clear: push the Confederates south, away from Washington, and strip the Valley of provisions that the enemy would find useful. "Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command," Grant wrote, "such as cannot be consumed, destroy." Grant added that it was not desirable to destroy buildings—a suggestion that Sheridan later would ignore under Grant's further orders to so strip the Valley that "crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their provender."

The Federals began marching up the Valley on 10 August, and by 13 August were at Cedar Creek with the Confederates ensconced on Fisher's Hill four miles farther south. Word reached Sheridan of Confederate troop movements from Petersburg to the Valley; on Grant's recommendation, he withdrew his force to Winchester. Although Sheridan feared that Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's corps had marched to the Valley to reinforce Early, in fact Lee had dispatched only Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw's infantry division, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, and Lt. Col. Wilfred E. Cutshaw's artillery battalion under the overall command of Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson. On Grant's advice, Sheridan began withdrawing through Winchester back to Halltown.

On 14 August, Anderson reached Front Royal, where the north and south forks of the Shenandoah River converge north of the town. There, Anderson threatened the Federal line of retreat, which Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's cavalry division guarded just north of the rivers. On 16 August, when Merritt began moving north, Anderson ordered Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford's infantry brigade and Brig. Gen. Williams C. Wickham's cavalry brigade across the rivers to Guard Hill to watch the roads and river fords.

In midafternoon, Wickham advanced from Guard Hill against Merritt, but two regiments of Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Devin's brigade counterattacked, and after a brief clash of sabers the Confederates retreated across the rivers. Brig. Gen. George A. Custer led another Federal attack against Wofford's infantry on Guard Hill; again the Confederates retreated, and many drowned or were captured as they

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crossed the forks of the Shenandoah River. Having confirmed the presence of Confederate infantry and cavalry in Front Royal, Merritt's cavalry followed the main Federal army toward Halltown. The two sides suffered a total of some 550 casualties in the Guard Hill engagement.

For the next several weeks, Early probed the Union lines around Halltown, and Sheridan likewise skirmished with the Confederates. Considerable maneuvering occurred in Jefferson County, West Virginia, and Clarke County, Virginia. On 3 September, most of Sheridan's army advanced to Berryville in Clarke County and took up defensive positions north of the town facing west on rolling ground along present-day Rte. 611. The Confederates occupied a parallel line about a mile west. To the west of Berryville, as part of Crook's corps settled down for the night on the Union left flank, Kershaw's division attacked and met with initial success but lacked the manpower to continue. During the night, Early brought up the remainder of his army, but when daylight revealed entrenchments too strong to attack, he withdrew that night west beyond Opequon Creek. The two sides suffered about 500 total casualties, and the maneuvering continued with little interruption.

As the armies appeared to be stalemated, in mid-September Early agreed that Anderson would depart with Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery battalion and rejoin Lee at Petersburg, leaving Early with some 12,500 men against Sheridan's 40,000. Some contemporaries contended that Anderson's decision was based as much on having had enough of Early's abrasiveness as on military considerations. On 15 September, Anderson and his men began their march out of the Valley, a movement observed by Federal spies. The next day, Grant arrived at Charlestown to confer with Sheridan. Asked if he could move on Early in four days, Sheridan replied that he could do it in three; "Go in," Grant said, in the briefest order he issued during the war.

Early approved Anderson's departure in part because he thought Sheridan timid. In case he was wrong, however, Early ordered a withdrawal to Winchester. He also scattered his infantry divisions and resumed raiding the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Martinsburg, West Virginia. About 1:00 A.M. on 19 September, Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah was roused from its bivouac and soon began marching west on the Berryville Turnpike (present-day Rte. 7). The Third Battle of Winchester (called Opequon by the Federals) was about to begin and Early would discover just how wrong he was about Sheridan's aggressiveness.

Just before dawn, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson's cavalry division trotted across Opequon Creek at a ford called Spout Spring, followed by Sheridan's infantry. The army successfully negotiated the narrow, two-mile-long defile called Berryville Canyon because Ramseur, who defended this sector for Early, had posted only pickets at the eastern entrance.

Ramseur's division blocked the western end of turnpike and formed the Confederate right flank. Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division held the center, and Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon's division secured the left. The Federal forces deployed with Brig. Gen. William Dwight's and Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover's divisions forming the right flank, Brig. Gen. James B. Rickett's division the center, and Brig. Gen. George W. Getty's the left, facing west to the Dinkle farm. Brig. Gen. David A. Russell's division was held in reserve.

The Union attack began about 11:40 A.M. Grover's division suffered heavy losses against Gordon, and Dwight's was pinned down. Ricketts and Getty, however, almost collapsed Ramseur's right flank

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before Rodes counterattacked about 1:30 P.M. Sheridan ordered all of his reserves, including the cavalry, to strike the Confederate flanks, and that action turned the tide. Early's line dissolved and the men fled in panic, "whirling through Winchester" and up the Valley Turnpike to Kernstown, where a hastily organized rearguard action saved the army from destruction.

The battle was hideously costly, with the Confederates losing some 3,600 killed, wounded, or captured—almost 25 percent of the force engaged—and the Federals about 5,000, or 13 percent. The Union XIX Corps suffered 40 percent casualties and lost every regimental commander among the killed or wounded during the fighting in Second Woods and Middle Field. In addition, Confederate general Rodes and Union general Russell both were killed. Suddenly, Sheridan found himself in control of the northern end of the Valley, and he set off in pursuit of Early.

Early's army wended its way south to Fisher's Hill, a ridge south of Strasburg that spanned the turnpike and provided the Confederates with a natural stronghold that provided the best chance of stopping Sheridan's progress. Reaching Fisher's Hill on 20 September, Early deployed his force, now reduced to about 9,500, in a line that extended almost five miles, with skirmishers on the hills just to the north. Although infantry held the Confederate center and right flank, Early stationed Maj. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax's cavalry division alone on the fragile left as little more than a skirmish line.

Sheridan's force of some 30,000 arrived at Hupp's Hill north of Strasburg on 20 September as Early completed his deployment. The Federals entrenched on a series of hills just north of Early's skirmishers. The next day, shortly after noon, Sheridan mounted three assaults that succeeded in capturing Flint Hill, one of Early's forward positions near the center of his line. During the night and early on the morning of 22 September, others of Sheridan's units pushed ahead until they occupied virtually all the ridges and hills overlooking Tumbling Run in front of Early's position.

In the meantime, Crook secretly marched his two divisions in columns west to the base of Little North Mountain and around Early's left flank. About 4:00 P.M., Crook ordered his men to face east and charge; they rushed pell-mell through Lomax's thin line and rolled up the Confederate left flank until they encountered stiffening resistance by Ramseur's division. Simultaneous with Crook's charge, the rest of Sheridan's force attacked, and soon Early's line collapsed and the men fled south in disarray. Early withdrew to Rockfish Gap near Waynesboro, having suffered some 1,200 casualties (mostly captured) to Sheridan's 530.

The rout of Early at Fisher's Hill meant that most of the Shenandoah Valley lay open to Sheridan. Having accomplished the first part of Grant's orders by driving Early far away, Sheridan proceeded to execute the second part: to destroy the Valley's ability to sustain the Confederate army. For the next several weeks, the Union army incinerated barns, mills, and crops between Strasburg and Staunton in what became known locally as "The Burning" or "Red October."

Sheridan's activities did not go unchallenged, particularly by Lt. Col. John S. Mosby, the "Gray Ghost," and his Partisan Rangers (officially, the 43d Virginia Battalion). In operation since late in 1862, the Rangers harassed the Federals in northern Virginia so successfully that the counties of Fairfax, Fauquier, Loudoun, and Prince William were known as Mosby's Confederacy. As soon as Sheridan's army entered the area in August 1864, Mosby waged a relentless and effective campaign against its lines of supply and communication, and he continued it into the winter. No other Confederate officer was

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mentioned as frequently by Lee in his reports, nor was any other the subject of such heated and futile efforts by the Federals to capture or kill him. An exasperated Grant finally ordered captured Rangers summarily executed, but when Mosby responded in kind he canceled the order. Mosby was a problem with no solution.

Suddenly, in October, Early demonstrated that he had not been "solved" by Sheridan either. After the defeat at Fisher's Hill, Early wrote Lee and asked him to send additional cavalry to his aid, and called as well for the return of Kershaw's infantry and Cutshaw's artillery. Lee complied, and also dispatched Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser and his brigade from Petersburg. They arrived just as Sheridan, who considered his work almost done, began withdrawing north down the Valley early in October. Assigning Rosser the command of all his cavalry, Early ordered him to pursue and harass the Federals. By the evening of 8 October, Sheridan, fed up with the several days of badgering that his horsemen had endured, angrily ordered Torbert with his cavalry command to "start out at daylight and whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped."

The Confederate cavalry had bivouacked just south of Tom's Brook, a stream that flowed across the Valley from northwest to southeast and emptied into the North Fork of the Shenandoah River. Lomax's division held the right flank on the Valley Turnpike north of Woodstock while Rosser's occupied the left almost two miles west on the Back Road (present-day Rte. 623). North of Tom's Brook, Merritt's division encamped a mile across the stream opposite Lomax, while Custer bivouacked north of Rosser's camp.

Torbert ordered a dawn attack for 9 October. While Merritt pressed Lomax, Torbert sent a brigade to Custer's assistance. The reinforced Custer soon overwhelmed Rosser by outflanking his position and forcing a retreat. Once the Confederate left gave way, Lomax could only follow suit. Despite brief rearguard actions just north of Woodstock by Lomax and at Pugh's Run to the west by Rosser, the Union cavalry routed their once-vaunted opponents. The Confederates lost 11 cannon and some 350 men killed, wounded, and captured, the Federals fewer than 60. Once again, Sheridan dominated the Valley.

For the next week and a half, Sheridan and Early played cat-and-mouse between Tom's Brook and Middletown a few miles north. Despite frequent skirmishes, Sheridan believed Early's army finished as an offensive force; it had reoccupied the Fisher's Hill works and appeared to be on the defensive. The same engagements, however, caused Sheridan to postpone his plan to detach part of his army to reinforce Grant at Petersburg. In addition, Grant preferred that Sheridan establish a fortified position near Manassas Gap, a proposal that contributed to the impasse. On 13 October, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wired Sheridan to suggest that he come to Washington for a conference with chief of staff Henry W. Halleck. Two days later, Sheridan decided to attend; he departed for Washington on 16 October. At the conference, he gained support for his plan to leave a small defensive force in the Valley and send the bulk of the army to Grant. On 18 October, Sheridan returned to Winchester, where he spent the night.

Sheridan's army was encamped on low hills and ridges north of Cedar Creek about fourteen miles south of Winchester. The terrain dictated the shape of the encampment, which took the form of a U centered on the Valley Turnpike and pointing south, with Col. Joseph Thoburn's division of Crook's corps in front of the main body at the apex. The Union force numbered some 32,000 against the Confederates' 21,000.

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Early, who had communicated with Lee by telegram, knew he had to do something to keep Sheridan in the Valley and away from Petersburg. On 18 October, he held a council of war with all his generals. Gordon proposed to lead most of the army east to the base of Massanutten Mountain, then north toward Cedar Creek, and finally against Sheridan's left flank. The rest of the army would march by divisions to attack the Federal center and right. The march would take place that night and the attacks would occur simultaneously at dawn. Early supported this clearly risky plan over a few objections, and Gordon set off with his detachment at 8:00 P.M.

The audacious scheme succeeded brilliantly in one of the great maneuvers of the war. Leaving behind their canteens, cooking pots, and anything else that might rattle, Early's men marched silently through the night to their assigned attack points. Virtually every unit was in its place at the appointed time. Aided by a dense fog that rolled in about 4:00 A.M. on 19 October, Early achieved surprise when the attack began at 5:40. In a matter of minutes the Federal left and center had crumbled, and the soldiers fled north well to the rear.

Sweeping over the abandoned Union camps, many Confederates stopped to plunder tents and sample the still-warm breakfasts of their adversaries. Additionally, some units lost cohesion in the smoke and fog and rush of combat. Federal resistance also stiffened here and there, and slowly Early's attack lost momentum. By 10:00, a new Union line had formed some three miles north on a ridge northwest of Middletown and west of the turnpike. For a while, the battle lapsed into an artillery duel.

On the southern edge of Winchester, just after dawn the Union pickets there heard the low rumble of gunfire in the distance and reported it to Sheridan. He mounted his horse and rode up the Valley Turnpike toward Cedar Creek, shouting as he rode for fleeing men to turn back and rejoin their units. About 10:30, Sheridan arrived at the front. After discussing the situation with his generals, Sheridan turned west off the turnpike and galloped along the front of his army, waving his hat and roaring that the army would sleep in its camps again that night; the men roared back, and believed.

Early, seeing the Federals in their new position, with the fog gone and Union cavalry beginning to nip at his own flanks, turned cautious. He launched a couple of attacks while the camp plunderers were being rounded up, but the assaults lacked vigor. He concluded that the army had accomplished all that it could, given the imbalance of numbers and the Federals' strong position. He did not pull his men back, however, but continued to confront Sheridan.

That was a mistake. At 4:00 P.M., after his own stragglers had returned to their units, Sheridan launched a counterattack that soon broke Early's left flank and turned his center. Retreat turned into rout, and the Confederates fled south. By sundown, the Federals once more held their old campsites.

Early's army suffered almost 3,000 casualties in the battle, Sheridan's just under 5,700. Despite losing the smaller number, the Confederate army had been reduced enough to prevent its taking the offensive again. By mid-November, both armies were being broken up as they were recalled piecemeal to Petersburg. In December, the remnants of each army went into winter camp, Early's at Staunton and Sheridan's at Winchester.

In late February 1865, Grant ordered Sheridan south to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and to capture Charlottesville. With two cavalry divisions, some 10,000 men, Sheridan left Winchester on 27 February and by 1 March had occupied Staunton, which was stripped of supplies and largely empty of

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inhabitants. Early's force, now reduced to 1,600 men, had abandoned the town and marched east to Waynesboro.

Early set up a defensive line on hills west of the town. The next day, Custer led his cavalry division to within reconnoitering distance and spent three hours studying Early's dispositions. Finding a gap in the left flank, Custer sent three dismounted regiments slicing through it at 3:30 P.M. As the Confederate left crumbled, a Federal brigade charged the center and Early's men fled in panic. Early himself barely escaped and most of his force was captured. The Valley was in Federal hands for good.

Early drifted south, eventually reaching his home in Franklin County. Sheridan spent the remainder of March raiding east by way of the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River & Kanawha Canal, destroying each as he progressed. On 26 March, he and his cavalymen joined Grant at Petersburg in time for the last campaign of the war in Virginia.

Much criticism has been heaped on Early's head for his "failure" to hold the Valley, in contrast to Stonewall Jackson's earlier success there. Some of Early's faults include impetuosity and petulance, both of which undoubtedly contributed to his troubles and the outcome of his campaign. It has been pointed out that Jackson's quirky temperament and secretiveness sometimes worked against him and that he like Early confronted superior numbers and yet succeeded. But although Jackson was outnumbered by the totality of the three Federal armies he faced, he engaged each one separately when the superior numbers were on his side. More importantly, his opponents' armies were unseasoned and the generals themselves were barely competent. Early faced some of the most experienced troops in the Union army, matched wits with the extremely capable Sheridan, and was outnumbered in every battle he fought. In addition, his own men were worn out and ill-supplied, problems the Federals did not experience. Despite the odds against it, Early's army marched farther and fought more large battles than Jackson's and tied up three Union corps for most of the campaign season. The wonder is not that Early ultimately was defeated, but that he and his men accomplished as much as they did.

SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS

During most of the Civil War, Southwest Virginia experienced little military activity as the majority of significant battles occurred to the east between Richmond and Washington. The region remained strategically important, however, because of its salt and lead mines and its proximity to Kentucky, which remained in the Union, and to the rail center of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Southwest Virginia's steep hills, poor roads, and remoteness from the primary scenes of activity relegated it to a secondary role through the first half of the conflict.

Several significant transportation corridors passed through the region. In the eighteenth century, the Wilderness Road, which had been improved by the explorer Daniel Boone, was the historic route of migration into eastern Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. The road was further improved during the antebellum period, when the South Western Turnpike was constructed. During the same era, the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad was built between Lynchburg, Virginia, where it connected with the Orange & Alexandria Railroad and the Southside Railroad, and Bristol, Tennessee, the northeastern terminus of the

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East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, which extended to Knoxville, Tennessee. The southwestern railroads would become primary objectives of Federal raids late in the war.

As the gateway between the two principal theaters of operations in Virginia and the west, Cumberland Gap became the immediate objective of both combatants early in the conflict. By September 1861, some 4,000 Confederate troops initially commanded by Brig. Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer and then Col. James E. Rains occupied the gap. On 16 March 1862, a Union brigade some fifty miles northeast captured Pound Gap from entrenched Confederate defenders, thereby threatening Cumberland Gap. Several skirmishes ensued, and on 18 June 1862, Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan's Federal division occupied Cumberland Gap. Brief engagements occurred in the area throughout the summer as each side contended in the surrounding valleys.

In August 1862, to induce Kentucky to embrace the Southern cause, the Confederates launched a two-pronged invasion of the border state. Maj. Gen. E. Kirby Smith led a Confederate advance into Kentucky while Gen. Braxton Bragg attacked from Tennessee. Smith crushed a Union force at Richmond, Kentucky, on 29-30 August, and a few weeks later a Federal garrison at Munfordville surrendered to Bragg. Brig. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, who reported to Smith, then advanced to Cumberland Gap and besieged Morgan until he evacuated it on 17 September. After Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio stopped the combined Southern force at Perryville on 8 October, however, the Confederates soon retreated through Cumberland Gap, and most of Kentucky remained in Union hands.

In September 1863, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's Army of the Ohio invaded East Tennessee and captured Knoxville. Brig. Gen. James M. Shackelford, leading a cavalry brigade of Burnside's army, approached from the south and, on Burnside's arrival, Union forces then converged on Cumberland Gap and its Confederate garrison led by Brig. Gen. John W. Frazer. The Federals demanded and received the surrender of the smaller Confederate force on 9 September after a three-day siege.

On 1 January 1864, Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones led his cavalry brigade from Little War Gap on Clinch Mountain toward Cumberland Gap with the intention of seizing it. The next day, he learned that Federals under Maj. Charles H. Beeres had defeated Lt. Col. Auburn L. Pridemore's command earlier that day near Jonesville. Jones crossed Powell's Mountain to attack the Federals and ordered Pridemore, who had withdrawn from the town, to return and join in the attack.

After a night-long march in the bitter cold, the Confederates reached Jonesville early on 3 January. Jones immediately attacked the Union encampment on the western edge of town, having achieved surprise. After capturing Federal artillery in the initial assault, the Confederates abandoned the guns under a Union counterattack. The outnumbered Federals soon retreated to the Milbourn farmhouse and its outbuildings. Jones kept the force pinned down until Pridemore arrived late in the day, then countered an attempted Federal breakout with a general assault, which was soon followed by the surrender of Beeres's men. The Confederates lost 16 killed and wounded in the engagement, the Federals 12 killed, 48 wounded, and 300 captured.

On 9 March 1864, President Abraham Lincoln appointed Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant commander in chief of all Union armies. Grant's plan for the spring campaign called for massive Federal advances to begin everywhere about 4 May, including Piedmont Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and Southwest Virginia, where Brig. Gen. George Crook planned to destroy the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad at Dublin

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in Pulaski County. Later that month, Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered Jones north to the Shenandoah Valley to cope with the Federal advance there, which threatened Lee's left flank.

Crook had marched from the Kanawha River in West Virginia toward Dublin on 29 April with three brigades. After more than a week's march through West Virginia and Virginia, he encountered Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins at Cloyd's Mountain half a dozen miles north of Dublin on 9 May 1864.

The Confederates had prepared defensive positions on each side of the road from Dublin to Pearisburg (present-day Rte. 100). Shortly after dawn, Crook and his force crossed the summit of Cloyd's Mountain and prepared to descend the road toward Jenkins's position. When Crook observed the Confederates' strength, however, he ordered one of his brigades to march through underbrush to the east of the road and strike Jenkins's right flank while the other two assaulted the front. After a short but hard fight, Crook stormed the Confederate position and captured Jenkins, who had been mortally wounded. Jenkins's second in command, Brig. Gen. John McCausland, attempted to rally his men but Crook dispersed them with a brisk attack. The Federals then marched on to Dublin, where they destroyed the depot and military stores and burned the nearby New River Bridge. On 11 May, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell, who had tried and failed to raid Saltville two days earlier, joined Crook there. The Battle of Cloyd's Mountain, the largest engagement in Southwest Virginia, resulted in some 538 Confederates killed, wounded, captured, or missing, and 745 Federal casualties.

Averell and his brigade had ridden toward Wytheville to prevent the Confederates from concentrating their forces against Crook's and to destroy the lead works there. On the afternoon of 10 May, Averell encountered Jones's brigade on the Raleigh & Grayson Turnpike near Cove Mountain in Wythe County, between Wytheville and Dublin. The fighting began when Averell ordered an attack on the Confederate position. Jones also advanced, pressing the Union flanks, as he hoped to delay the Federals from reaching Crook. Four hours later, as Averell prepared to renew the attack near nightfall, the Confederates withdrew. The two sides suffered about 300 casualties.

Averell and his brigade marched to the New River and crossed on 11 May on a flatboat and at a ford while Confederate forces watched from the other side of the river. Averell then joined Crook near Dublin.

During the summer and fall of 1864, the Shenandoah Valley and the vicinity of Petersburg became the focus of military activity in Virginia, while little of note occurred in Southwest Virginia. Grumble Jones was killed and his army defeated at the Battle of Piedmont on 5 June, thus leaving vulnerable not only the Valley but Southwest Virginia, where Jenkins had been placed in command on 5 May in Jones's absence.

Early in October, Federal forces under Brig. Gen. Stephen G. Burbridge attempted to seize the town of Saltville and destroy the nearby saltworks, which produced a large proportion of the salt used to preserve meat and tan leather for the Confederate army. A makeshift Confederate force delayed him at Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap on 1 October, however, thereby enabling Brig. Gen. Alfred E. "Mudwall" Jackson to concentrate troops near Saltville to meet him. The next morning, the Federals attacked Jackson but made little headway as Confederate reinforcements continued to arrive during the day and held off successive attacks. As evening fell, Burbridge retired without accomplishing his objective. Afterwards, Confederate soldiers under Brig. Gen. Felix H. Robertson massacred an undetermined number of captured

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5th U.S. Colored Cavalry troopers, many of them wounded. One of the Confederate officers, Capt. Champ Ferguson, would later be captured by Federal forces, tried, and executed for the murders on 20 Oct. 1865. The battle may have cost the two sides as many as 450 casualties.

In November 1864, Maj. Gen. George Stoneman led his cavalry division on a series of raids to destroy iron and lead mines, saltworks, and railroads in East Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. Stoneman's 4,200-man force defeated Confederates under Brig. Gen. Basil W. Duke at Kingsport, Tennessee, on 4 December. Two days later, near Bristol, Tennessee, Stoneman dispersed a small mounted force commanded by Brig. Gen. John C. Vaughn, thereby preventing it from joining the main body of Confederate defenders under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge near Saltville. On 17-18 December, Stoneman's force defeated Breckinridge at Marion, thus enabling the Federals to attack Saltville.

Turning west to Saltville, Stoneman made short work of the guards on 20-21 December. The Federals then captured and destroyed the saltworks, including between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand bushels of salt. Stoneman then led his troopers through Cumberland Gap to Kentucky and Tennessee. His successful raid cost the Federals and Confederates 275 casualties.

Stoneman returned to Southwest Virginia late in March 1865 on a raid to destroy rail lines and other property of military value to the Confederacy. His men wrecked sections of the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad around Salem and Wytheville, as well as the Piedmont Railroad between Danville, Virginia, and Greensborough, North Carolina. Since Confederate resistance in the region had effectively ended with Breckinridge's defeat in December 1864, Stoneman met with little resistance. His raid ended when he learned of the surrender of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and the Army of Tennessee at Durham Station, North Carolina, on 26 April 1865.

RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN

From early May to early June 1864, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia bled each other white to little advantage for either side. Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had not defeated Gen. Robert E. Lee nor had Lee vanquished Grant. Despite enormous casualties, neither side had achieved its goals; in particular, Grant had not captured Richmond. After all the maneuvering and fighting, Lee and Grant were stalemated.

While the two main armies contended from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler's Army of the James fought a series of desultory actions and then withdrew behind its fortifications on the Bermuda Hundred peninsula. The Confederate defense force commanded by Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard constructed a system of fieldworks called the Howlett Line that paralleled the Federal works and—assisted by Butler's willingness to sit and wait for further orders—effectively "bottled up" his army there for several weeks.

On 9 June, Butler finally acted, attacking Petersburg with some 4,500 cavalry and infantry from City Point (present-day Hopewell) under Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore. Petersburg's 2,500 Confederate defenders—most of them home guards—were sheltered behind the so-called Dimmock Line, a ten-mile-long series of fortifications that were named for their designer, Capt. Charles H. Dimmock. The line

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extended around the eastern, southern, and western approaches to the city on the Appomattox River, and Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, a former governor of Virginia, commanded the garrison.

While Gillmore and the infantry demonstrated against the northeastern part of the line, Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz led his cavalry division south to the Jerusalem Plank Road (U.S. Rte. 301), then north to the underbelly of the Dimmock Line. He drove through a redoubt designated Battery 27 that was defended by the city militia, but was stopped at the city limits by reinforcements sent from Bermuda Hundred. By mid-afternoon, Butler's thrust at Petersburg had ended in failure and the Federals withdrew. The two sides suffered about 120 casualties.

To the north, meanwhile, Grant was faced with two choices. He could continue to pound Lee's army directly and attempt to drive through to Richmond, or he could bypass Lee's right flank to the James River and points south, thereby threatening both Richmond and Petersburg, and perhaps engage Lee on ground more favorable to himself. Confronting the prospect of more bloody but fruitless engagements like that at Cold Harbor on 3 June, Grant chose the indirect approach and issued orders to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac. On 12 June, in the night, the army disengaged from the Cold Harbor line and marched south to the James River at Wilcox's Landing and Windmill Point.

The army's disengagement and crossing of the river was a logistical feat that left Lee seething when he found his adversary vanished on the morning of 13 June. After a few days, Lee discovered that Grant was crossing the river rather than massing his army behind McClellan's old earthworks. The Confederate commander must have reached his conclusion with some trepidation. Earlier, Lee had written that "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to James River. If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time."

The Army of the Potomac crossed the James River in four days beginning 14 June, using transport vessels and a 2,200-foot long pontoon bridge hastily constructed at Weyanoke Point. Even before the entire army had passed over the river, however, Grant ordered an assault on the Petersburg fortifications. His subordinates carried out a series of attacks starting 15 June and lasting four days.

Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith led XVIII Corps from Point of Rocks Landing on the Appomattox River (just west of the present Interstate 295 bridge) and began the attacks in the evening of 15 June. He struck the northeastern part of the Dimmock Line, breached it, and forced Wise's men back to Harrison's Creek, where darkness ended the day's combat. After sundown, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps, which had just arrived at Petersburg after the march from Cold Harbor, relieved Smith's men. Hancock captured another part of the Dimmock Line the next day, and Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps did the same on 17 June.

The Confederates, meanwhile, strove mightily to bolster the city's defenses. Beauregard stripped the Howlett Line at Bermuda Hundred of every available resource, and Lee rushed troops south to reinforce the garrison at Petersburg. On 18 June, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren's V Corps joined the II and IX Corps in an all-out attack, but it was repulsed with frightful casualties. Grant then abandoned the effort and began what he believed would be a short siege of Petersburg. The four days of combat resulted in 8,150 Federal and 3,236 Confederate casualties.

Several intermediate objectives eventually comprised Grant's overall strategy during the siege: cut the city's lines of communication and supply, divert Lee's attention and resources by attacking Richmond's

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defenses, and stretch the Confederate defenses to the breaking point by extending the Federal lines south and westward. Initially, Grant concentrated on the first objective by making a series of attempts to destroy the three railroads that served Petersburg and Richmond that were not in Union hands. They included the Petersburg Railroad (also called the Weldon Railroad), which led south to Weldon, North Carolina, the South Side Railroad, which extended west to Lynchburg, and the Richmond & Danville Railroad. As the Federals, extended their lines they also constructed the U.S. Military Railroad to transport food and ammunition from City Point to distribution areas near the front. This remarkable engineering accomplishment was constructed with little grading. Ties and rails were laid directly on the ground and, as a train traversed hill and dale, at a distance it looked like "a fly crawling over a corrugated washboard."

On 21 June, Hancock's II Corps (led temporarily by Maj. Gen. David B. Birney), supported by Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright's VI Corps and preceded by Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson's cavalry division, struck at the Petersburg Railroad. One day later, assisted by Maj. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox's division, Maj. Gen. William Mahone's division of Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's corps counterattacked and drove the II Corps back east to the Jerusalem Plank Road. Although the Federals had to abandon their advanced positions, they still gained ground at a cost of about 4,000 casualties for the two combatants.

On the north side of the James River, meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan and his cavalry division were returning to the Army of the Potomac after their unsuccessful attack on the Virginia Central Railroad at Trevilian Station on 11-12 June. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton's cavalry division pursued the Federals and attempted to intercept them at Samaria (Saint Mary's) Church in Charles City County. Sheridan fought a delaying action there on 24 June to protect his supply train, then rejoined the Union army at Bermuda Hundred. This engagement produced some 630 total casualties.

The attack on the Petersburg Railroad on 21 June signaled the beginning of what has come to be called the Wilson-Kautz Raid of 22-30 June. Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson and Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz led their respective divisions, some 3,300 troopers, down the South Side Railroad, then southwest along the Richmond & Danville Railroad to destroy track. At Staunton River Bridge, their principal objective that was located just south of Roanoke Station, on 25 June the cavalrymen encountered a makeshift defense force under Capt. Benjamin L. Farinholt. Repeated attacks failed to dislodge the Confederate defenders, which included "old men and boys" as well as regular troops, and the Federals withdrew. They lost 42 killed, 44 wounded, and 30 missing or captured, while Farinholt lost 10 killed and 24 wounded.

Maj. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalry division, which had been trailing the raiders, continued to pursue Kautz and Wilson. At Sappony Church in Sussex County, elements of Lee's division and then Hampton's attacked the Federals on 28 June. During the night, Kautz and Wilson disengaged and rode north toward Petersburg, eager to return to Union lines.

They thought they would be secure once they reached Ream's Station, where they expected to find Union infantry. Much to the shock of Kautz, who arrived there first while Wilson fought a rearguard action against Lee, Mahone's Confederate division occupied the place instead. The Federals were virtually surrounded, and about noon Mahone attacked their front while Lee threatened their left flank. Abandoning their artillery and burning their wagons, Kautz and Wilson cut their way out of the trap and fled. Kautz and his men reached the Union lines by dark, while Wilson swung east and then north, eventually reaching

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safety on 2 July. Even though the Wilson-Kautz raid succeeded in tearing up some sixty miles of track, a heavy price was paid in horses and men (about 1,800 human casualties for the raid).

Grant concentrated on the siege for the next month but grew increasingly frustrated when no results seemed apparent. He decided to attack the Petersburg defenses on 30 July after forcing Lee to weaken his lines there by expending troops in the defense of Richmond. During the night of 26–27 July, II Corps and two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry under Hancock's overall command crossed to the north side of the James River at Deep Bottom to threaten the Confederate capital. The defenders quickly reinforced their lines, however, and foiled Union attempts to capture positions at New Market Heights and Fussell's Mill. Hancock recrossed the river during the night of 29 July but left a garrison at Deep Bottom. The expedition cost some 1,000 casualties.

The attack on Petersburg began as scheduled at 4:44 A.M. on 30 July, but in a shocking manner. One day near the end of June, Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, a civil engineer and commander of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, had studied the Confederate lines from his own a little more than a hundred yards away. It occurred to him that a gallery could be dug from his lines to the enemy's, filled with gunpowder, and ignited; the explosion would produce a gap large enough to push a division through. He took his idea to Burnside, who approved it. At noon on 25 June, the digging began, with Pennsylvania coal-miners-turned-soldiers doing the work. They finished excavating on 23 July, packed the far end of the tunnel with four tons of gunpowder, and waited for the day of the attack. At 4:44 A.M. on 30 July, the powder exploded in a great burst of flame and smoke, killing or wounding 278 of the 330 Confederate soldiers and gunners above the gallery and creating an enormous crater.

After that initial success, virtually everything went wrong for the Federals in the Battle of the Crater. A plan to send troops around the sides of the opening had been disapproved by Meade in favor of a direct assault through the gap. The folly of the new plan quickly became apparent when the attacking brigades bogged down in the loose soil of the crater, unable to gain footholds to climb out. One delay followed another, while on the other side Mahone rushed troops forward to the rim of the crater. Soon the crater became a death trap and the Union breakthrough was repulsed. The United States Colored Troops (USCTs) that were ordered to attack even after it became obvious that the assault would fail suffered especially heavy casualties. When the fighting ended in the afternoon, some 5,300 men lay dead or wounded, the Confederates had recovered all the ground, and Grant's best chance of ending the siege by a *coup du main* had evaporated.

Grant, disgusted, relieved Burnside of command and returned to his strategy of combining demonstrations against Richmond with raids on the railroads that served Petersburg. On the night of 13–14 August, Hancock led the II and X Corps and Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's cavalry division back across the James River to Deep Bottom. After sunrise, X Corps approached New Market Heights with II Corps to the right near Fussell's Mill. The next day, Union assaults near the mill initially succeeded, but Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field orchestrated Confederate counterattacks that drove the Federals out of a line of captured works. Hancock began to withdraw, and heavy skirmishing continued until his command crossed to the south side of the river on 20 August, once again leaving a garrison at Deep Bottom. Some 4,600 men had become casualties during this diversion.

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The purpose of the expedition had been to divert Lee's attention from yet another attack on the Petersburg Railroad. Warren led the V Corps, with elements of the II and IX Corps following, on the railroad raid. On 18 August, he attacked near Globe Tavern and drove in Confederate pickets. A subsequent Federal attack was repulsed and both sides entrenched during the night. The next day, Mahone attacked and rolled up Warren's right flank but Warren counterattacked and with help from IX Corps recaptured the ground lost earlier. With the two sides effectively stalemated, Warren improved and extended his entrenchments on 20 August until they were connected with the main Union line from the Jerusalem Plank Road and paralleled the Petersburg Railroad. Hill probed the new lines the next day but could not penetrate them. The Globe Tavern engagement resulted in the extension of the Federal siege lines to the south and west of Petersburg, thereby securing a stranglehold on the Petersburg Railroad some five miles south of the city. Henceforth, the Confederates would have to offload supplies from North Carolina at the Stony Creek depot some twenty miles south of the city and haul them to Petersburg by wagon on the Boydton Plank Road (U.S. Rte. 1). About 6,055 men were killed or wounded during the four days of fighting.

Not every Federal expedition met with success. On 23 August, Gregg's cavalry division led Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles's division of Hancock's II Corps south along the Petersburg Railroad to destroy track. The objective was Rowanty Creek, about ten miles from the Union lines and five miles beyond Ream's Station. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's division joined Miles's men the next day, by which time Lee had dispatched eight brigades of infantry under Hill and two cavalry divisions under Hampton to attack the outpost. The Federals had begun improving the old earthworks near the station that had been built there in June, but they made little headway before they were attacked. Hill, who was unwell, turned over tactical control of the battle to Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, who pressed on with his foot soldiers supported by Hampton's cavalry and Col. William J. "Willie" Pegram's artillery. Near dark on 25 August, almost encircled, Hancock gave orders to withdraw. By 9:00 P.M., the Federals had disengaged and headed back to the Union lines east of Petersburg, but not before losing some 2,600 men, most of them captured. Heth and Hampton lost about 800.

During the next month, Grant's army improved its siege lines and prepared for the next round of combat. On the night of 28-29 September, Butler led most of the Army of the James across the river for yet another assault on the defenses of Richmond. At dawn, he launched a two-pronged attack against the outer Confederate fieldworks at Chaffin's Farm and New Market Heights. The principal objective was the stronghold of Fort Harrison at Chaffin's Farm. The attack on the works at the foot of New Market Heights was designed to protect the right flank of the main force as it turned toward the fort. The USCTs, whose combat role Butler had long championed, performed especially well. Fourteen of the sixteen Medals of Honor awarded to black soldiers during the war were awarded for gallantry in this action. Fort Harrison fell to the Federals, who held it despite a counterattack on 30 September that was overseen by Lee himself. With Butler's men firmly established in the captured lines, Lee had no choice but to post troops north of the James to guard against a renewed Union advance on the city. Now it was up to Grant to keep the pressure on Lee.

The Army of Northern Virginia had lost its ability to maneuver, unless it abandoned Richmond and Petersburg to the Federals and took to the field again. Politically, it was not possible to flee the capital;

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strategically, Lee lacked the manpower to defeat Grant or break through the Union lines into the open; tactically, Lee could only delay the inevitable collapse of his own lines as Grant's tactics extended them to the breaking point.

Scarcely had the Federals captured Fort Harrison than they moved against the Confederate lines of communication southwest of Petersburg, resulting in the action at Peebles's Farm. On 30 September, two divisions of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke's IX Corps, two divisions of Warren's V Corps, and Gregg's cavalry division marched by Poplar Spring Church to reach Vaughan Road. The initial Federal attack overran Fort Archer and flanked the Confederates, who abandoned their Squirrel Level Road line. Late in the afternoon, Confederate reinforcements arrived and slowed the Federal advance. The next day, the Federals repulsed a counterattack directed by Hill. Reinforced by a II Corps division, the Federals resumed their advance on 2 October and extended their left flank and fieldworks west to Arthur's Swamp. The two sides suffered some 4,200 casualties; once again, the Union lines crept westward.

Lee, remaining hopeful of recapturing Fort Harrison, countered Grant's tactics with his own actions. On 7 October, he launched an offensive against the Union right flank that resulted in combat on the Darbytown and New Market Roads. At first, the attack met with success as the divisions commanded by Field and Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke routed Kautz's cavalymen on Darbytown Road and then assaulted the main Union line on New Market Road. There the attack stalled and then collapsed, as the well-entrenched Federals held their ground and the Confederates withdrew. The casualties totaled some 1,750.

A week later, on 13 October, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry led two divisions of his corps against the Confederate defenses newly constructed along Darbytown Road. Although most of the engagement was between opposing skirmish lines, one of Terry's brigades assaulted what appeared to be a weak point in the fortifications and was repulsed with heavy losses. Suffering most of the almost 500 casualties, the Federals retired to their own lines.

Grant initiated a combined attack on the defenses of both Petersburg and Richmond on 27 October with little success. Hancock, leading divisions from the II, V, and IX Corps, as well as Gregg's cavalry division, marched west across the Boydton Plank Road toward the South Side Railroad. Although the Federals gained a lodgment on the plank road, an afternoon counterattack by Heth's division of Hill's corps and Hampton's cavalry forced a retreat that was completed the next day at a cost of 3,000 total casualties. North of the James River, Butler attacked the Confederate lines on Darbytown Road and Fair Oaks. The defenders counterattacked and easily repulsed the Federals. The two sides lost some 1,750 men.

For the next three months, each army conducted periodic raids but concentrated mostly on conserving its resources and strengthening its lines around the two cities. Early in February 1865, however, Grant broke the stalemate with vigorous drives to extend the Petersburg lines westward and cut off Lee's supply lines for good. The first operation occurred on 5 February in the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, when Gregg led his cavalry division to the Boydton Plank Road in a sweep to the south and west by way of Ream's Station and Dinwiddie Court House in order to intercept a wagon train reputedly hauling Confederate supplies (no train was found there). To protect Gregg, Warren led the V Corps across Hatcher's Run to block Vaughan Road while two divisions of Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's II Corps (he had replaced the wounded Hancock in November 1864) covered Warren's right flank at Armstrong's Mill. Late in the day, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth attempted to turn Humphreys's right flank near the mill but

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was repulsed. During the night, two divisions reinforced the Federals and Gregg returned to Gravelly Run on Vaughan Road from his unsuccessful raid. The next day, a division of Warren's corps was attacked by elements of Brig. Gen. John Pegram's division, with Mahone's division joining in near the site of Dabney's steam sawmill. Although this attack checked the Union advance, the Federals nonetheless extended their fieldworks to the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's Run.

His lines now stretched to the point of rupturing, Lee tried a desperate gamble on 25 March. He assembled half his available forces in an attempt to break through the northeastern portion of the deep Federal works and threaten Grant's supply depot at City Point. At dawn, Gordon led an attack that overwhelmed Fort Stedman and nearby Batteries X, XI, and XII in the IX Corps sector, but the Confederate drive soon sputtered to a halt amid a murderous crossfire and furious counterattacks. More than 1,900 of the attackers were captured, another 1,000 were killed or wounded against 950 Federals, and Lee's last hope was dashed. Late in the afternoon, Wright's VI Corps drove the Confederate pickets from their trenches north of Fort Fisher, thereby advancing the Federal line closer to its objective. Lee's prophecy about the outcome of the siege had come true: now it was a "mere question of time" for the Army of Northern Virginia.

APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN

The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of rapid growth in Virginia's "internal improvements": turnpikes, plank roads, canals, and railroads. By the time of the Civil War, the Southside Virginia Piedmont was rich in these resources. Canals aided commerce on the James and Appomattox rivers above the falls at Richmond and Petersburg. The Richmond and Danville Railroad linked those two cities and passed through Chesterfield, Amelia, and Nottoway Counties to the southwest. Petersburg was joined to Lynchburg by the South Side Railroad, which ran westerly through Dinwiddie, Nottoway, Prince Edward, and Appomattox Counties. Another rail line, the Petersburg Railroad (also called the Weldon Railroad), ran almost directly south from the city to Weldon, North Carolina. The Boydton Plank Road (present-day U.S. Rte. 1) extended to the southwest from Petersburg through Dinwiddie County to Mecklenburg County, and the Jerusalem Plank Road (U.S. Rte. 301) connected the city with the Southampton County seat made notorious by Nat Turner a generation earlier. During peacetime all these transportation routes were important farm-to-market avenues. During wartime the railroads in particular became strategically important lines of communication, supply, and escape.

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign of May-June 1864 forced Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia to maneuver from the Wilderness in Spotsylvania County southward, and eventually into a complex network of fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg. The railroads became lifelines for both sides in the conflict. Grant's force consisted of two combined armies, the Army of the Potomac commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, and the Army of the James, which was commanded first by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler and then, after Butler was relieved on 8 January 1865, by Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord. Direct Federal assaults failed to penetrate the lines, so the Union and Confederate armies settled into what became a ten-month-long siege. Lee protected Richmond with Lt.

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Gen. Richard S. Ewell's and Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's corps and secured Petersburg with Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard's command and Lt. Gens. A. P. Hill's and Richard H. Anderson's corps; he already had dispatched Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early's command to the Shenandoah Valley in June to protect the Confederacy's breadbasket and threaten Washington. Grant kept up probing attacks against Lee's thin defenses, and sent his own army south around Petersburg and then westward in an attempt to turn the Confederate right flank and sever Lee's lines of communication, particularly the rail lines.

By the end of August 1864, Grant's strategy had secured the Petersburg Railroad for the Union and cut Lee's most direct route to North Carolina. In the meantime, Beauregard had been reassigned and his troops incorporated into the Army of Northern Virginia. Late in September, Grant captured Fort Harrison near Richmond, thereby forcing Lee to defend the capital city aggressively. Lee thwarted Grant's efforts to some extent by shifting his troops continuously to meet Union threats, but this tactic required an expenditure of men, materiel, and energy that he could not replace. The Confederates suffered during the winter, while the Union army extended its lines ever westward and bombarded Petersburg. By March 1865, Lee was defending some twenty-eight miles of fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg with an army that was daily shrinking from deaths, illness, and desertions.

Grant attacked Lee's supply line along the Boydton Plank Road southwest of Petersburg early in February 1865. Lee successfully defended the position, but the Union army retained most of the ground it had gained. Soon thereafter, in the Shenandoah Valley, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan defeated the remnants of Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early's command, the Army of the Shenandoah, in the Battle of Waynesboro on 2 March. Lee realized that Sheridan's sizeable force was now free to join Grant at Petersburg. On 25 March Lee launched a desperate assault on Fort Stedman, hoping to break through Grant's lines and force the Union commander to shorten them, thereby enabling the Confederates to escape to North Carolina and join the army led by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Successful at first, the tactic failed when the Union army counterattacked vigorously. The Confederates retreated to their own lines, and Grant prepared for what would be the final campaign of the war in Virginia.

The campaign opened on Wednesday, 29 March, when on Grant's orders a force of about 50,000 troops—the II Corps under Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, the V Corps under Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, and the cavalry commanded by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan—marched around the Confederate right flank west of Petersburg to seize the South Side Railroad (now the Norfolk Southern). This was Lee's last major supply line from the west to Petersburg, and its rupture, according to Grant's reasoning, would force Lee to withdraw from the defenses of Petersburg and the Confederate capital at Richmond. Grant's plan ultimately succeeded, but it took several days to execute.

Lee, realizing the importance of protecting the railroad, dispatched a force of 10,000 infantry and cavalry under Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett to hold a strategic crossroads called Five Forks, just two miles south of the rail line. In a series of sharp engagements over three days, the Union army maneuvered into position to attack Pickett on 1 April.

The final week of March brought heavy rains to the Petersburg area. Consequently, creeks and rivulets were swollen beyond their banks by the freshets that followed. Leading Grant's offensive, Warren's V Corps moved up Quaker Road (Rte. 660) on 29 March. At the Lewis Farm, Union forces led by Brig. Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain engaged Confederates under Maj. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson. After

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hard fighting, the Union troops entrenched nearby along the Boydton Plank Road while the Confederates withdrew to their lines on White Oak Road (Rte. 613). The engagement at Quaker Road (Lewis Farm), then, ended with the Union army straddling both the Quaker Road and the Boydton Plank Road, thereby severing two important highways. Meanwhile, Sheridan's cavalry pushed on to Dinwiddie Court House on the Boydton Plank Road, from which point they could head northward toward the railroad. The distance between Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks was only six miles.

Heavy rains began in the evening of 29 March and continued the next day, limiting operations. Humphreys's and Warren's corps edged closer to Sheridan and threatened the Confederate right flank. When the rain stopped on Friday morning, 31 March, Sheridan advanced toward Five Forks from Dinwiddie Court House on present-day Rte. 627. About three miles from the village, Sheridan's left came under attack from Pickett, who had sallied forth from Five Forks in an attempt to drive Sheridan back. Pickett attacked from west to east on two roads: today's Rte. 611 and another road, no longer extant, that joined Brook or Turkey Egg Road (Rte. 740). Sheridan's advance was halted and he fell back in good order to a position just north of the county seat. Pickett, however, could not keep his force exposed as he found himself threatened from the east by Humphreys's and Warren's corps, and so withdrew to Five Forks.

As Pickett and Sheridan struggled, to the east Warren confronted Confederate earthworks on White Oak Road near the intersection of Claiborne Road (Rte. 631), and sought to sever the line of communication with Pickett's detachment near Five Forks, four miles west. Lee personally supervised the counterattack to Gravelly Run by Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's corps. After a brief success, the Confederates were forced back into their entrenchments as Warren's men gained the important roadway. In addition, Warren also sent a force west to threaten Pickett's left and rear. Seeing the predicament he was now in, Pickett fell back from near Dinwiddie Court House to his original position of that morning. He then received a dispatch from Lee: "Hold Five Forks at all hazards. Protect road to Ford's Depot and prevent Union forces from striking the South-side railroad. Regret exceedingly your forces' withdrawal, and your inability to hold the advantage you had gained."

As a result of the fighting at Dinwiddie Court House and White Oak Road on 31 March, the thin Confederate defenses had been weakened further by battle losses. Pickett had relinquished his hard-won ground, while Warren and Sheridan moved closer to the Confederate works.

Saturday, 1 April, found Pickett's men building entrenchments parallel to the White Oak Road that extended almost two miles east and west from Five Forks. A considerable gap existed between the eastern end of the Five Forks earthworks and those near the White Oak Road–Claiborne Road intersection, which left Pickett's left flank "in the air." Partly to mitigate this defensive shortcoming, Pickett "returned" his left flank; that is, he ordered the earthwork there constructed at a right angle to the rest, bending away from the road to the north for about 150 yards, for better protection. By noon all seemed quiet in front of the works, so some of the high command rode north to the rear and partook in a shad planking, a type of fish bake.

Because the area was heavily wooded, Pickett's 10,000 infantry and cavalry could not see or hear what was occurring in front of them except for short distances. They were unaware that Sheridan had left Dinwiddie Court House with 3,000 cavalry augmented by the 12,000 infantry of Warren's corps. By late

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afternoon Sheridan's horse soldiers were in position to assault Pickett's front, while Warren was moving into position to attack his left. Finally, about 4:15 P.M., the crash of small arms was heard as Warren's infantry appeared. Warren did not know that Pickett's flank was in the air, so at first his own left was subjected to a raking fire from the rear. Warren's corps quickly wheeled to face the threat, however, and soon got in the rear of Pickett's defenses. Resistance was savage at first but weakened as the Confederates fell back toward the forks. Simultaneously, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's cavalry rode down on Pickett's right flank. By the time Pickett left his meal and reached his men, all was lost. It was each command for itself. There were brief pockets of resistance here and there but nothing could stop Sheridan's momentum. By dark, the road (Rte. 627) to the South Side Railroad was open to the Federals, while more than 2,000 Confederates had surrendered and the rest had scattered. That night, on receiving news of this victory, Grant issued orders for an all-out assault the next day at selected points along the Petersburg lines.

At dawn on Sunday, 2 April, the Union army launched its attack, and the VI Corps under Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright broke through southwest of the city on the Boydton Plank Road. Southeast of Petersburg, Maj. Gen. John G. Parke's IX Corps attacked along the Jerusalem Plank Road and captured the outer works but could not puncture the inner. Back on Wright's front, the Confederate Third Corps commander, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, rode to reconnoiter only to be killed in a confrontation with two Federal soldiers. Wright's breakthrough enabled Ord's Army of the James to capture Forts Gregg and Whitworth, two outposts protecting Petersburg's western approaches, after overcoming a stubborn defense.

Ten miles to the west of Petersburg, the day closed with a symbolic stand by a Confederate detachment at Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad. Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles's division of Humphrey's II Corps attacked the Confederate line there, which was held by Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division. After holding off three assaults, the Confederates finally yielded their position, losing a thousand prisoners and two cannon in the process. With the Federals in control of Lee's lifeline to the west, he had no alternative but to evacuate his army from both Petersburg and Richmond. He sent word to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond, who was informed during worship services at St. Paul's Episcopal Church.

When Lee ordered the Army of Northern Virginia to evacuate the two cities, his intention was for the separate contingents, which totaled between 55,000 and 58,000 men, to rendezvous about forty miles west at the Richmond & Danville Railroad depot at Amelia Court House. There he would resupply his army, then march to Danville and then into North Carolina to join Johnston.

At the beginning of its retreat from Richmond and Petersburg, Lee's army—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—included more than a thousand baggage and supply wagons. The logistics of moving so many men and supplies meant that the Confederates retreated, and the Federals followed, along several different routes. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Reserve Corps, Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw's Division, and Brig. Gen. Martin W. Gary's cavalry brigade left Richmond over Mayo's Bridge, then followed present-day Hull Street, Broad Rock Road, and Walmsley Boulevard to Rte. 360. The division commanded by Maj. Gen. G. W. Custis Lee crossed the James River on a pontoon bridge to Drewry's Bluff, then followed Walmsley Boulevard to Rte. 360, where it joined the line of march. The departing Confederates set fire to downtown warehouses and also burned the bridges behind them.

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Maj. Gen. William Mahone led his division from the Bermuda Hundred front west on present-day Rte. 10 through Chester and Chesterfield Court House. Eventually his column joined Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon's and Longstreet's corps.

Most of the Confederates in Petersburg crossed to the north side of the Appomattox River over four bridges: one railroad, two vehicle, and one pontoon. All but the pontoon bridge were burned, and the various corps and divisions then marched west on several roads.

The Union armies pursued with about 76,000 men, as well as their own lengthy wagon trains. Grant's objective was to prevent Lee from uniting his army with Johnston's and then surround and defeat it. His strategy to accomplish this objective was to send the infantry in pursuit while his cavalry rode to get ahead of Lee. Part of the infantry and cavalry followed in Lee's rear, while the remainder marched on parallel roads to the south, keeping between the Confederates and North Carolina.

Lee's army marched some twenty miles on 2–3 April, its progress hampered by swollen watercourses and washed-out bridges that forced changes in the assigned routes of march. By the evening of 3 April, most of the Army of Northern Virginia bivouacked just a few miles short of Amelia Court House.

On bringing his army together at the county seat on 4 April, Lee found to his dismay that a mix-up in communications caused no subsistence to be sent there. Deciding to remain in the area while his army foraged, he allowed Grant to eliminate the one-day lead that he enjoyed. Consequently, hard riding by Sheridan's cavalry, despite the occasional skirmish such as the one at Namozine Church on 3 April, enabled the Federals to move around and get in front of the Confederate army. This allowed them to cut the intended path of Lee's retreat along the railroad at Jetersville, the next station down the line. On 5 April, when the Southerners marched out of Amelia Court House, they found not only Federal cavalry blocking their way, but fast-marching Union infantry arriving in support. Lee, deciding not to bring on a battle then, changed his plans and ordered a night march around the entrenched Union left flank. His destination was Farmville, where his men could find rations at the South Side Railroad depot.

A Federal cavalry raid that day destroyed a Confederate wagon train near Paineville. The engagement was significant as the only documented instance of the war in Virginia in which uniformed black Confederate soldiers saw action. The Federal cavalrymen quickly overwhelmed the inexperienced recruits, however. Returning to Jetersville from their attack, the Union horse soldiers encountered part of Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry corps near Amelia Springs, and the Confederates pursued them back to Jetersville.

On 6 April, the opposing armies fought several significant actions. Riding along roads parallel to those on which Lee's column was moving, Sheridan's cavalry intercepted the Confederate line of march near Little Sailor's (Saylor's) Creek. Custer's troopers drove into a gap that had opened up between Longstreet's and Anderson's corps, blocking two-thirds of the column. With the II and VI Corps closing in from behind, the Confederates had to make a stand. In three separate engagements—at the Hillsman farm, the Lockett farm, and Marshall's Crossroads (the Harper farm)—the Federal infantry and cavalry were able to put 7,700 men hors de combat, mainly as prisoners, almost one-fifth of Lee's army. Eight Confederate generals, including Ewell, were among those captured. Lee, observing the conclusion of the disaster, exclaimed, "My God! Has the army dissolved?" Those who escaped continued on another night march to

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Farmville, on the south bank of the Appomattox River, or crossed to the north bank over High Bridge with Gordon.

Before the action at Little Sailor's Creek, Ord directed a body of infantry and cavalry from the Army of the James to destroy High Bridge so that the Confederates could not use it in their retreat. High Bridge, an enormous South Side Railroad trestle, spanned the Appomattox River about four miles east of Farmville. Confederate cavalry discovered the raid and overtook the Union force near the bridge. In the fight that ensued, most of the Federals were either killed or captured, while Confederate Brig. Gen. James Dearing was mortally wounded. During the night, Gordon and Mahone crossed the bridge and in the morning attempted to burn it as well as the nearby wagon bridge so that the Federals could not follow (the attempt failed). Longstreet's corps marched south of the river to Farmville.

Longstreet, meanwhile, continued his march westward. When he learned that High Bridge, located a few miles north of his route, was threatened, he entrenched at Rice's Station on the South Side Railroad to block the Union advance. That night, while the bridge remained in Confederate hands, Gordon's corps and Mahone's division crossed to an illusory safety. Infantry from Maj. Gen. John Gibbon's XXIV Corps, the advance of Ord's column, approached Longstreet's position. There was heavy skirmishing, but Longstreet held Gibbon at bay long enough to escape.

Arriving in Farmville on the morning of 7 April, the ravenous Confederates found some 40,000 rations of bread and 80,000 of meal aboard the trains at the depot. As rations were being issued, word came that the Federals not only were approaching the town on the south side of the river, but also were pressing Gordon and Mahone on the north side. Lee had no alternative but to entrench his army around Cumberland Church, about three miles north of the town and within sight of the Blue Ridge, to protect his wagon train. Federal attempts to break the Confederate line that afternoon failed but held most of the Southern army at bay until dark. The Confederates were compelled to make their third night march in a row. That evening Grant sent the first of a series of dispatches to Lee requesting the surrender of his army.

From Cumberland Church Lee planned to march his army west to Campbell Court House (Rustburg), just east of Lynchburg. En route, he hoped to resupply his men at Appomattox Station on the South Side Railroad, about three miles southwest of Appomattox Court House. The Confederates faced a thirty-eight-mile march to the station, but south of the river, the route was eight miles shorter and provided an opportunity for the Union armies to get around them.

Lee's army was relatively unmolested on this final day of the march, 8 April, although two Federal corps (II and VI) pursued it north of the river. To the south, with Sheridan's cavalry leading, the V Corps and the Army of the James were taking advantage of the situation they held. Arriving at Appomattox Station ahead of the van of Lee's column, the cavalry captured the supply trains and supplies that awaited the famished Confederates and, later that evening, a portion of the artillery and wagon train. This action placed part of the Union force directly in front of Lee's army gathering around Appomattox Court House. With the Federal infantry behind him and Union cavalry across his line of march, Lee decided to attempt a breakout through the horsemen early the next morning.

At daybreak on 9 April, a combined force of infantry and cavalry under Gordon and Fitzhugh Lee attacked the Federal troopers, forcing them to give ground. As the cavalymen fell back, however, infantry from the Army of the James began arriving on the field in support. It became apparent to Lee that he was

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about to be surrounded, especially when the V Corps appeared on his flank. The Southerners carried forward flags of truce, and that afternoon—Palm Sunday—Lee met with Grant in Wilmer McLean's parlor to discuss and accept surrender terms.

The casualties for the Appomattox Campaign totaled approximately 9,000 for the Federal army and 28,000, including desertions, for the Confederate. Lee surrendered more than 28,000 men at Appomattox, and they were all paroled and allowed to go home. After four years of bloodshed, the fighting in Virginia had ended.

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F. ASSOCIATED PROPERTY TYPES

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: BATTLEFIELD

DESCRIPTION

A battlefield is the area within which combat occurred between Confederate and Union forces. It includes, according to *National Register Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America's Historic Battlefields*, "all of the locations where opposing forces, either before, during, or after the battle, took actions based on their assumption of being in the presence of the enemy." It may or may not contain earthworks, historic roads and fences, buildings used as headquarters or hospitals, historic fields and woodlands, bivouac and camp sites, and archaeological components. It may encompass one continuous area, or it may be divided into several separate areas.

The combat may have occurred entirely or partially on land or on water. It may have involved small units or major portions of armies, and it may be classified as a skirmish, a larger engagement, or a full-scale battle.

Most Virginia Civil War battles were fought in rural areas on open or wooded ground, usually on farms. The size of rural battlefields depends on several factors: the number of troops engaged, the military branches (artillery, cavalry, infantry, navy) involved, the duration of the battle, whether or not the combatants maneuvered or employed flanking tactics, whether the combatants entrenched, and so forth. The typical rural battleground may include the following components: terrain features (hills, lowlands, ravines, etc.); watercourses (rivers, ponds, streams, wetlands, etc.); transportation resources (roads, turnpikes, railroads, etc.); buildings (dwellings, agricultural buildings, churches, depots, etc.); structures (bridges, walls and fences, forts, redoubts, entrenchments, etc.); and miscellaneous elements such as fords, cemeteries, etc. A battlefield may also retain some or all of its historic patterns of fields, pastures, and woods.

Other battles took place as the combatants contended for the possession of towns, cities, and industrial sites. Examples include the engagements at Norfleet House and Hill's Point during the siege of Suffolk in 1863, the battles for Richmond and Petersburg in 1862 and 1864–1865, and the battles for Jonesville and Saltville in 1864. Still other battles, like those at Fredericksburg in 1862 and at Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, in 1863, were unintended; neither army planned to fight at those locations, but unanticipated encounters nonetheless resulted in major engagements. Urban or industrial-site battlefields may include dwellings, industrial and commercial buildings, bridges, dams, walls and fences, and streets, as well as such natural features as watercourses, hills, and lowlands.

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SIGNIFICANCE

A battlefield may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. In the words of *National Register Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America's Historic Battlefields*,

To be significant at the local level, a battle must have been associated with military events important in the history of a town, city, county, cultural area, or region. Battlefields are significant in a statewide context when they are associated with an aspect of military history important to the State as a whole. Battlefields significant in a national context are those associated with a facet of military history that had an important impact on the entire nation.

A battle may be evaluated as significant at the national level because it influenced strategically important military or political decisions, or because it affected the outcome of an important military campaign. For example, the Battle of Ball's Bluff on 21 October 1861, a humiliating Union defeat, is an example of a relatively minor military engagement that attained national importance because of its political consequences. It prompted Congress to create the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, thereby injecting congressional influence into the military arena and further politicizing the military establishment. By enabling certain Republicans to gain power in Congress, the battle and its consequences resonated even into the Reconstruction era. The Battle of Cedar Creek on 19 October 1864, in contrast, was a large-scale battle that effectively ended Confederate influence in the Shenandoah Valley, the "Breadbasket of the Confederacy." This Union victory all but destroyed Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early's command as a fighting force and ultimately enabled Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan to reunite his command with the principal Federal army at Richmond and Petersburg. The battle represents the culmination of the military campaign in the valley and therefore is of national significance.

A battle significant at the state level may be a less significant combat in an important campaign, or one with consequences that were confined to the state in which it occurred. For instance, the Battle of Kelly's Ford in Culpeper County on 17 March 1863 was a large combat involving several cavalry divisions from both sides. It ended in a Confederate defeat, the first of any size in Virginia for Southern cavalry. In addition, it resulted in the death of Maj. John Pelham, an innovative artilleryman much admired by Gen. Robert E. Lee and Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Although it is difficult to measure the implications of his death and of the Confederate defeat, it seems reasonable to conclude that they were something less than of national importance but certainly of more than local significance.

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A battle may be considered significant at the local level because its lasting consequences are more important to the history of a community than to a campaign or the course of the war. Obviously, every battle is important locally even if it is more important nationally, but usually a battle of only local significance will be small in scale, brief in duration, and low in numbers of participants. For example, the Battle of Cove Mountain occurred in Wythe County on 10 May 1864, during a series of Federal cavalry raids. It involved Brig. Gen. William W. Averell's Union cavalry division and Confederate infantry and cavalry under Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones and Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan. The combat lasted four hours, did not involve all of the troops present, resulted in relatively few casualties, and had no long-lasting military effects. Locally, however, the battle is deeply imbedded in the collective memory of the rural residents of Crockett's Cove, as families there nursed the wounded and buried the dead after the engagement. Stories about the battle have been passed down through the generations, and eventually the United Daughters of the Confederacy placed a plaque in the church cemetery to commemorate the event.

The selection of the appropriate level of significance may be difficult. It is suggested, therefore, that the writer of a nomination consult with the State Historic Preservation Office.

Battlefields are most commonly nominated under Criterion A, for their association with the Civil War. They may be nominated under other criteria—usually in addition to Criterion A—as well. A battlefield may be nominated under Criterion B for its association with an important person, under Criterion C if it includes significant architectural components, or under Criterion D if it contains important archaeological resources.

Criterion A

Battlefields may be significant under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865. As one of the major theaters of operations in the East, the Commonwealth was the location of more important battles than any other state. According to the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission's *Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields* (1993), "some 10,500 armed conflicts occurred during the Civil War . . . ; 384 (3.7 percent) were identified as the principal battles." Of them, 123 were located in Virginia; Tennessee, the state with the next highest number, had 38. Besides these major battles, most of which were significant on the national level because of their strategic consequences, many other battles and engagements may be significant under Criterion A for their statewide or local importance.

Examples of battlefields listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion A (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Appomattox Court House National Historical Park (Appomattox Co.); Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery (Loudoun Co.); Bristoe Station Battlefield (DOE, Prince William Co.); Cedar Creek Battlefield and Belle Grove (Frederick and Warren Cos.); Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Cool Spring

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Battlefield (Clarke Co.); Cumberland Gap National Historic Park (Lee Co.); Dam No. 1 Battlefield Site (Newport News); Five Forks Battlefield (Dinwiddie Co.); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); Freestone Point Battery (Prince William Co.); Manassas National Battlefield Park (Fairfax and Prince William Cos.); New Market Battlefield Park (Shenandoah Co.); Petersburg National Military Park (Dinwiddie Co., Prince George Co., and Petersburg); Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.); and Saylor's Creek Battlefield (Amelia and Prince Edward Cos.).

Criterion B

Battlefields may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted soldiers or civilians whose actions directly influenced the outcomes of battles or campaigns or advanced military science, or who are significant in their own right. For example, Appomattox Court House National Historical Park is listed under Criterion B for its association with Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. Robert E. Lee. Nominations under this criterion are rare, however, since many persons usually can be credited for military victories or scientific advancement. The significance of most noted soldiers and civilians will be based on their entire careers rather than on one battle or other historic event.

Examples of battlefields listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion B (or a similar area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include Appomattox Court House National Historical Park (Appomattox Co.), and Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.).

Criterion C

Battlefields may be significant under Criterion C because they contain elements of architectural importance. Typically, these may include fortifications and earthworks, such as Fort Pocahontas at the Wilson's Wharf battlefield in Charles City County. Structures nominated under this criterion must be notable examples of military engineering and their features must retain sufficient integrity to illustrate their purposes and uses.

Examples of battlefields listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion C (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Appomattox Court House National Historical Park (Appomattox Co.); Cedar Creek Battlefield and Belle Grove (Frederick and Warren Cos.); Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

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Criterion D

Battlefields may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of military events based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments, the types of ammunition used, and information about living conditions, personal possessions, encampments, burials, supplies, areas of heaviest fighting, tactics, and strategy.

Examples of battlefields listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion D (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Battlefields may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. Most battles in Virginia were fought along major transportation routes, and today development along those same routes threatens the integrity of the battlefields as once-rural areas are engulfed by urban sprawl, industrialization, and scattered residential communities.

To be eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, a battlefield must retain the majority of its historic landscape or other relevant components. The battle, for instance, must still be “readable” or understandable without mentally subtracting subdivisions, shopping malls, and similarly overwhelming intrusions from the core, or most important areas, of the battleground. Likewise, contributing structures, buildings, and archaeological sites must retain sufficient integrity to be eligible.

Most battlefields will contain some noncontributing properties. Their effect on the integrity of the battlefield will depend not only on their number but on their nature, location, and size, as well as the size and topography of the battlefield. For example, if the noncontributing element reflects a continuing later development of traditional land use (such as modern farm buildings on an antebellum farmstead), then the effect will be less than that of noncontributing structures reflecting nontraditional uses (such as a bowling alley on a historic farm).

The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible battlefields, structures and buildings, and sites.

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1. **Location:** The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A battlefield or contributing building, structure, or site retains integrity of location if it is the place where the historic battle or event took place, or where the structure, building, or site was located.
2. **Association:** The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A battlefield or contributing building or site retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the event and the place to the observer. The physical features of the terrain or structure contemporary with the event must not have been obliterated.
3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. A battlefield retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment that existed at the time of the battle or engagement are largely intact. Such features may include natural elements such as hills, ridges, ravines, and watercourses, and manmade elements such as roadways, rail beds, fence lines, wood lots, fields, and pastures. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity. The grading and leveling of a tactically important hill, for instance, may be of greater concern than the widening of a road or the growth of trees in former fields. If the resource is a contributing building or structure, then the character of its setting is also important in assessing integrity.
4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A battlefield retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive and intrusive alterations to the setting of a battlefield will also adversely affect its integrity of feeling, regardless of their reversibility. Such alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of a contributing building, structure, or site will have a similar effect.
5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. Integrity of design may be more relevant to a contributing building, structure, or site than a battlefield, unless manmade features played a tactical role in the engagement. For example, if sunken roads, railroad cuts or embankments, or the arrangement of buildings on a farmstead or in an urban setting were essential to the execution and outcome of a battle, then their modern-day presence or absence may affect the integrity of the battleground.
6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. Integrity of materials is more relevant to a contributing building or structure than to a battlefield, where time and weather likely will have obliterated them. The presence of a historic stone wall bordering a field, for instance, would be a remarkable rather than an expected survival.
7. **Workmanship:** The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. Integrity of workmanship is more relevant to a contributing building or structure than to a battlefield.

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NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: EARTHWORKS

DESCRIPTION

Most of the earthworks constructed in Virginia during the Civil War—with notable exceptions—were built in 1864 and 1865, when the mode of warfare shifted from active to static. Earlier, some earthworks were carefully planned and constructed to protect towns and cities such as Winchester, Suffolk, and Richmond, and throughout the war, soldiers under fire threw field works together using earth and fence rails or logs. Later earthworks often were elaborate, highly engineered structures designed for the siege warfare conducted around Richmond and Petersburg during the last two years of the conflict. Such works frequently were several lines deep, with traversing trenches to shelter troops en route to and from the front, “bombproofs” to protect munitions, and other features not found in impromptu field works.

Many types of earthworks were constructed during the war to fulfill various functions. Often several types were incorporated into a section of earthworks, particularly if the soldiers remained stationary for a period of time. The following list of types is meant to be representative, not definitive:

- Entrenchment or trench. The most common type, usually consisted of a ditch and a breastworks or parapet made of earth from the ditch as well as any handy stones, logs, or fence rails. Throughout the war, soldiers often constructed such earthworks before or during a battle for temporary protection.
2. Fort. A large, enclosed, permanent work that frequently incorporated many types of earthworks, including batteries or redoubts, entrenchments, etc. Forts usually were constructed to guard important approaches to towns and cities.
 3. Lunette. An earthwork similar in design and function to a redan, but with two flanking works extending rearward from each wing for additional protection.
 4. Redoubt. A many-sided extension of other earthworks, or a detached defensive work (often square) supporting a main fort or fortified line. Redoubts were large structures (but smaller than forts) that usually housed artillery, and were thus sometimes referred to as batteries. They were intended to function semi-independently of the main defensive line.
 5. Redan. Earthworks hastily constructed in front of a cannon to protect the crew and the gun. A redan usually was in the shape of a V pointed toward the enemy.

SIGNIFICANCE

Earthworks may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history, engineering, and historical archaeology.

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Criterion A

Earthworks may be significant under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865. Frequently, earthworks are the only tangible above-ground evidence that a battle occurred. They serve to illustrate the strategy and tactics utilized by the combatants during the war, as well as the engineering skill of their (usually unknown) designers and builders. Earthworks may be significant at the local, statewide, or national level.

Examples of earthworks listed on the National Register of Historic Places individually or as a component of a battlefield under Criterion A (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Cannon Branch Fort (Manassas); Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Cumberland Gap National Historic Park (Lee Co.); Dam No. 1 Battlefield Site (Newport News); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fort Ward (Alexandria); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); Freestone Point Battery (Prince William Co.); Petersburg National Military Park (Dinwiddie Co., Prince George Co., and Petersburg); Mayfield Fortification (Prince William Co.); Mitchell's Ford Entrenchment (Prince William Co.); Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.); and Spotsylvania Court House Historic District (Spotsylvania Co.).

Criterion B

Earthworks may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted soldiers or military engineers. Nominations under this criterion will be rare, however, since most notable persons are either associated with the overall battle, or because the name of the works' designer is unknown.

No earthworks are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

An earthwork may be significant under Criterion C for its architectural importance as a notable and intact example of military engineering, or a rare or unusual example, of a specific type. Fort Pocahontas, located on the Wilson's Wharf battlefield in Charles City County, is such an earthwork. Protected from the elements by the vegetation that covered it when the field was abandoned after the war, the fort contains traces of features, such as firing platforms for the infantry, that rarely survive. It was recently registered under Criterion C.

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Examples of earthworks listed on the National Register of Historic Places individually or as a component of a battlefield under Criterion C (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fort Riverview (Amherst Co.); Fort Ward (Alexandria); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

Criterion D

Earthworks may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of military events based on archaeological remains. Although earthworks may be nominated under Criterion C regardless of their archaeological potential, if investigations reveal significant artifacts, then such sites may also be eligible under Criterion D. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments, the types of ammunition used, and the frequency with which units were rotated into and out of the earthworks, as well as information about living conditions, personal possessions, encampments, burials, supplies, areas of heaviest fighting, tactics, and strategy.

Examples of earthworks listed on the National Register of Historic Places individually or as a component of a battlefield under Criterion D (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Cannon Branch Fort (Manassas); Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas (Charles City Co.); Fort Riverview (Amherst Co.); Fort Ward (Alexandria); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); Mayfield Fortification (Prince William Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Earthworks may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible earthworks.

- Location: The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. An earthwork retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was constructed and used.
2. Association: The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. An earthwork retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the earthwork and the purpose for which it was built.

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3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. An earthwork retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time of its construction are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity.
4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. An earthwork retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of an earthwork will affect its integrity of feeling.
5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. An earthwork will retain integrity of design if substantial above-ground structural remains exist, or if its original design can be discerned through archaeological study.
6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. An earthwork may retain integrity of materials either above or below the surface.
7. **Workmanship:** The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. An earthwork will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its original design and construction techniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: CAMPSITE

DESCRIPTION

A campsite may be defined as a place occupied by troops for a short time, as a bivouac during a campaign, or for a long time, as an encampment for winter quarters or for training and resupply. During the Civil War, most campsites were located in rural areas but some were adjacent to towns or cities. Campsites range in size from very small (for a picket post or regimental bivouac) to very large (the encampment of the Army of the Potomac during the winter of 1863–1864 occupied most of Culpeper County). Likewise, the effect of a campsite on the landscape will range from negligible, for a bivouac, to considerable, for a winter encampment. Features found at long-term campsites may include the remains of hut sites, earthworks, and other structures. Historic resources at short-term campsites typically include below-ground features such as soldiers' personal possessions, military weapons and supplies, and evidence of campfires. Most campsites of lengthy duration were laid out and constructed according to military designs.

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SIGNIFICANCE

Campsites may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, or D for significance in the areas of military history and historical archaeology.

Criterion A

Campsites may be significant under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865. They will usually be significant for their role in the military history of the war as bivouacs, training and resupply centers, winter quarters, and the like.

An example of a campsite eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion A is the Hansborough Ridge Winter Encampment District (DOE, Culpeper Co.). This 1863–1864 encampment of the Army of the Potomac is of national significance for several reasons. During the winter, foreign-born soldiers, particularly Germans, entered the army in large numbers and complicated the training process. The successful training and drilling program undertaken during the encampment forged the army that finally defeated the Confederates in Virginia. Perhaps most importantly, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant joined the Army of the Potomac there, having chosen to accompany Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's army as commander of all Federal land forces.

Criterion B

A campsite may be significant under Criterion B for its association with important military figures or civilians who are associated with the site. Nominations under this criterion will be rare, however, since individuals tend to be significant for their overall contributions to military science, a campaign, or a battle rather than to an encampment.

No campsites are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

A campsite may be significant under Criterion C if sufficient resources remain above ground to convey its use and significance. Nominations under this criterion will be rare, however, since most camp structures tended to be constructed for temporary use.

No campsites are currently registered under Criterion C.

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Criterion D

Campsites may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of the history of the site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the layout and organization of the campsite, the identity of divisions and regiments, and the types of ammunition used, as well as information about living conditions, personal possessions, burials, military supplies, tactics, and strategy.

Examples of campsites listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion D include Hansborough Ridge Winter Encampment District (DOE, Culpeper Co.) and Louisiana Brigade Winter Camp (Prince William Co.).

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Campsites may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. They should be largely intact, and should retain most of their historic landscape elements to be eligible. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible campsites.

1. **Location:** The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A campsite retains integrity of location if it is the place where the historic encampment was located.
2. **Association:** The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A campsite retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the site and the camp that once stood there.
3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. A campsite retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time it existed are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity. The continuance of traditional land uses help preserve the integrity of the site.
4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A campsite retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the site will affect its integrity of feeling.
5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. A long-term campsite will retain integrity of design if substantial above-ground structural remains exist, or if its original design can be discerned through archaeological study.
6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. A long-term campsite may retain integrity of materials either above or below the surface.

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7. Workmanship: The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A long-term campsite will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its original design and construction techniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: MILITARY HOSPITALS

DESCRIPTION

Military hospitals of short- or long-term duration were established on or near battlefields and in urban areas in Virginia during the Civil War. The short-term hospitals usually were established in tents or in existing buildings such as dwellings, churches, and barns to treat the wounded men gathered there from the nearby battlefield. Long-term hospitals typically were established in cities and towns to care for wounded and sick soldiers who required extensive care and convalescence. These facilities occasionally utilized existing hospitals (more frequently, warehouses and other large buildings), but specially made buildings were also constructed as at Chimborazo and Winder hospitals in Richmond. Typically, such hospital buildings were frame, gable-ended, one-story structures designed and laid out according to military specifications.

SIGNIFICANCE

Military hospitals may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history, health and medicine, and historical archaeology. Military hospitals were important for the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers, and for their convalescence. Many thousands of soldiers and sailors survived the war because of the care they received in military hospitals.

Criterion A

Military hospitals may be significant at the local, statewide, or national level under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. They were essential to the welfare of both armies for sustaining their manpower, for providing immediate care after a battle, and for minimizing deaths from disease and combat.

No military hospitals are currently registered under Criterion A.

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Criterion B

Military hospitals may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted physicians or nurses or others important to the military history of the hospital. Nominations under this criterion would be rare because of the transitory nature of the hospitals and because the evaluation of important persons are based more on their overall careers than on their activities at a specific place.

No military hospitals are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

Military hospitals may be significant under Criterion C for their architectural importance as notable and intact examples of hospital architecture. Nominations under this criterion would be rare because few Civil War-era hospitals built for that purpose still exist.

No military hospitals are currently registered under Criterion C.

Criterion D

Military hospitals may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of a site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments, the types of ammunition used, and the availability of medical supplies and surgical instruments, as well as information about the layout or design of hospital complexes, living conditions, personal possessions of patients and staff members, and burials.

No military hospitals are currently registered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Military hospitals may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible military hospitals.

1. **Location:** The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A military hospital retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was used or constructed for that purpose.
2. **Association:** The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A military hospital retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the hospital and the purpose for which it was built.

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3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. A military hospital retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time of its construction or use are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity.
 4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A military hospital retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of a hospital will affect its integrity of feeling.
 5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. A military hospital will retain integrity of design if it possesses a majority of its Civil War-era form, plan, and architectural style.
 6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. A military hospital will retain integrity of materials if it possesses the majority of original features such as exterior walls, fenestration, and porches.
 7. **Workmanship:** The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A military hospital will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its craftsmanship and construction techniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

DESCRIPTION

Military headquarters of short- or long-term duration were established on or near battlefields and in urban areas in Virginia during the Civil War. They were occupied by the commanding generals of armies and their staffs. They usually were established in tents, in dwellings, or in the yards of dwellings near battlefields, earthworks, and campsites. They were occupied for a short time, as during a battle, or for several months, as during a winter encampment or a siege. Long-term headquarters complexes, like long-term campsites, were laid out according to military specifications.

SIGNIFICANCE

Military headquarters may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history and historical archaeology. Headquarters were essential to the conduct of a battle, being the communication and command centers of armies to which intelligence was reported and from which orders were issued.

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Criterion A

Military headquarters may be significant at the local, statewide, or national level under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865. They constituted the centers from which battles were planned and controlled by army commanders.

No military headquarters are currently registered under Criterion A.

Criterion B

Military headquarters may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted army commanders. Nominations under this criterion may be among the most common because of the role of headquarters as communications and control centers under the authority of commanding generals during battles, campaigns, and encampments.

No military headquarters are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

Military headquarters may be significant under Criterion C for their architectural importance as notable and intact examples of architecture. Nominations under this criterion would be rare because few if any Civil War-era headquarters built for that purpose still exist.

No military headquarters are currently registered under Criterion C.

Criterion D

Military headquarters may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of a site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of headquarters guard units and the types of arms and ammunition used, as well as information about the layout or design of the headquarters, the life of the commanding officers, the living conditions of the staff, and the personal possessions of the occupants.

No military headquarters are currently registered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Military headquarters may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible headquarters.

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1. **Location:** The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A military headquarters retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was used or constructed for that purpose.
2. **Association:** The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A military headquarters retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the headquarters and the purpose for which it was built and used.
3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. A military headquarters retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time of its construction or use are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity.
4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A military headquarters retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of a headquarters will affect its integrity of feeling.
5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. A military headquarters will retain integrity of design if it possesses a majority of its Civil War-era form, plan, and architectural style.
6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. A military headquarters will retain integrity of materials if it possesses the majority of original features such as exterior walls, fenestration, and porches.
7. **Workmanship:** The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A military headquarters will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its craftsmanship and construction techniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: MILITARY PRISONS

DESCRIPTION

Military prisons or prisoner-of-war camps were established near battlefields and in urban areas in Virginia during the Civil War. The prisons were usually established in confined natural areas such as ravines or islands, in warehouses, or in other large buildings such as tobacco factories. The prisons may have been occupied for a short time immediately after a battle, or for several months or years, to be emptied periodically by prisoner exchanges or the transfer of captives to new prison sites. Prisons established in natural areas were laid out according to military specifications like long-term campsites.

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SIGNIFICANCE

Military prisons may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history and historical archaeology. Tens of thousands of prisoners captured during battles in Virginia were confined in prisons or prisoner-of-war camps ranging from restricted natural areas such as bowls or ravines or islands to warehouses and other large buildings in urban environments. Although early in the war prisoners were typically paroled or exchanged, by 1863 these policies were terminated, thus requiring each side to devote manpower to confine, shelter, feed, and care for many thousands of men, great numbers of whom suffered from wounds, illness, or malnutrition. The prisons, most of which provided substandard living conditions, played a major role in wartime and postwar propaganda, and fostered the continuation of bad feelings on both sides.

Criterion A

Military prisons may be significant at the under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865. Prisons eligible under this criterion will be significant for the role they played in confining prisoners and in requiring the capturing power to staff the prisons and care for the prisoners.

Belle Isle (Richmond) is an example of a military prison registered under Criterion A.

Criterion B

Military prisons may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted prisoners or camp commanders. Nominations under this criterion will be rare because an important person's overall career is usually of greater significance than the portion of it associated with a prison.

No military prisons are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

Military prisons may be significant under Criterion C for their architectural importance as notable and intact examples of architecture. Nominations under this criterion would be rare because few if any Civil War-era prisons or prison buildings constructed for that purpose still exist.

No military prisons are currently registered under Criterion C.

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Criterion D

Military prisons may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of a site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of prison guard units and the types of arms and ammunition they used, as well as information about the layout or design of the prison, the living conditions of the prisoners and guards, and their personal possessions.

No military prisons are currently registered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Military prisons may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible prisons.

1. **Location:** The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A military prison retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was used or constructed for that purpose.
2. **Association:** The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A military prison retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the prison and the purpose for which it was built and used.
3. **Setting:** The physical environment of a historic property. A military prison retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time of its construction or use are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessing integrity.
4. **Feeling:** A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A military prison retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of a prison will affect its integrity of feeling.
5. **Design:** The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. A military prison will retain integrity of design if it possesses a majority of its Civil War-era form, plan, and architectural style.
6. **Materials:** The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. A military prison will retain integrity of materials if it possesses the majority of original architectural features in the case of a building, or if original materials survive below ground in the case of an archaeological site.

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7. **Workmanship:** The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A long-term military prison will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its craftsmanship and construction techniques are still discernable.

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G. GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

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H. SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS

The multiple property documentation form for the historic and archaeological resources related to the Civil War in Virginia, 1861–1865, is based on the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study conducted between 1991 and 1993. The commission produced the *Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields* (1993), which prioritized the battlegrounds according to historical significance, threats, and preservation possibilities. Supporting the report is a vast quantity of primary- and secondary-source research, field work, battlefield assessments, and maps. Copies of the materials that relate to Virginia battlefields are maintained in the state historic preservation office, the Virginia Department of Historic Resources.

The form is also based on additional research by the preparer. In 1995, the Department entered into an agreement with the National Park Service to write a guidebook to Virginia's Civil War battlefields using the sources compiled in the course of the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study. The first draft of the guidebook has been completed, reviewed by National Park Service historians, and corrected; it employed not only the material compiled during the study but the most authoritative secondary sources on individual battles as well. These books, written by respected Civil War historians (several of whom are employed by the National Park Service), are listed in Section I: Major Bibliographical References.

The preparer of this form assisted with the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study and wrote the above-mentioned guidebook to Virginia Civil War battlefields. He also consulted nominations of Civil War-related resources to the National Register of Historic Places on file at the Department in the preparation of this form. The historic context, the selection and descriptions of resources, the analyses of relevant criteria, and the registration requirements are based on his familiarity with Civil War-related resources in Virginia from more than ten years of involvement with the subject. The significant property types—battlefields, earthworks, campsites, and military headquarters, hospitals, and prisons—were observed by him in the course of research and field work. Several Civil War-related resources already have been listed on the National Register of Historic Places. With the exception of the battlefields that were the subject of the commission study, however, these resources have not been systematically surveyed throughout the Commonwealth.

According to the commission report, "some 10,500 armed conflicts occurred during the Civil War . . . ; 384 (3.7 percent) were identified as the principal battles." Of them, 123 were located in Virginia; Tennessee, the state with the next highest number, had 38. Most of the Virginia battlefields mentioned in the commission report are of national significance, but there are many more not mentioned that are of local or statewide significance. Likewise, many related resources, including earthworks, campsites, and military headquarters, hospitals, and prisons, are eligible for registration under one or more criteria at the national,

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state, or local level of importance. The purpose of this multiple property documentation form is to make it easier to register these threatened and irreplaceable treasures as they are identified and evaluated.

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